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3 The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
Conclusions
Introduction
1. This report focuses on the Government’s negotiating objectives and not on the 
potential benefits and opportunities that arise from the United Kingdom leaving 
the European Union. (Paragraph 8)
2. We welcome the Government’s decision to publish a White Paper in response to a 
recommendation in our First Report. This document has provided some further 
detail on the Government’s negotiating objectives. However, as the Secretary of 
State has indicated, “this is likely to be the most complicated negotiation of modern 
times” and its outcome is far from certain. (Paragraph 9)
Certainty and clarity
3. We will examine the Government’s plans for converting the acquis into domestic 
law by taking evidence on the “Great Repeal Bill” White Paper when it is published. 
This will be a complex task for both the Government and Parliament and will need 
appropriate resource and time to be allocated. We intend to invite Ministers from 
departments other than the Department for Exiting the European Union to give 
evidence. We note that the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs has acknowledged the scale of the technical challenge ahead. The importance 
and complexity of ensuring legal certainty in the UK on the day after Brexit must 
not be underestimated. (Paragraph 17)
4. The “Great Repeal Bill” is expected to entail the delegation of very significant 
powers to Ministers, whether of the UK or devolved governments, to bring forward 
legislation to ensure that the body of EU law being transposed into domestic law 
both fits the UK’s legal framework and keeps pace with the UK’s negotiations on its 
exit deal and its future relationship with the EU. In our scrutiny of the Bill, while 
understanding the pressure facing Ministers, we will want to be confident that the 
delegation of powers is sufficient only for the limited job required and does not 
become a means of passing significant new legislation without the higher level of 
scrutiny that primary legislation requires. (Paragraph 22)
5. A major justification for Brexit was to enhance Parliamentary sovereignty. Leaving 
the European Union should not therefore result in a shift in power from Parliament 
to the Executive. The Committee believes it is essential that Parliament plays a full 
role in all Brexit-related legislation including the “Great Repeal Bill”. (Paragraph 23)
6. Once the European Communities Act 1972 is repealed, UK courts will no longer be 
bound by decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, 
the extent to which UK courts continue to take account of CJEU case law remains 
to be decided (Paragraph 30)
7. We welcome the Secretary of State’s assurance that Parliament will have a vote 
on any final deal reached under Article 50 and any agreement on the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU before the European Parliament votes on it, but we also 
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believe that Parliament must have a vote in the event that there is ‘no deal’. Leaving 
the EU without a future trade deal and in doing so defaulting to World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules is no less an important decision for the UK’s economic 
future than the terms of any future Free Trade Agreement between the UK and the 
EU. It is therefore essential that such a step is not taken without Parliament having 
a vote on the matter. (Paragraph 33)
8. Ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU over the UK is one of the Prime Minister’s “red 
lines” in negotiations. The European Communities Act 1972, which the Government 
is planning to repeal, provides that rulings of the CJEU are binding on UK courts. 
Whilst the UK is likely to move away from the jurisdiction of the CJEU on exiting 
the EU, the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU may entail continuing 
regulatory conformity in certain areas, such as certain product standards or data 
protection. Where regulatory conformity provides the basis of the continuing 
relationship, this may necessitate agreeing dispute resolution procedures, in trade 
and other areas, which require continuing account to be taken by UK courts of 
CJEU case law, just as in any similar agreement with another country the UK courts 
would take account of the other country’s rulings. (Paragraph 41)
A stronger Britain
9. The Government says that it wants the deal between the UK and the EU to work for 
the whole of the UK, and that it will be developed with the full engagement of the 
devolved administrations. There are clearly significant differences in the negotiating 
priorities of the different parts of the UK. If the future deal is to be acceptable to the 
whole of the UK, then these differences will need to be discussed, negotiated and 
common ground agreed upon. Differing priorities reflect, in part, differences in the 
economies and demography of different parts of the UK. The Government must 
ensure that it understands these differences and takes them into account when it 
begins its negotiations with the EU. (Paragraph 70)
10. We recommend that the UK Government respond formally to the Welsh, Scottish 
and Northern Ireland legislatures regarding each of their options papers. It must 
do so as a matter of urgency given that negotiations to leave the EU will start 
imminently. (Paragraph 71)
11. The legislation required to implement the UK’s exit from the EU will affect the 
competences of the devolved administrations and it is expected that it will require 
their legislative consent. We note the Supreme Court’s statement that “the Sewel 
Convention has an important role in facilitating harmonious relationships between 
the UK and devolved legislatures.” The devolved administrations will require 
adequate time to conduct the appropriate scrutiny and consultation required before 
consent can be given. It is likely that the devolved administrations will need to pass 
their own additional legislation, in turn requiring time for proper consideration 
in the devolved legislatures. The Government will need to take account of the 
timescales of the devolved legislatures in its planning. (Paragraph 72)
12. The repatriation of EU powers to the UK raises questions about how the framework 
for devolved policy areas will evolve. The Welsh and Scottish governments are 
clear that any future UK framework for devolved policies should be a matter 
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for consultation and intergovernmental negotiations. Notwithstanding the 
Government’s commitment that “no decisions currently taken by the devolved 
administrations will be removed from them”, the devolved administrations will 
be looking to ensure that legislative competences which are currently held by the 
EU which relate to matters which have been devolved are repatriated as devolved 
competences. (Paragraph 73)
13. The Government has established a Joint Ministerial Committee for EU Negotiations 
(JMC (EN)) for consulting the devolved administrations on their priorities for 
Brexit and it aims to use this forum to agree a UK approach to, and objectives for, 
negotiations, and to consider proposals put forward by the devolved administrations. 
The evidence we heard indicated that these meetings have not been effective from 
the point of view of the devolved administrations. The Government must establish 
a more effective process for engaging the devolved administrations in developing 
the UK’s negotiating position. If the Government’s asserted wish to fully engage 
the devolved administrations is to be credible, it must share more information and 
discuss options before decisions are reached. A successful exit from the EU will be 
measured not just in terms of achieving a good deal with the EU but also whether it 
“works for the whole of the UK”. (Paragraph 74)
14. We welcome the UK Government’s recognition of Gibraltar’s specific concerns, 
expressed in the White Paper and through the establishment of the Joint Ministerial 
Council (Gibraltar EU Negotiations). We were encouraged by the Chief Minister’s 
confidence that Gibraltar’s views were being heard and that the UK Government 
would find solutions to the challenges that leaving the EU presents for Gibraltar. 
This will be very important to avoid any damaging consequences for Gibraltar. We 
encourage the UK Government to maintain a high level of dialogue and engagement 
with the Government of Gibraltar throughout the Article 50 negotiation process. 
(Paragraph 83)
15. The UK and Irish economies are deeply integrated and mutually important. 
Disruption to the Irish economy would not only be damaging for Ireland itself, but 
would have consequential effects on the economy in Northern Ireland and the rest 
of the UK. Were the UK to exit the EU without a deal on tariff-free trade, the impact 
on the agri-food industry on both sides of the border in Ireland would be extremely 
serious and damaging. (Paragraph 109)
16. The UK has deep and close historical, economic and cultural ties with the Republic of 
Ireland. The Government has a responsibility to consider how its future relationship 
with the EU will affect both Northern Ireland and the Republic. Politicians and 
businesses we met in Dublin were concerned about the UK’s future trading 
relationship with Ireland and the impact on trade of the re-introduction of customs 
checks on cross-border trade. Maintaining freedom of movement throughout the 
island of Ireland and the wider UK is also extremely important, both for many 
businesses and for many UK and Irish citizens. The border between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic will become one of the EU’s external borders when the UK 
leaves the EU. Ensuring that this change does not disrupt flows of trade and people 
will be a complex challenge. (Paragraph 110)
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17. Cross-border cooperation in combating crime is highly valued by both the UK and 
Irish Governments. With goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to work out a 
way of ensuring that this cooperation can continue. However, the Irish Government 
does not see this as a straightforward task and some arrangement would need to be 
reached to ensure that cooperation can continue the day after the UK leaves the EU 
even if no permanent deal had yet been reached. (Paragraph 111)
18. It is important to ensure that in implementing Brexit everything is done to maintain 
and build upon the considerable progress made as a result of the peace process. 
The Good Friday Agreement was not just a single event but was a critical step in 
the normalisation of social and economic relations over a period of time. Many in 
Ireland are deeply concerned that the introduction of new and visible border check 
points would provide an opportunity and focal point for those who wish to disrupt 
the peace and feed a sense in some communities that the Good Friday Agreement 
was being undermined. Irish politicians welcome the Government’s aspiration of 
maintaining a seamless border, but, at present, do not understand how this can be 
achieved in practice, given the obligations which Ireland will have as an EU Member 
State bordering a third country. With the goodwill that currently exists on both sides 
of the border, we hope that a mutually acceptable solution can be found. This must 
be at the top of the list of the Government’s negotiating objectives. (Paragraph 112)
A fairer Britain
19. We agree with the Secretary of State that immigration from the EU has made 
an important contribution to many sectors of the economy in different parts of 
the country and that, while reducing net migration remains an objective of the 
Government, this should not be done in a way that damages the economy. The 
Government’s objective is to secure control of EU migration and this may not entail 
reducing numbers. Future policy will be an important element in the forthcoming 
negotiations, given the linkage frequently made between ‘free movement’ and 
access to the Single Market. We look forward to scrutinising the proposals once the 
Immigration Bill has been published. (Paragraph 122)
20. We urge the Department for Exiting the EU to continue to make the argument in 
Government that the future system for EU migration needs to be flexible enough 
to meet the needs of the economy across the UK. This includes a broad range of 
different sectors, both high and low skilled, including scientists, bankers, vets, 
care workers, health service professionals and seasonal agriculture workers. That 
flexibility should include considering whether immigration should be managed on a 
geographic basis. We also note with concern the tendency of some employers to rely 
on importing skilled labour from abroad rather than training up UK employees. 
(Paragraph 123)
21. The status of EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals living elsewhere in the EU 
cannot be left unresolved until the end of the two-year period for negotiations. We 
reiterate the conclusion of our earlier Report that it would be unconscionable for the 
more than four million people in these groups to find themselves living in a state 
of uncertainty about their futures until negotiations are complete, and, therefore, 
that the Government “should now make a unilateral decision to safeguard the 
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rights of EU nationals living in the UK”. We note that, to date, Ministers have not 
taken this step. The debate around whether “no deal is better than a bad deal” has 
focussed on the trade aspects of the future relationship. If the negotiations were to 
end prematurely without an agreement on the rights for the four million, this could 
put them in an uncertain position. (Paragraph 130)
22. We recommend that an agreement between the UK and EU27 is reached as a matter 
of priority once negotiations formally start. That agreement should be concluded as 
a stand-alone and separate deal which is otherwise not dependent on any other exit 
or future trade deal being agreed to between the parties. (Paragraph 131)
23. We welcome the intention of both the Secretary of State and Michel Barnier, the 
European Commission’s Chief Negotiator for Brexit, to meet representatives from 
the EU nationals in the UK and the UK nationals who are resident across Europe in 
advance of the negotiations. This is an important development and we hope it is a 
positive step towards an early resolution of the uncertainty and anxiety of the four 
million across Europe. (Paragraph 132)
24. Notwithstanding the Government’s commitment to maintain protections for 
workers after the UK leaves the EU, it is likely that levels of protection for workers 
will diverge in future. Although regulations will be aligned on the day that the 
UK leaves the EU, thereafter, regulatory power will return to the UK. We note 
the General Secretary of the TUC’s concern that the UK should not become the 
“bargain basement” of Europe in this respect and therefore welcome the Secretary of 
State’s commitment that the Government has no intention of looking to undermine 
workers’ rights. (Paragraph 138)
A truly global Britain
25. In approaching the negotiations, the Government needs to recognise the strength 
of the view in the EU27 that, as Michel Barnier has emphasised, the ‘four freedoms 
are indivisible’. (Paragraph 169)
26. The Government should seek a UK–EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which covers 
both goods and services and retains the mutual recognition of standards and 
conformity assessments. The Government should also seek to maintain the right 
of establishment and mutual recognition of qualifications in a UK–EU FTA. The 
Government should maintain the maximum possible flexibility in its negotiating 
approach to achieve these outcomes. (Paragraph 170)
27. Notwithstanding the Government’s plans to enshrine EU law into domestic law 
through the “Great Repeal Bill”, over time the two bodies of law may diverge as the 
Government seeks to change or repeal regulations. The Government should provide 
clarity on how it will address divergence in rules and standards and disputes that 
may arise as a result, outside of the jurisdiction of the CJEU. (Paragraph 171)
28. London is a pre-eminent global financial centre and the financial services industry 
supports a large number of jobs in London and even more across the rest of the UK. 
It is in both the UK’s and the EU’s interests to ensure there is minimal disruption to 
financial services when the UK leaves the EU. As part of negotiations on a UK–EU 
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FTA, the Government should seek to secure stable and predictable equivalence 
arrangements or a bespoke system comparable to the EU system of “passporting” 
which will ensure the stability of cross-border financial services between the UK 
and the EU. (Paragraph 177)
29. Financial and professional services will require time to adjust to any new 
trading arrangements. The Government should seek to agree a phased process of 
implementation for the sector early in the negotiations to provide certainty for 
businesses in preparing for Brexit. (Paragraph 178)
30. The digital industry is an increasingly important sector to the UK economy and 
relies on the stability of data flows across UK and EU borders. The Government 
must seek to maintain uninterrupted UK–EU data flows by securing a data adequacy 
agreement with the EU before the end of the Article 50 negotiations. (Paragraph 182)
31. The broadcasting industry, like many aspects of the UK creative industries, is a 
success story. International broadcasters base themselves in the UK to broadcast 
across the EU and the Audio Visual Media Services Directive enables broadcasters 
in one Member State to do so if they have a licence from the domestic regulator—
Ofcom in the UK—and comply with the regulatory requirements in that Member 
State. This has helped the UK to become Europe’s leading broadcasting hub. In the 
event of an exit without alternative arrangements in place, international broadcasters 
could fall back on the Council of Europe’s Convention on Transfrontier Television 
(CTT), however, it is an inadequate replacement: on-demand broadcasting is not 
covered, six Member States are not signatories, and it cannot be effectively enforced. 
International broadcasters could seek to access the EU market through subsidiaries, 
but this would require them to relocate a significant proportion of their workforce 
to the EU and for most of their editorial decisions to be made there. Neither of these 
options are attractive to the sector. The Government must therefore ensure that a 
future FTA between the UK and the EU retains the ability of broadcasters based 
in the UK to continue to operate across the Single Market to the same extent once 
the UK is no longer a Member State. Securing continued access to this market is a 
priority. (Paragraph 186)
32. In seeking to negotiate its own preferential trade agreements with non-EU 
countries, the Government has said that it will not continue to observe the 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and Common External Tariff (CET) of the EU 
customs union. However, it will seek to negotiate a new customs arrangement with 
the EU to minimise the “frictions” in cross-border trade between the UK and the 
EU27. The Government has been vague as to the characteristics of such a customs 
arrangement. The Government must provide more clarity as to the features of its 
preferred customs arrangement with the EU and how it will differ from a customs 
union. (Paragraph 198)
33. There is, however, a risk that, on trade, the EU27 will decline to allow the UK to 
both leave the CCP and the CET and yet retain existing tariff and barrier free trade. 
(Paragraph 199)
34. Notwithstanding the Government’s ambition to secure a UK–EU FTA, there is a 
risk that the UK might reach the end of the Article 50 process without a deal and 
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have to fall back on trading under WTO rules. It is imperative that the Government 
undertake an economic assessment of the scenario whereby the UK leaves the EU 
without a deal. The Government must also set out what contingency planning is 
taking place across Whitehall and the mitigation being considered for a ‘no deal’ 
outcome. (Paragraph 210)
35. Similar to negotiating a UK–EU FTA, embarking on negotiations for FTAs 
with non-EU countries is entering into the unknown. It is unclear whether the 
UK’s smaller and more focussed market will be an advantage or a disadvantage 
in trading negotiations. What is clear, however, is that the UK needs to urgently 
develop resources and expertise for trade negotiations. The Government should 
identify resourcing needs and prioritise countries which provide opportunities for 
developing expertise in trade negotiating. The Government should also prioritise 
those countries with which the EU has preferential trade agreements and seek early 
clarity on whether the UK can ‘grandfather’ those FTAs after Brexit. (Paragraph 218)
36. The success of the Higher Education sector in the UK owes much to its ability to 
attract international skills and talent. The UK Government must design a future 
immigration system that does not make it difficult for such talent, both students 
and staff, to come to the UK. It must also send a strong and consistent message that 
the UK is a welcoming place for people to come and study. The Government should 
make clear that it wishes to continue to take part in the Erasmus+ student exchange 
programme. (Paragraph 224)
37. The UK has benefitted from being part of Horizon 2020. The Government has made 
a clear commitment to underwrite research funding commitments while the UK is 
a Member State, even if the project continues after the UK leaves the EU. However, 
the Secretary of State has told us that he does not know what ongoing relationship 
the UK will have with Horizon 2020. The Government needs to make an explicit 
commitment that it wishes to continue joint research with the EU27 on the basis of 
the Horizon 2020 framework, and its successor. (Paragraph 227)
38. The UK needs to be clear what kind of relationship it wishes to pursue with 
Euratom. It is important that whatever the relationship is, it does not reduce the 
ability of the UK to pursue international cooperation in the civil nuclear industry 
and collaborative research in the future, including Horizon 2020 and its successor. 
(Paragraph 231)
39. The Government will be looking to conclude a bespoke arrangement for continuing 
involvement with Europol. The UK has been a leading force in Europol’s 
development. If negotiations progress in a spirit of goodwill towards agreement, 
there should be scope for an imaginative solution to enable the UK to continue some 
level of involvement with Europol for the benefit of all European citizens. However, 
the technical obstacles that will need to be overcome for this to happen will be 
significant and it is unlikely that the UK will be able to retain the leading role that it 
currently enjoys. (Paragraph 245)
40. Across the range of Justice and Home Affairs data-sharing instruments, there is a 
strong operational argument, in the interest of both UK and EU27 law enforcement, 
for the UK retaining access to data. However, the extent to which this will be possible 
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is likely to be determined by commitments that the UK is able to make in relation 
to ensuring that its data protection provisions remain aligned with those of the EU, 
and the governance arrangements that can be agreed around the databases. The 
access agreed is likely not to be of the same level currently granted. (Paragraph 264)
41. The value of maintaining participation in the European Arrest Warrant, or at least 
securing an analogous agreement, has been commended to us. We note that the 
UK comes from the position of having extradition processes already in line with 
those in the EU. We also note that there are precedents for agreements with the EU 
analogous to the European Arrest Warrant that do not involve remaining within 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU. (Paragraph 271)
42. The Secretary of State has said that the Government wants “as far as is possible to 
replicate what we already have” in respect of Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation. 
It is to be hoped that the UK’s relationship with the EU when outside it will be 
one of partnership on the basis of shared values and cooperation. Continuing deep 
levels of Justice and Home Affairs cooperation represents a test of whether this will 
be possible. The technical challenges are significant but, we believe, not insuperable 
and the prize of continued close cooperation is too valuable to lose. We note that, 
as the Prime Minister acknowledged, a “phased process of implementation” may be 
required if agreement is not possible within two years. (Paragraph 272)
43. We welcome the Government’s commitment to continuing co-operation with the 
EU27 on foreign policy and defence matters. This is an area of considerable mutual 
interest and must be prioritised during the negotiations. We look forward to the 
Government setting out in more detail its proposals for how such cooperation 
can be made to work in practice, including the institutional and decision-making 
frameworks that would underpin it. (Paragraph 276)
A phased approach
44. It appears clear that negotiations will have to take place in a timeline shorter than 
the two years provided for in Article 50 TEU. Michel Barnier has said that, once 
Article 50 is triggered, the UK would have just 18 months to negotiate its exit from 
the EU in order to give the EU institutions enough time to ratify the agreement 
within the two-year period afforded by Article 50. On both occasions he has given 
evidence to us, the Secretary of State has agreed with this timetable. (Paragraph 282)
45. There is no precedent for the conclusion of a major, comprehensive bilateral or 
multilateral FTA covering goods and services within two years, although there is 
also no precedent for the negotiation of a major FTA between countries that are 
already convergent in legal and regulatory terms. It may be that starting from this 
position of convergence enables the terms of a future trade deal to be negotiated 
more quickly than comparable agreements such as CETA. It is not yet evident, 
however, that the two-year timetable for achieving this is realistic. (Paragraph 283)
46. Negotiations around the UK’s outstanding and future financial liabilities to the EU 
will form a very important part of the negotiations which will need to consider 
liabilities, assets and, potentially, payments by the UK for continued participation 
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in certain EU programmes. It will be essential also to ensure that discussions about 
money do not get in the way of simultaneous negotiations on the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU27. (Paragraph 289)
47. We note the Foreign Affairs Committee’s recent conclusion that a ‘no deal’ scenario 
“represents a very destructive outcome leading to mutually assured damage for the 
EU and the UK”. We share that view. It is, therefore, very important that both the 
UK and the EU avoid reaching the end of the two-year negotiating period without 
an agreement. The Government has talked about walking away from a bad deal, but 
has not yet explained what terms would be demonstrably worse for the UK than 
‘no deal’. The Government should therefore conduct a thorough assessment of the 
economic, legal and other implications of leaving the EU at the end of the Article 50 
period with ‘no deal’ in place. This should be published. The public and Parliament 
have a right to the maximum possible information about the impact of the different 
future trading options being considered, including the possibility of no FTA being 
reached. (Paragraph 293)
48. Without an economic assessment of ‘no deal’ having been done and without 
evidence that steps are being taken to mitigate what would be the damaging effect 
of such an outcome, the Government’s assertion that “no deal is better than a bad 
deal”, is unsubstantiated. Parliament must be in an informed position to decide 
whether a proposed deal is, in fact, better or worse than ‘no deal’. (Paragraph 294)
49. As the Government has suggested, the extent of disruption caused by leaving the 
EU is likely to vary across sectors, depending on the terms of the final withdrawal 
agreement. In some areas, adjustments are likely to be minimal. Where changes 
in trading arrangements or market access may be more substantial, however, the 
Government should seek to establish frameworks for implementation phases as 
early as possible in the negotiation process. It should communicate the terms of 
those agreements promptly and clearly to businesses and the public, in order to 
ensure adequate time for planning. (Paragraph 299)
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1 Introduction
1. In her speech at Lancaster House on 17 January 2017, the Prime Minister, the Rt 
Hon Theresa May, MP, set out the 12 principles that would guide the Government during 
negotiations to secure the UK’s exit from the EU.1 Further detail was provided on these 
principles in the Government’s White Paper on The United Kingdom’s exit from and new 
partnership with the European Union, published on 2 February 2017.2
2. We agreed to report on the White Paper as the Third Report of our initial inquiry 
into the Government’s negotiating objectives.3 Now that notification has been given by 
the Government under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union of the UK’s intention 
to leave the EU, our work enters a new phase.
3. As with our previous reports, we have drawn on the valuable work of other select 
committees in both the House of Lords and the House of Commons to help to inform our 
thinking.
4. One of our first priorities was to launch a programme of visits around the UK, 
encompassing visits both to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and to different parts 
of England. Our visit schedule has taken in Sunderland, Aberdeen, Wolverhampton, 
Stoke-on-Trent, London, Boston, Truro and Swansea, as well as a visit to Dublin. We are 
grateful to all those who have hosted us and met with us in each of these locations. We 
have not only been made most welcome, but have learned a great deal about the priorities 
of businesses and a wide range of organisations and individuals, and have heard their 
thoughts on the risks and opportunities that Brexit throws up in different sectors. We 
published notes of our Sunderland and Aberdeen visits with our First Report. Notes of 
our visits to Wolverhampton and Stoke-on-Trent; London; Boston; Truro and Swansea are 
annexed to this Report. We also annex a note of our visit to Dublin last month.
5. We had hoped to be able take evidence from the relevant Ministers in each of the 
devolved nations. We took evidence from Mike Russell MSP, Minister for UK Negotiations 
on Scotland’s Place in Europe, Scottish Government, in Westminster and took evidence 
from Mark Drakeford AM, Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Local Government, Welsh 
Government by video link.4 Although we had hoped to take evidence from the appropriate 
Minister in the Northern Ireland Executive, the resignation of the Deputy First Minister 
and elections in Northern Ireland and the subsequent delay in re-establishing the Executive 
prevented this from being arranged in the time available. We had also arranged to visit 
Derry~Londonderry before the triggering of Article 50, but, postponed our visit following 
the death of the former Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness. The Committee plans 
to visit Northern Ireland in April 2017.
1 The Government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: Prime Minister’s Speech, Lancaster House, 17 
January 2017 (The Lancaster House Speech.)
2 HM Government, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, CM 9417, 
February 2017, para 2.1 (The White Paper.)
3 See also our First Report of Session 2016–17, The process for exiting the European Union and the Government’s 
negotiating objectives, HC 815; and our Second Report of Session 2016–17, The Government’s negotiating 
objectives: the rights of UK and EU citizens, HC 1071
4 Oral evidence taken on Wednesday 8 February 2017 [Mr Russell MSP] and on Tuesday 7 March 2017 [Mr 
Drakeford AM]
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6. In her Lancaster House speech, the Prime Minister set out her 12 objectives for the 
negotiations. We examine each of these in turn in this Report. The Prime Minister also set 
out the principles that she said would guide the Government’s approach:
as we negotiate that partnership, we will be driven by some simple principles: 
we will provide as much certainty and clarity as we can at every stage. And 
we will take this opportunity to make Britain stronger, to make Britain 
fairer, and to build a more Global Britain too.5
7. This Report sets out the Committee’s conclusions under the chapter headings 
contained in the Government’s White Paper.
8. This report focuses on the Government’s negotiating objectives and not on the 
potential benefits and opportunities that arise from the United Kingdom leaving the 
European Union.
9. We welcome the Government’s decision to publish a White Paper in response to a 
recommendation in our First Report. This document has provided some further detail 
on the Government’s negotiating objectives. However, as the Secretary of State has 
indicated, “this is likely to be the most complicated negotiation of modern times” and 
its outcome is far from certain.
5 The Lancaster House Speech
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2 Certainty and clarity
Objective 1: Providing certainty and clarity
The “Great Repeal Bill”
10. The Government has announced its intention to introduce a “Great Repeal Bill” to 
provide legal certainty for the UK on leaving the EU. The Bill will be designed to repeal the 
European Communities Act 1972 and convert the acquis of existing EU law into domestic 
law. Accordingly, on the day after the UK leaves the EU, the same legislation will apply as 
applied before exit. The UK Parliament and, where appropriate the devolved legislatures, 
will then be able to determine which legislation they wish to keep, amend or repeal. The 
Bill is also expected to delegate powers to Ministers to amend “laws that would otherwise 
not function sensibly once we have left the EU” by means of secondary legislation.6
11. In its report on The “Great Repeal Bill” and Delegated Powers, the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution noted that the UK Government and Parliament 
faced a unique challenge in transposing the full body of EU law into domestic law, not 
least because “the body of EU law is found in a number of different places”. Some EU law 
underpins existing UK legislation (for example EU directives which must be converted 
into domestic law) and some is directly applicable in the UK (for example EU regulations 
that apply directly in the UK under the terms of the European Communities Act 1972). 
The Select Committee on the Constitution noted that:
Yet further elements of the body of EU law are non-legislative in nature, 
consisting, for example, of judgments made by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, regulatory rulings by EU agencies, or in the interpretation 
of our own courts.7
The Lords Committee added that the task was complicated by the fact that in many areas, 
the final shape of the law will depend on the outcome of negotiations on the UK’s exit, 
but preparations will have to be made in time to come into force on the day that the UK 
leaves the EU.8
12. The “Great Repeal Bill” itself will not be a straightforward undertaking and will raise 
a number of important constitutional and legal questions, in particular:
• Whether and how the Bill will seek to remove references to EU institutions and 
agencies from the EU law which is to be transposed into domestic law and what 
institutions will be referred to in their place;
• The breadth and scope of any “Henry VIII powers” contained in the Bill which 
will enable Ministers to make changes to primary legislation which applies EU 
law through secondary legislation and, if so, how these will be limited;
• Whether the Bill will require legislative consent motions from the devolved 
legislatures;
6 The White Paper, CM 9417, para 1.5
7 House of Lords Committee on the Constitution, Ninth Report of Session 2016–17, The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and 
delegated powers, HL Paper 123, Summary
8 Ibid
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• The impact on the constitutional settlements of Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland; and
• Whether judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
will continue to be relied on in UK courts after Brexit in order to interpret the 
transposed acquis.9
13. The nature of the legislative powers that will be delegated and the appropriateness of 
Parliamentary procedures for their consideration are the subject of an inquiry launched 
by the House of Commons Procedure Committee.10
14. In our First Report, we urged the Government to publish the “Great Repeal Bill” 
in draft to enable the “fullest scrutiny” of its provisions to take place before formal 
consideration took place in Parliament.11 This was merited “given the significance of the 
repatriation of legislative competences to the UK for the constitutional makeup of the UK 
[and the] implications for the devolution settlement”. The Secretary of State told us that 
the White Paper on the Bill had been delayed by the elections in Northern Ireland (and the 
Government’s desire to inform the Northern Ireland Executive in advance of publication), 
but would be published soon.12
Transposition of regulations into domestic law
15. The question of how EU regulations will be transposed into domestic law may raise 
particular questions where those regulations specify enforcement or certification by EU 
regulatory bodies. In respect of product certification by a regulatory agency, on leaving 
the EU, the UK would need to determine whether it wished to continue to follow the 
decisions of an EU agency or set up its own certification processes. A UK equivalent agency 
may require arrangements for mutual recognition of decisions with its EU counterpart. 
In respect of enforcement, where EU regulations specify enforcement by the European 
Commission or EU regulatory agency, the UK would need to determine to whom the 
enforcement power was given.
16. There may be other areas where legal drafting will need to be changed to bring it into 
line with the body of domestic law.13 The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, Rt Hon Andrea Leadsom MP, has said that, in respect of her Department’s 
remit,
We think that in the region of about two-thirds of the legislation that 
we are intending to bring into UK law will be able to be rolled forward 
with just some technical changes, so roughly a third won’t, which means 
that obviously there will be work to do to ensure that we can make those 
measures continue to work once we leave the EU.14
9 Legislating for Brexit: the Great Repeal Bill, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 7793, 23 February 
2017, Summary.
10 Procedure Committee inquiry into Delegated powers in the “Great Repeal Bill” 2 February 2017 
11 First Report of Session 2016–17, HC 815, para 71
12 Q1500
13 Legislating for Brexit: the Great Repeal Bill, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 7793, 23 February 
2017, Section 3.4
14 Environmental Audit Committee, Sixth Report of 2016–17, The Future of the Natural Environment after the EU 
Referendum, HC 599, Q327
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17. We will examine the Government’s plans for converting the acquis into domestic 
law by taking evidence on the “Great Repeal Bill” White Paper when it is published. 
This will be a complex task for both the Government and Parliament and will need 
appropriate resource and time to be allocated. We intend to invite Ministers from 
departments other than the Department for Exiting the European Union to give 
evidence. We note that the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
has acknowledged the scale of the technical challenge ahead. The importance and 
complexity of ensuring legal certainty in the UK on the day after Brexit must not be 
underestimated.
Delegation of powers
18. The Government will not only have a significant body of legislation to incorporate 
into domestic law before the UK exits the EU, but will also need to make separate legislative 
provision in the numerous areas where the law will either need to be changed to ensure that 
it works in the context of domestic law or where some legislative or regulatory divergence 
is required. The White Paper notes that legislation to give effect to the UK’s withdrawal 
will not be limited to the “Great Repeal Bill” but will also include separate bills, including 
on immigration and customs. The extent to which new primary legislation or powers 
to be delegated under the “Great Repeal Bill” are used to construct the post-Brexit legal 
framework will be a matter for Parliament to consider in its scrutiny of the Bill.
19. The “Great Repeal Bill” is also expected to include provisions for delegating powers 
to Ministers to make changes to legislation transposed from EU law to take account of the 
progress of negotiations. The Government has said that this will give them “the flexibility 
to take account of the negotiations with the EU as they proceed”.15
20. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution noted that:
The challenge facing Parliament—and on which we focus in this report—
is how to grant the Government relatively wide delegated powers for the 
purpose of converting EU law into UK law, while ensuring that they cannot 
also be used simply to implement new policies desired by the Government 
in areas which were formerly within EU competence.16
That Committee recommended that a provision be placed on the face of the Bill to limit 
delegated powers to be used only
So far as necessary to adapt the body of EU law to fit the UK’s domestic legal 
framework; and
So far as necessary to implement the result of the UK’s negotiations with 
the EU.
21. The Secretary of State told us before Christmas that any material changes would be 
done through primary legislation rather than through delegated legislation.17 He reiterated 
in evidence this month that:
15 Government announces end of European Communities Act, 2 October 2016
16 House of Lords Committee on the Constitution, The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated powers, HL Paper 123
17 Qq483–484
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The strategy is to deal with the repeal of the European Communities Act 
1972 and the translation of the acquis communautaire into English law in the 
Great Repeal Bill. [ … ] The second phase will be dealing with substantive 
matters in primary legislation, because that is my view as to how it should be 
done, and nonsubstantive matters or less substantive matters in secondary 
legislation. There will be a number of major bills.18
22. The “Great Repeal Bill” is expected to entail the delegation of very significant 
powers to Ministers, whether of the UK or devolved governments, to bring forward 
legislation to ensure that the body of EU law being transposed into domestic law 
both fits the UK’s legal framework and keeps pace with the UK’s negotiations on its 
exit deal and its future relationship with the EU. In our scrutiny of the Bill, while 
understanding the pressure facing Ministers, we will want to be confident that the 
delegation of powers is sufficient only for the limited job required and does not become 
a means of passing significant new legislation without the higher level of scrutiny that 
primary legislation requires.
23. A major justification for Brexit was to enhance Parliamentary sovereignty. Leaving 
the European Union should not therefore result in a shift in power from Parliament to 
the Executive. The Committee believes it is essential that Parliament plays a full role 
in all Brexit-related legislation including the “Great Repeal Bill”.
Impact on the Devolution Settlement
24. Under the Sewel Convention, the Government does not normally invite the UK 
Parliament to legislate on devolved matters or the scope of devolved powers without the 
assent of the devolved legislature concerned.19 The Sewel Convention is given a statutory 
basis by the Scotland Act 201620 and in the Wales Act 2017.21 Assent is signified by means 
of a legislative consent motion.
25. The Supreme Court has noted that “Over time, devolved legislatures have passed 
legislative consent motions not only when the UK Parliament has legislated on matters 
which fall within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, but also when the 
UK Parliament has enacted provisions that directly alter the legislative competence of a 
devolved legislature or amend the executive competence of devolved administrations”.22 
The way that the Sewel Convention has operated in practice establishes that legislative 
consent motions will probably be required in respect of the “Great Repeal Bill” were it to 
remove from a devolved legislature the requirement to abide by EU law (with the effect 
that legislative competence is changed); change EU law that currently comprises part of 
the devolved body of law; or take back into UK legislative competence any EU competence 
that relates to a devolved matter. We consider the implications of the “Great Repeal Bill” 
for the devolution settlements further in Chapter 3.
18 Q1501
19 House of Commons Library, The Sewel Convention, Standard Note SN2084, 25 November 2005
20 Scotland Act 2016, section 2
21 Government of Wales Act 2017, section 107 as inserted by the Wales Act 2016
22 R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, 
para 140
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Court of Justice of the European Union case law
26. In its bid to provide “legal certainty”, the “Great Repeal Bill” will be designed to 
incorporate the acquis communautaire into domestic law. The acquis is considered to 
include decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
27. After Brexit, a large quantity of UK primary and secondary legislation will still have 
arisen from EU law. In some areas, the UK Parliament may, in time, legislate in a manner 
that results in domestic law diverging decisively from EU law. In others, the UK may seek 
to maintain a high level of regulatory compliance in the interests either of maintaining 
trade or ensuring continued participation in EU programmes. In any case, where domestic 
law is still derived from EU law, even after Brexit, UK courts are likely to continue to refer 
to CJEU judgments in their interpretation of that legislation. The White Paper indicated 
that “in general the Government also believes that the preserved law should continue to 
be interpreted in the same way as it is at the moment”.
28. David Jones MP, Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union, 
responding specifically to a question about the status in the UK of case law and judgments 
of the CJEU after the UK had left the EU stated:
I wish to make it clear that the starting position of the Government is that 
EU-derived law, from whatever quarter, will be transferred into United 
Kingdom law in full at the point of exit.23
29. In the light of the Government’s stated intention to preserve EU law in the UK until 
the UK Parliament decided to change it, Professor Kenneth Armstrong, Professor of 
European Law at the University of Cambridge, questioned what continuing role the CJEU 
would play:
To what extent should UK courts follow or at least track developments in 
the interpretation of EU rules by EU courts to maintain consistency? Should 
UK judges continue to follow changes in the interpretation of EU rules 
unless and until ministers decide to express a view on an interpretation 
they do or do not wish to see reflected in UK law?24
30. Once the European Communities Act 1972 is repealed, UK courts will no longer 
be bound by decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, 
the extent to which UK courts continue to take account of CJEU case law remains to 
be decided.
Vote on the final deal
31. The White Paper notes that the final deal agreed between the UK and the EU will be 
put to a vote in both Houses of Parliament.25 In our First Report, we called for Parliament 
to have a vote on any final deal and sought clarification that “the timetable for this vote 
will allow for proper consideration of any deal that is negotiated”.26
23 HC Deb, 7 November 2016, col 1363
24 Professor Kenneth Armstrong, On your marks, get set LEAVE! The technical challenge of the Great Repeal Bill, 
LSE Brexit Blog, October 2016
25 The White Paper, CM 9417, para 1.12
26 The process for exiting the European Union and the Government’s negotiating objectives, HC 815, para 168.
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32. In its response to our Report, the Department stated that the Government would 
“bring forward a motion on the final agreement to be approved by both Houses of 
Parliament before it is concluded, and [ … ] intends that this will happen before the 
European Parliament debates and votes on the final agreement”.27 The response continued 
that “The Government expects that this vote will cover both the withdrawal agreement 
and the future relationship with the EU”.
33. We welcome the Secretary of State’s assurance that Parliament will have a vote 
on any final deal reached under Article 50 and any agreement on the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU before the European Parliament votes on it, but we also believe 
that Parliament must have a vote in the event that there is ‘no deal’. Leaving the EU 
without a future trade deal and in doing so defaulting to World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) rules is no less an important decision for the UK’s economic future than the 
terms of any future Free Trade Agreement between the UK and the EU. It is therefore 
essential that such a step is not taken without Parliament having a vote on the matter.
Objective 2: Taking control of our own laws
34. The Prime Minister made clear that one of her “red lines” in negotiations would be to 
end the jurisdiction of the CJEU over the UK.28 This position was underlined in the White 
Paper which stated that:
The sovereignty of Parliament is a fundamental principle of the UK 
constitution. Whilst Parliament has remained sovereign throughout our 
membership of the EU, it has not always felt like that.29 [ … ]
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the EU’s ultimate 
arbiter on matters of EU law. As a supranational court, it aims to provide 
both consistent interpretation and enforcement of EU law across all 28 
Member States and a clear process for dispute resolution when disagreements 
arise. The CJEU is amongst the most powerful of supranational courts due 
to the principles and direct effect in EU law. We will bring an end to the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK.30
35. We note in paragraph 30 above, the extent to which the UK courts may have to 
continue to take account of CJEU case law in certain areas. However, this does not affect 
the White Paper’s clear objective of removing the primacy and direct effect of EU law, 
interpreted and enforced by the CJEU.
Dispute resolution procedures
36. Although the White Paper envisages ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK, 
it does acknowledge that dispute resolution mechanisms will be required in respect of any 
future relationship agreed between the UK and the EU. Dispute resolution procedures 
would be required in respect of future trading arrangements and cooperation in certain 
27 First Special Report of Session 2016–17, The process for exiting the European Union and the Government’s 
negotiating objectives: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report, HC 1101
28 Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 2 October 2016
29 The White Paper, CM 9417, para 2.1
30 The White Paper, CM 9417, para 2.3
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EU projects, including participation in aspects of Justice and Home Affairs policies, 
including Europol and provisions for data-sharing. These are discussed further below. 
Mechanisms would:
Ensure that all parties share a single understanding of an agreement, both 
in terms of interpretation and application. These mechanisms can also 
ensure uniform and fair enforcement of agreements.31
37. The UK is already party to dispute resolution mechanisms in relation to a number 
of international agreements. The White Paper notes that “unlike decisions made by the 
CJEU, dispute resolution in these agreements does not have direct effect in UK law”.32 
The dispute resolution mechanism or mechanisms that will apply to the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU “must be ones that respect UK sovereignty, protect the role of 
our courts and maximise legal certainty, including for businesses, consumers, workers 
and other citizens”.33
38. There are examples of dispute resolution mechanisms that do require acceptance of 
CJEU jurisdiction, such as the Deep Association Agreement with Ukraine and Denmark’s 
Agreement to participate (as if it were a third country) in Europol. However, Professor 
Steve Peers, University of Essex, told us that it would be unusual for the EU to insist on 
a third country (ie. the UK, in an agreement on a future UK–EU relationship) accepting 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU. It was more common for the agreement to provide that “the 
two sides keep each other’s case law under review [ … ] if there is divergence, there is a 
discussion about how to try to resolve it”.34 He noted that this could lead to problems 
at a later point. Citing the example of data protection, he argued that, notwithstanding 
any agreement reached on regulatory equivalence between the UK and the EU, this 
agreement could be open to challenge in the CJEU by EU institutions, a Member State or 
an individual.35
39. Allowing for the Prime Minister’s “red line” on CJEU jurisdiction, David Anderson 
QC, the Government’s former Independent Adviser on Terrorism Legislation, told us that:
I would have thought the genius of our diplomats and lawyers ought to be 
capable of negotiating something that could be swallowed, even if in practice 
it is likely to mean a high degree of ECJ influence over the development of 
our own law.36
40. The Secretary of State told us that the UK may look to agree different models for 
arbitration or dispute resolution with the EU covering different areas, such as trade and 
Justice and Home Affairs cooperation. In terms of the model adopted he told us that the 
CJEU would not be the appropriate body:
If we did a deal with the United States, we would not have the Supreme 
Court of the United States be the arbitration mechanism. We will have to 
design the mechanism to be appropriate.37 [ … ]
31 The White Paper, CM 9417, para 2.5 
32 The White Paper, CM 9417, para 2.8 
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It does not really matter whether it is the ECJ or any other domestic court 
for a trade partner. We would not look to a system that was effectively 
subordinate or even the same as their own domestic court. We would look 
for an independent system, so independence is the key issue.38
41. Ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU over the UK is one of the Prime Minister’s 
“red lines” in negotiations. The European Communities Act 1972, which the 
Government is planning to repeal, provides that rulings of the CJEU are binding on 
UK courts. Whilst the UK is likely to move away from the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
on exiting the EU, the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU may entail 
continuing regulatory conformity in certain areas, such as certain product standards 
or data protection. Where regulatory conformity provides the basis of the continuing 
relationship, this may necessitate agreeing dispute resolution procedures, in trade and 
other areas, which require continuing account to be taken by UK courts of CJEU case 
law, just as in any similar agreement with another country the UK courts would take 
account of the other country’s rulings.
38 Q1499
22  The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
3 A stronger Britain
Objective 3: Strengthening the Union
The Government’s objectives and priorities of the devolved administrations
42. The Government has made it clear that while it is the sole responsibility of the UK 
Government to trigger Article 50, the future deal with the EU will be based on consultation 
with all of the devolved nations and regions of the UK. It aims to negotiate a deal on the 
future relationship of the UK with the EU, that “secures the specific interests of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland as well as those of all parts of England” and “that works for 
the whole of the UK”. The Prime Minister stated that she would not trigger Article 50 
“until I think that we have a UK approach and objectives for negotiations”.39 It says that it 
has ensured that, since the referendum, “the devolved administrations are fully engaged 
in our preparations to leave the EU”.40 Each of the three devolved administrations has 
published a document setting out its priorities for the negotiations, and has endorsed the 
Government’s commitment to ensure that they are fully engaged in developing plans for 
the UK’s future relationship with the EU.41
43. Prior to the recent elections, the then First and Deputy First Ministers of Northern 
Ireland noted a number of particular concerns for Northern Ireland in a letter to the 
Prime Minister, stating that the full involvement and representation of Northern Ireland 
in negotiations on the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU will be “a 
fundamental prerequisite of a meaningful and inclusive negotiation process”.42 The White 
Paper published by the Welsh Government and Plaid Cymru supports the Government’s 
objective of negotiating an outcome that works for the UK as a whole and states that 
“We are working with the UK Government, Northern Ireland Executive and the Scottish 
Government with the intention of helping shape a viable and consensual UK negotiating 
position”.43
44. The Scottish Government has adopted a different position, saying that its priority 
is for Scotland to maintain its current position in the European Single Market, whether 
or not the rest of the UK decides to leave. The First Minister has stated that the best 
way of achieving this would be for Scotland to become a full member of the EU as an 
independent country. However, the Scottish White Paper also set out two other options 
for meeting its objective: either through the UK as a whole remaining in the Single Market 
through membership of the European Economic Area; or through a differentiated deal 
with the EU which enabled Scotland to maintain its current position in the Single Market. 
This last option would require the devolution of a significant range of additional powers 
for Scotland.
39 The process for exiting the European Union and the Government’s negotiating objectives, HC 815, para 42
40 The White Paper, CM 9417, para 3.1 
41 The then First and Deputy First Ministers of Northern Ireland wrote to the Prime Minister on 10 August 2016, 
setting out the priorities for Northern Ireland. The Scottish Government published its paper, Scotland’s Place 
in Europe, on 20 December 2016. The First Minister of Wales, Carwyn Jones, and leader of Plaid Cymru, Leanne 
Wood, published Securing Wales’ Future on 23 January 2017.
42 Letter from the then First and Deputy First Ministers of Northern Ireland to the Prime Minister. 10 August 2017
43 Securing Wales’ Future, Foreword by the First Minister 
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45. The First Minister announced on 13 March that she wishes to hold a second Scottish 
independence referendum “within a timeframe to allow an informed choice to be made–
when the terms of Brexit are clear but before the UK leaves the European Union or shortly 
afterwards”,44 citing as her reason a failure by the UK Government to respond to or engage 
with the Scottish Government’s proposals.45
46. The Secretary of State, however, said that:
The Scottish Government have already had a detailed response [to its paper] 
in the meeting. One part of it that is still ongoing is the technical work 
that we are doing in conjunction with the Scottish Government, over their 
proposal for single market status for Scotland alone. That is not complete 
yet. I am not going to give any further commentary on how we are going to 
respond to that. We have done a great deal of response already.46
47. Professor Nicola McEwen told us that the Scottish Government’s White Paper was “a 
credible proposal that merits examination.47 Sir Ivan Rogers told us that, although he had 
not gone through the Scottish Government’s proposal in detail, his instinct was that some 
Member States would:
be extremely worried about the precedent. You can start with Spain, but you 
would probably also have Belgium and Italy worried about the implications 
for their jurisdictions and the unity of their jurisdictions if you ever get into 
differentiation.48
48. At this stage, there are clearly key differences in the priorities identified by the 
devolved administrations and the exit plan set out by the UK Government.
• Barrier-free trading with the EU: Wales and Scotland specifically ask for continued 
UK membership of the European Single Market. The agri-food sector, which is 
highly interconnected with the Republic of Ireland, is of particular importance 
to Northern Ireland.
• Access to labour: The devolved bodies have raised concerns about the potential 
impact on business and public sector services particularly dependent on EU 
migrant labour, and the difficulties in some parts of the devolved nations of 
recruiting people to fill a range of essential roles.
• EU funding and other forms of EU support and networking: Questions have been 
raised as to how these will be replaced so as to target the particular needs in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, noting the Strand Two (North/South) 
basis of some of the EU funding for Northern Ireland.
• The impact of Brexit on the devolution settlements: It is unclear which EU 
powers will be repatriated directly to the devolved governments, and there is 
uncertainty regarding who will have policymaking authority in some areas after 
the enactment of the planned “Great Repeal Bill”.
44 “Referendum must be ‘made in Scotland’”, Scottish Government press release, 14 March 2017 
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49. The Secretary of State said that the Government would do everything it could to 
ensure that the people of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland got a good deal from 
leaving the EU. There were already some areas of agreement between the UK Government 
and the devolved administrations, and other areas which were still being debated and 
where solutions were being sought.49
Legislative consent
50. The Supreme Court ruled on 24 January 2017 that the Sewel Convention did not give 
rise to a legally enforceable obligation and that the devolved legislatures did not have a veto 
on the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU and on the process of triggering Article 
50.50 It noted that the UK Parliament did not normally exercise its right to legislate with 
regard to devolved matters without the agreement of the devolved legislatures, but stated 
that the policing of the scope and operation of the Sewel Convention was not within the 
constitutional remit of the courts. However, the Supreme Court did say that the removal 
of the EU constraints on withdrawal from the EU Treaties will alter the competence of 
the devolved institutions unless new legislative constraints are introduced. In the absence 
of such new constraints, withdrawal from the EU will enhance the devolved competence. 
They also noted that they did not underestimate the importance of constitutional 
conventions, some of which play a fundamental role in the operation of our constitution 
and that the Sewel Convention was important for the “harmonious relationship” between 
the UK and devolved legislatures.51 It is not yet clear how the Sewel Convention will be 
engaged during the legal process of UK withdrawal from the UK, and at what stage the 
UK Government might seek the consent of the devolved administrations.
51. Both the proposed “Great Repeal Bill” and any amendments to the Devolution Acts 
will almost certainly either legislate in devolved areas or affect the competences of the 
devolved administrations and therefore engage the Sewel Convention. The “Great Repeal 
Bill” will remove the requirement for the UK as a whole to comply with EU law after exit, 
by repealing the European Communities Act 1972. It could also be the vehicle for the 
necessary removal of the requirement in each of the devolution settlements that devolved 
competence must be exercised in compatibility with EU law. It will also provide that 
existing EU law will continue to be given effect in the UK until fuller consideration can 
be given to the question of whether it should be replaced, amended or retained. Other 
legislation will also be required, and it is likely that at least some of this too will affect 
devolved competences.
52. The Institute of Government has claimed there would be a “full-blown constitutional 
crisis” unless all nations of the UK are involved in negotiations around leaving the EU.52 
Dr Hannah White, Director of Research, Institute for Government told us that, whilst it 
was clear that it was for the UK Government to lead the Brexit process,
It would be almost unprecedented, given the history of what we have seen 
so far, for one of those legislatures to express concern and refuse to pass 
49 Q1443
50 R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, 
Press Summary 
51 R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, 
paras 130 and 151
52 “Theresa May warned of risk of constitutional crisis over Brexit deal”, The Guardian, 24 October 2016, see also 
Institute for Government, IfG in the news, 24 October 2016
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a legislative consent motion, and for the UK Government to go ahead. It 
has happened, but the basis of the constitutional settlement we have at the 
moment is that the UK Government take on the concerns of the legislatures.53
53. The expectation of the devolved administrations is that the UK Government will need 
to secure legislative consent from them for the “Great Repeal Bill” and other legislation 
implementing UK withdrawal. Mark Drakeford said that the Welsh Government’s view 
was that “We certainly believe that we will need legislative consent motions [ … ] and we 
are beginning to see signs that we will need to take very substantial amounts of secondary 
legislation through the National Assembly for Wales, to regularise some of the acquis, as 
it is called, and make it operable.”54 The Welsh Government had a very early discussion 
of the “Great Repeal Bill” and “would wish to be more engaged in some of the detailed 
preparations of it.”55
54. The Scottish Government has made clear that it expects the “Great Repeal Bill” to be 
subject to a legislative consent motion.56 The Secretary of State for Scotland, Rt Hon David 
Mundell MP, has acknowledged that the Government was likely to seek consent from the 
Scottish Parliament for the “Great Repeal Bill”:
given the Great Repeal Bill will both impact on the responsibilities of this 
Parliament and on the responsibilities of Scottish Ministers, it’s fair to 
anticipate that it would be the subject of a legislative consent process.57
The devolution settlements
55. All three devolution settlements currently set out that the devolved competence must 
be exercised compatibly with EU law. The effect of this is that, for a devolved policy such as 
agriculture, devolved administrations have the power to legislate and determine policies, 
but only within the framework provided by EU legislation. The Government will need to 
remove this requirement, assuming there are no relevant regulatory equivalence clauses 
in the final deal, from the Devolution Acts when the UK leaves the EU and EU powers 
are repatriated to the UK. However, for some policy areas there is likely to be a need to 
create a new UK framework, for example so as to ensure compatibility with wider UK 
trade policies and to ensure that there are no new barriers to living and doing business 
within the UK. The policy area discussed most often in evidence was agriculture, but we 
were told that there would also be questions raised around fisheries, the environment, and 
potentially also specific parts of some other policy areas.58
56. There may also be a need to define the role and responsibilities of other regional 
bodies. For example, the Mayor of London suggested that London would need powers 
and resources to enforce environmental protection regulations, and suggested that a new 




56 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Place in Europe, December 2016, para 176
57 “Mundell: Holyrood to be consulted on Great Repeal Bill”, BBC News, 26 January 2017
58 Q1244
59 Q1358
26  The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
57. The UK Government’s White Paper raises the possibility that some of the EU powers 
for devolved policy areas could be returned to the UK Government, rather than to the 
devolved administrations, so that it has the ability to create a UK policy framework. It 
explains that:
As the powers to make these rules are repatriated to the UK from the EU, 
we have an opportunity to determine the level best placed to make new 
laws and policies on these issues, ensuring power sits closer to the people 
of the UK than ever before. We have already committed that no decisions 
currently taken by the devolved administrations will be removed from 
them and we will use the opportunity of bringing decision making back to 
the UK to ensure that more decisions are devolved.
[ … ] our guiding principle will be to ensure that—as we leave the EU—no 
new barriers to living and doing business within our own Union are created. 
We will maintain the necessary common standards and frameworks for 
our own domestic market, empowering the UK as an open, trading nation 
to strike the best trade deals around the world and protecting our common 
resources.
On the basis of these principles we will work with the devolved 
administrations on an approach to returning powers from the EU that 
works for the whole of the UK and reflects the interests of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland.60
We note that the devolved settlements are based on the general principle that a subject 
matter falls within devolved legislative competence unless it is “reserved” to the UK 
government (“excepted” in the case of Northern Ireland). Matters such as agriculture and 
fisheries fall within devolved legislative competence.61
58. Witnesses from Scotland and Wales explained that they had a clear expectation 
that EU competences in devolved policy areas would be allocated to the devolved 
administrations. The Scottish Government’s White Paper comments that leaving the 
EU must not result in greater concentration of powers at Westminster. Nicola McEwan, 
Professor of Politics, Edinburgh University, described the Government’s explanation of 
repatriation of competences as “ambiguous” and “an obvious source of tension as the 
negotiations get under way”.62 Professor Alan Page told us that he was surprised by 
suggestions that there would be a need to be flexible about which powers went where in 
respect of agriculture, given that agriculture is a devolved competence, and that “there was 
general agreement that devolved powers would remain where they are”.63 He suggested 
that a new intergovernmental decision-making process would be necessary to protect the 
interests of the devolved administrations, saying that:
[ … ] whilst there is a lot of emphasis on the powers that will go to 
Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, the powers that will come to London are 
infinitely more significant. They are far more important. There is a real 
60 The White Paper, CM 9417, paras 3.4–3.7
61 Scotland Act 1998, section 29; Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 6; and Government of Wales Act 2006 (as 
amended by the Wales Act 2017), section 108A
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issue therefore of the protection of the position of the devolved nations 
in relation to decisions taken in London, which will require, at the very 
least, a much more thoroughgoing system of intergovernmental relations, 
extending possibly so far as shared decision-making.64
59. From the Welsh perspective, Roger Scully, Professor of Political Science, Cardiff 
University, called the UK Government’s approach “a model of vagueness” and said 
that the wording of the White Paper could include a situation where all EU powers for 
agriculture were repatriated to the UK Government. This would mean that, whereas at 
present Wales has an opportunity to feed into the decision-making processes, in future 
most responsibility would be shifted from a devolved to a UK level.65 Mark Drakeford 
confirmed that the Welsh Government shared this concern:
There are matters that are devolved to the Welsh Government today, as they 
are devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland, but which we choose to 
operationalise through our membership of the European Union. When the 
European Union is no longer there, those competencies are where they are 
today: at the devolved level. They are not free-floating or capable of being 
grabbed by the UK Government. They are here now. They remain here after 
we leave the European Union, and suggestions to the contrary are very 
unhelpful.66
60. Mr Drakeford agreed with Professor Page’s suggestion that the participation of the 
devolved nations would be a necessary part of developing UK-wide policies, and that this 
could not be done centrally by the UK Government:
From a Welsh perspective, in agriculture, for example, we recognise freely 
that, without the European Union being there, we would like to come to the 
table in a very constructive way to shape UK-wide frameworks, so we can 
continue to have a UK Single Market as far as agriculture is concerned.67
[ … ] However, there is a really fundamentally important point from our 
point of view here, which is that that has to be done by agreement. It has 
to be done by recognising the responsibilities that we have, and which we 
will want to bring to the table, to create a new set of frameworks across the 
United Kingdom. It cannot be done at the UK level by saying, “Actually, we 
are just going to take that from you, and we will tell you what the result will 
be”.68
He believed that primary legislation would be required to change the devolution settlement 
for Scotland or Wales in this way.69
61. Another factor to be taken into account when developing a UK framework for 
agriculture, is the mechanism by which devolved administrations will be able to seek 
to influence UK trade decisions which will have an impact on their nations. Trade deals 
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more of the devolved nations, even if those aspects are a lower priority for the UK as a 
whole. Professor Morgan explained the possible problems if the UK Government were to 
negotiate trade deals with new partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States:
I see that as a big problem area, because as we move towards free trade, we 
will be negotiating across different sectors, and if we want people to open 
up their markets to our cars, for example, we might well be—erroneously, 
in my view—agreeing to open up our market to their agricultural produce. 
That type of increased competition in the short run would be devastating 
for Welsh farmers.70
Resources for the devolved administrations
62. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have all received EU funding to support areas 
such as agriculture, fisheries and regional development. Scotland has benefitted from 
both pre-allocated and competitive European funds over the last four decades and has 
also been successful in accessing competitive funding, including Horizon 2020 research 
programmes.71 Wales has had access to considerable funding opportunities from the EU, 
in particular CAP and structural funds, but also others such as Horizon 2020.72 Northern 
Ireland benefits significantly from EU funding, including regional development and 
social fund programmes, and funds for the community and voluntary sectors and for 
peace-building and cross-community programmes. It should be noted that there is a 
cross-border dimension to some of the EU funding for Northern Ireland and that funding 
programmes are overseen by the special EU Programmes Body, one of the implementation 
bodies established under the Good Friday Agreement. The UK Government has given 
some guarantees to the devolved administrations to fund projects which were signed up 
to prior to leaving the EU, but it is not clear exactly what funding the UK Government will 
give in practice and what arrangements will be made in the longer-term.
63. Mark Drakeford pointed out that Wales would have continued being a beneficiary 
of EU funding well after 2020, and that attention now needed to be given to questions of 
what would happen beyond the guarantees that the Chancellor has provided so far.73 Brian 
Morgan, Professor of Entrepreneurship, Cardiff Metropolitan University said that there 
was “a big worry in Wales that if [EU funds] are replaced through the Barnett formula, 
that would not be the best way to use the money” because of the risk that funds would 
not then be used for the highest priority needs. He suggested that the money should be 
ring-fenced for regional policies and delivered through some form of executive agency. 
74 Professor Page noted that there were questions around how UK agriculture would be 
funded after the UK had left the EU.75
64. Other witnesses commented on the resources and skills that the devolved 
administrations and legislatures would need to deal with the consequences of leaving the 
EU. Michael Clancy, Director of Law Reform, Law Society of Scotland said that “We are 
about to enter an unprecedented epoch of policy development and law reform, and not 
70 Q1261
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only the UK Parliament but the Parliament in Edinburgh and the Assemblies in Belfast 
and Cardiff will have to be adequately skilled for that.”76 Professor Scully made similar 
points in relation to Wales:
I think the Assembly is being put in essentially an impossible position, being 
given a level of responsibility that it does not have remotely the capacity to 
properly fulfil. The Welsh Government, if we look at the executive side, I 
think are also going to be very hard-pressed because, as everyone in this 
room I think will know, Brexit inevitably will have many, often fundamental, 
implications for many areas of responsibility.77
Consultation with the devolved administrations
65. The Government has established a Joint Ministerial Committee for EU Negotiations 
(JMC (EN)) for consulting the devolved administrations on their priorities for Brexit. The 
role of the Committee is “to seek to agree a UK approach to, and objectives for, negotiations, 
and to consider proposals put forward by the devolved administrations”.78 The Committee 
met for the first time on 9 November 2016, and subsequently on 7 December, 19 January 
and 8 February. The planned March meeting was postponed because of the Northern 
Ireland elections. When we asked how the Committee would handle the conflicting aims 
of the devolved administrations, the Secretary of State told us that the role of the JMC 
(EN) would be to debate them and make a decision, saying that “we will have to resolve 
them as best we can in the overall national interest”.79
66. Professor Michael Keating, Chair in Scottish Politics, University of Aberdeen, has 
suggested that consensus and “mutual understanding” will not easily be found in that 
Committee, saying that:
The Scottish Government has a list of demands, based on Scotland’s vote to 
remain and on staying within the Single Market. Wales voted No but Welsh 
Ministers are also concerned about market access and funding implications. 
Northern Ireland voted to remain and its Ministers are divided but there is 
consensus on keeping an ‘open border’. Yet it is clear that neither Scotland 
nor Northern Ireland can be in the Single Market, while the rest of the 
UK is outside, without creating new internal borders within the United 
Kingdom. It also seems, from what UK Ministers have been saying, that 
there is little scope for comprehensive and distinct Brexit packages for the 
nations and regions, nor for whole economic sectors.80
67. The Scottish Government presented its paper, Scotland’s Place in Europe, at the 
January JMC (EN) meeting, and the Committee agreed to undertake bilateral official-
level discussions on the proposals in that paper.81 However, Mike Russell MSP, Minister 
for UK Negotiations on Scotland’s Place in Europe, told us that the Scottish Government 
felt frustration that the devolved administrations “do not seem to be treated with either 
76 Q868
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78 The White Paper, p.17
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respect or concern”.82 In terms of the extent to which the JMC (EN) meetings had provided 
an effective way of involving Scotland in the Government’s planning for leaving the EU, 
Mr Russell told us that he had only learned that the UK planned to leave the European 
Single Market from listening to the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech, 48 hours 
before a JMC (EN) meeting. He said “I regret the way in which it was announced” and 
added that the JMC (EN) “was due to consider the matter; at least perhaps we could have 
been told”.83 He also told us that the Scottish Government had had no input into the UK 
Government White Paper, and had only been provided with a copy of it 40 minutes before 
publication,84 and that, as at 8 February 2017, there had been no discussion at JMC (EN) 
about the content of the Government’s proposed Article 50 letter.85 Mr Russell confirmed 
that the Scottish Government has received no formal reply to its position paper which 
has been with the UK Government since December 2016.86 The Committee notes that no 
formal response has been given as of the date of this Report.
68. From the Welsh perspective, Dr Jo Hunt, Cardiff University, pointed out that 
statements in the Lancaster House speech about the UK coming out of the customs union 
and out of the Single Market conflicted with the priorities set out in the Welsh White Paper 
which was published only a day or two later. 87 Mark Drakeford said that “the JMC has 
so far been a frustrating experience, probably for all participants around that table” and 
that “to date, it has failed to give confidence to devolved administrations that [their] views 
are making a genuine impact on the thinking of the UK Government”.88 He confirmed 
that the Welsh Government had not had advance sight of the UK Government’s White 
Paper or the Prime Minister’s earlier 12-point plan before they were formally announced.89 
However, Mr Drakeford said that there had been “a very genuine discussion” of the ideas in 
the Welsh White Paper at the February JMC (EN) meeting, and that there was a continuing 
discussion between the UK and Welsh governments.90 In terms of consultation about the 
content of the Article 50 letter, he said he would not expect it to be discussed at a JMC 
meeting if “it is a very short, simple, ‘triggering of a process’ letter”, but if the letter “tries 
to create the parameters within which those negotiations will begin, that is a very different 
matter”.91
69. Mr Drakeford suggested “four relatively straightforward ways in which the 
functioning of the JMC (EN) could be improved”:92
• Better administrative arrangements were needed.
• The JMC (EN) needed a clear future work programme.
• The UK Government should be more prepared to publish the evidence that lay 
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• In order to understand and try to influence the evolving UK position, the JMC 
(EN) needed better insight into the policy options that the UK Government 
were considering (on a confidential basis), and not just to be brought in at the 
end of the process.93
70. The Government says that it wants the deal between the UK and the EU to work 
for the whole of the UK, and that it will be developed with the full engagement of the 
devolved administrations. There are clearly significant differences in the negotiating 
priorities of the different parts of the UK. If the future deal is to be acceptable to the 
whole of the UK, then these differences will need to be discussed, negotiated and 
common ground agreed upon. Differing priorities reflect, in part, differences in the 
economies and demography of different parts of the UK. The Government must ensure 
that it understands these differences and takes them into account when it begins its 
negotiations with the EU.
71. We recommend that the UK Government respond formally to the Welsh, Scottish 
and Northern Ireland legislatures regarding each of their options papers. It must do so 
as a matter of urgency given that negotiations to leave the EU will start imminently.94
72. The legislation required to implement the UK’s exit from the EU will affect the 
competences of the devolved administrations and it is expected that it will require 
their legislative consent. We note the Supreme Court’s statement that “the Sewel 
Convention has an important role in facilitating harmonious relationships between 
the UK and devolved legislatures.” The devolved administrations will require adequate 
time to conduct the appropriate scrutiny and consultation required before consent 
can be given. It is likely that the devolved administrations will need to pass their own 
additional legislation, in turn requiring time for proper consideration in the devolved 
legislatures. The Government will need to take account of the timescales of the devolved 
legislatures in its planning.
73. The repatriation of EU powers to the UK raises questions about how the 
framework for devolved policy areas will evolve. The Welsh and Scottish governments 
are clear that any future UK framework for devolved policies should be a matter for 
consultation and intergovernmental negotiations. Notwithstanding the Government’s 
commitment that “no decisions currently taken by the devolved administrations will 
be removed from them”, the devolved administrations will be looking to ensure that 
legislative competences which are currently held by the EU which relate to matters 
which have been devolved are repatriated as devolved competences.
74. The Government has established a Joint Ministerial Committee for EU Negotiations 
(JMC (EN)) for consulting the devolved administrations on their priorities for 
Brexit and it aims to use this forum to agree a UK approach to, and objectives for, 
negotiations, and to consider proposals put forward by the devolved administrations. 
The evidence we heard indicated that these meetings have not been effective from the 
point of view of the devolved administrations. The Government must establish a more 
effective process for engaging the devolved administrations in developing the UK’s 
negotiating position. If the Government’s asserted wish to fully engage the devolved 
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administrations is to be credible, it must share more information and discuss options 
before decisions are reached. A successful exit from the EU will be measured not just 
in terms of achieving a good deal with the EU but also whether it “works for the whole 
of the UK”.
Gibraltar
75. Gibraltar is the only UK Overseas Territory that is also a member of the EU. It joined 
the then-European Economic Community along with the rest of the United Kingdom, 
under what is now Article 355(3) TFEU which declares that “The provisions of the Treaties 
shall apply to the European territories for whose external relations a Member State is 
responsible”.95 However, Gibraltar is exempt from several aspects of the Treaties, including 
the customs union, the Common Commercial Policy and the Common Agricultural 
Policy.96 Like the rest of the UK, Gibraltar is also exempt from the single currency and 
the Schengen area. In recognition of Gibraltar’s unique position, the Government has 
established a Joint Ministerial Council (Gibraltar EU Negotiations) as a forum bringing 
together the UK Government and the Government of Gibraltar to discuss specific issues 
relating to Gibraltar.
76. In the referendum, 96 per cent of the Gibraltarian electorate voted in favour of 
remaining in the EU.97 The Chief Minister of Gibraltar, the Hon. Fabian Picardo QC MP, 
told us that:
the people of Gibraltar did not vote on the basis of whether we liked the 
European Union or whether the European Union was faultless. I think we 
could all understand many of the issues that were being put in argument 
by those who were arguing to leave the European Union. Many of the 
frustrations that people felt with the European Union are equally felt in 
Gibraltar, as they might be felt in the United Kingdom and elsewhere 
throughout the EU. The people of Gibraltar were voting because we were 
very clear that the minute the result came in, if it was to leave, Spain would 
be putting the issue of Gibraltar’s sovereignty on the table.98
77. Despite the results of the vote in Gibraltar, the Chief Minister told us that Gibraltar 
would be unwilling to trade British sovereignty for continuing access to the EU. He said:
The view in Gibraltar held almost unanimously to a man, woman and child 
is that Brexit does not represent any change whatever in Gibraltar’s attitude 
to continued perpetual British sovereignty over the Rock in partnership 
with the people of Gibraltar. I have seen it said just this week in the Spanish 
press that they consider the offer of joint sovereignty to Gibraltar to be 
a generous offer that would allow us to remain in the European Union 
through Spain. Well, the people of Gibraltar left the referendum on leaving 
or remaining in the European Union behind them on the 24 June. We are 
not looking to remain in the European Union and be partly Spanish.99
95 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 355
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78. Gibraltar’s Government has expressed particular concern about the prospect of Spain 
raising the issue of sovereignty over Gibraltar as part of the Brexit negotiations. In written 
evidence to this Committee, the Government of Gibraltar said:
There is a risk that Spain will raise the Gibraltar question in its preliminary 
internal discussions with the other Member States as they seek to agree a 
common position for the EU/UK negotiations. Indeed, the previous acting 
Spanish Foreign Minister has written to all the other EU capitals in order 
to put across his views on shared sovereignty over Gibraltar, as the price to 
pay for maintaining a relationship with the EU.
Spain cannot be allowed to use her obsession with Gibraltar as a bargaining 
chip in the negotiations between the UK and the EU. However, it is important 
to be aware that this is an unnecessary and opportunistic challenge that the 
negotiating process may face.100
79. In addition to the sovereignty question, the Chief Minister raised particular concerns 
around preserving a relatively free-flowing land border. Since Gibraltar is not in Schengen 
or the customs union, it already has what its Chief Minister called a “hard frontier” with 
Spain, with customs and ID checks—but one that allows for between 10,000 and 14,000 
workers to cross from Spain to their jobs in Gibraltar, and back, every day.101 According 
to the Chief Minister, when Spain co-operates, the border functions “in an absolutely fluid 
fashion that does not interfere with anybody’s life and enables people to move across that 
frontier, and goods to move across that frontier, without more control than is necessary”.102 
He told us that those workers, and the industries that employ them:
[ … ] will have the challenge of wanting to ensure that those of their key 
workers who live in Spain are able to continue to access their workplaces 
every day, even if by being British they become non-EU citizens resident 
within the EU, coming out of the EU every day and then going back every 
evening.103
80. The Chief Minister also said that Gibraltar was keen to retain as much access as 
possible to the EU’s services market. He noted that about 90 per cent of Gibraltarian 
services are sold into the UK market, with the rest going to the EU27. He told us:
We still consider that access to the single market is hugely important for us. 
You ask anybody whether they are prepared to lop off 10 per cent of their 
business and obviously they will say that they don’t want to do that, and 
of course some who are established in Gibraltar selling services into the 
United Kingdom are also established there to sell services into the rest of 
the single market. If they lose that, they may look at somewhere else that 
they may be able to establish themselves to sell their services into the single 
market.104
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81. In general, the Chief Minister was optimistic about Gibraltar’s prospects, and the 
ability and willingness of the UK to find solutions to Gibraltar’s particular concerns. He 
told us:
The Prime Minister has skilfully set out the 12 headings of the areas that the 
United Kingdom is going to be seeking to negotiate on. As I told you before, 
I do not think that any of those contradict the key issues for Gibraltar. I 
sincerely believe that you will be able to discern from what I am telling 
you that the only potential issue is whether Spain might like to use the 
opportunity to restrict somehow Gibraltar’s access to those parts of the 
European Union that the United Kingdom might have access to in services 
in the future under a new deal.
Literally, this is about Spain singling out Gibraltar and seeking to exclude 
Gibraltar either throughout the process or at the last minute. That is 
the biggest concern that I have; I have no concerns that anything I have 
heard the Prime Minister say would have a seriously detrimental effect on 
Gibraltar’s operating model going forward, given that there is good will 
on the other side of the negotiating table, and I do not identify anything 
that suggests that anyone is coming at this with any bad faith in respect of 
Gibraltar, other than the issue that I have highlighted of Spain’s attitude.105
82. The Chief Minister also expressed confidence that Gibraltar’s concerns were being 
heard by the UK Government:
The United Kingdom has been clear that it stands steadfastly with the 
people of Gibraltar in our right of self-determination and to remain British 
entirely, if we wish to do so. The Foreign Secretary was, as usual, very clear in 
the way that he expressed the need for Britain to be seen to be in marmoreal 
support of the people of Gibraltar. He left no room for doubt about what the 
British Government’s position is going to be.106
Later, he added that he had faith in the Prime Minister’s willingness and ability to defend 
Gibraltar’s interests:
As long as the United Kingdom has the stomach to take Spain on and to 
play the aces that it has up its sleeve in the context of that negotiation, 
there will be no issue. Having worked with Theresa May when she was in 
the Home Office, and having seen her on the day that she became Prime 
Minister, when she gave Gibraltar an hour of her time, I can tell you that I 
have absolutely no concerns whatever about her having the stomach for this 
fight. She will stand by the people of Gibraltar.107
83. We welcome the UK Government’s recognition of Gibraltar’s specific concerns, 
expressed in the White Paper and through the establishment of the Joint Ministerial 
Council (Gibraltar EU Negotiations). We were encouraged by the Chief Minister’s 
confidence that Gibraltar’s views were being heard and that the UK Government would 
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be very important to avoid any damaging consequences for Gibraltar. We encourage 
the UK Government to maintain a high level of dialogue and engagement with the 
Government of Gibraltar throughout the Article 50 negotiation process.
Objective 4: Protecting our strong historic ties with Ireland and 
maintaining the Common Travel Area
84. The Government’s White Paper includes the objective of maintaining the UK’s strong 
links with Ireland and comments that the relationship between the two countries has 
never been better or more settled. The Prime Minister visited Dublin in January 2017 and 
both the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland have visited Dublin 
in 2017. The Secretary of State for Exiting the EU told us that there had been many other 
meetings between Irish and UK Ministers and senior officials since the referendum.108
Economic ties
85. The Government notes that the UK and Irish economies are deeply integrated, 
through trade and cross-border investments, as well as the free flow of goods, utilities, 
services and people. It estimates that annual trade between the UK and Ireland stands at 
over £43 billion, while around 60 per cent of Northern Ireland’s goods exports to the EU 
are to Ireland. Ireland experienced rapid economic growth from the early 1990s, but went 
through a severe recession from late 2007. After receiving EU and IMF funding, the Irish 
economy is now recovering and is currently Europe’s fastest growing economy. Ireland 
remains the UK’s fourth largest export market in the EU and fifth largest in the world 
(after the US, Germany, Netherlands and France).109
86. We discussed these strong economic ties with Irish politicians whom we met on 
our visit to Dublin on 23 February 2017. During that visit we had informal meetings 
with members of the Oireachtas Committees for Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and 
Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement; with Frances Fitzgerald TD, Tánaiste 
and Minister for Justice, Dara Murphy, Minister for Europe and Data Protection; Michael 
Creed, Minister for Agriculture as well as business representatives.
87. We were told on our visit of the profound regret in Ireland that Brexit was going to 
happen but a determination that strong business and trade links should continue and that 
the UK should retain a close relationship with the EU. However, we were told of concern 
that the Government’s plan for the UK to leave the Single Market and the customs union 
would hit trade and jobs in Ireland, and that Brexit represented Ireland’s biggest economic 
challenge for many years.
88. A particular area of concern in Ireland was the likely return of customs checks at 
the border with Northern Ireland, and their implications for the movement of goods 
throughout the island of Ireland once the UK has left the customs union. Much of 
Ireland’s business, particularly its agri-food sector, was closely integrated between north 
and south, and operated on the basis of seamless cross border movement; several business 
and political leaders told us that over a million litres of milk crossed the border in both 
directions each day. There was a fear that any customs requirements would introduce 
costs and delays and disrupt this business.
108 Qq1439–1440
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89. The UK Government’s aspiration for a “seamless and frictionless” border was 
welcomed, but neither politicians nor business leaders that we met were optimistic about 
this being achieved in practice. Ireland will have obligations as an EU Member State to 
protect the EU border with a third country, and the people that we met were sceptical that 
a solution would be found that would not resemble the re-emergence of a hard border but 
would be acceptable to the EU27 as the Northern Ireland border became one of the EU’s 
external borders.
90. Another concern for Ireland is the potential change to its trading relationship 
with the UK. Firstly, in the event of no UK–EU deal, the UK would revert to trading on 
WTO terms, which would include the imposition of tariffs. Whilst the average EU tariff 
under WTO terms is only 3.5 per cent, the tariffs on dairy and agricultural produce are 
substantially higher. The Secretary of State confirmed in evidence to us that producers of 
dairy and meat produce on either side of the border would be facing tariffs of 30 per cent 
to 40 per cent in cross-border trade.110 We were told that failure to reach a deal on tariffs 
with the EU would be “mutually assured damage and destruction”.111 Concerns about the 
potential for disruption of trade between the Republic of Ireland and the UK were raised 
during our visit to Swansea. There could also be implications for trade in goods exported 
from the Republic of Ireland to the rest of the EU that transit the UK.
91. Secondly, much of the ambition behind the decision of the UK to leave the EU was 
to secure new trade deals with other countries, and there was a concern expressed to 
us in Dublin that new trading partners could take the place of Ireland in some of the 
UK’s existing import markets. For example, Irish beef products could lose out to cheaper 
products, subject to fewer environmental and health controls, for example from the USA 
or South America. A big decrease in Irish beef exports to the UK, and similar instability 
in other sectors, could have a serious and negative impact on the Irish economy, which 
Irish politicians believed they would have little scope to offset.
92. We were also told that the future of the energy market in Northern Ireland and 
the Republic would need careful monitoring, and that longer term planning would be 
necessary to ensure that any UK divergence from EU policy, or any threats to long term 
investment, did not put future energy supply at risk. Security of energy supply was one 
of the five Brexit priorities for Northern Ireland, identified by the then First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland in their letter to the Prime Minister. In that 
letter, the Ministers pointed out that energy supply is vital to the economy, but Northern 
Ireland is a small, isolated market, and so has inherent cost and supply challenges. In 
its report on Northern Ireland and the EU referendum, the Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee judged that whilst Brexit need not necessarily have an immediate detrimental 
impact on the existing Northern Ireland electricity sector, problems could arise in the 
longer term if the UK did not continue to participate in electricity market integration.112
93. The House of Lords EU Committee also examined this issue in its report Brexit: 
UK–Irish relations. John Bruton, former Taoiseach, in evidence to the Committee, pointed 
out that the Republic of Ireland was a net importer of electricity from the UK. If the UK 
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were to leave the European internal energy market then Ireland’s energy security could 
be put at risk, potentially forcing Ireland to invest in a direct connection to the EU grid, 
at substantial cost.
Movement of people
94. One of the Government’s key objectives on leaving the EU is to exercise greater 
control over the number of EU migrants coming to work and settle in the UK. However, 
the UK has a particularly close relationship with Ireland, and there are specific factors 
relating to the movement of people across the border between Ireland and the UK. The 
Government notes that “for the people of Northern Ireland and Ireland, the ability to 
move freely across the border is an essential part of daily life”.113
95. The Common Travel Area (CTA) is a special travel zone for the movement of people 
between the UK, Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. The Government notes 
that it was formed long before the UK and Ireland were members of the EU and that it is 
committed to protecting this arrangement:
Protocol 22 of the EU Treaties provides that the UK and Ireland may continue 
to make arrangements between themselves relating to the movement of 
people within the CTA. Nationals of CTA members can travel freely within 
the CTA to the UK without being subject to routine passport controls.
[ … ] We want to protect the ability to move freely between the UK and 
Ireland, north–south and east–west, recognising the special importance of 
this to people in their daily lives. We will work with the Northern Ireland 
Executive, the Irish Government and the Crown Dependencies to deliver 
a practical solution that allows for the maintenance of the CTA, while 
protecting the integrity of the UK’s immigration system.114
96. In addition, UK and Irish citizens have reciprocal rights to live and work in each 
other’s countries which are underpinned by domestic law. In addition, under the Good 
Friday Agreement, the people of Northern Ireland have the right to identify as British, 
Irish or both, and to claim citizenship accordingly. Those who claim Irish citizenship 
would, by extension, be able to claim EU citizenship.
97. David Anderson QC has suggested that, whilst the CTA has been in existence 
for some time, it has depended for its survival on significant policy coordination and 
practical cooperation between the UK and Ireland where non-UK and Irish nationals 
are concerned. He contends that, where EU nationals are concerned, the free movement 
rules in the Treaty have rendered such coordination largely automatic, but this will change 
after Brexit if the UK wishes to impose barriers to the entry of non-Irish EU citizens. He 
argues that the options of introducing immigration checks at either the border between 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland or between Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain are unlikely to be acceptable, in which case it would be necessary to resort to in-
country immigration checks, possibly involving the cooperation of employers, landlords, 
medical and educational professionals.115
113 The White Paper, para 4.4
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98. The Irish politicians that we met in Dublin, told us that the current freedom of 
movement arrangements between Ireland and the UK were particularly important for 
those people living and working close to the border, and to businesses which operated on 
both sides of the border. They said that about 50,000 people crossed the border every day 
and that freedom of movement had been a key factor in promoting social, cultural and 
economic equality throughout the island of Ireland.
99. There was a clear desire to maintain cooperation on cross-border movement and 
policing and security issues but data protection restrictions on data sharing would require 
resolution once the UK was no longer subject to the relevant EU agreements. Transitional 
arrangements would also be likely to be required as we were unequivocally told that 
bespoke arrangements could not be put in place within the two-year Article 50 timescale.
100. The Secretary of State said that as far as he was concerned, maintaining the CTA was 
“non-negotiable”: it was the Government’s intention to maintain the CTA and he did not 
foresee this being a problem.116
The peace process
101. The Government’s White Paper does not specifically mention the peace process, 
other than to say that “no one wants to see a return to the borders of the past”, that “for 
the people of Northern Ireland and Ireland, the ability to move freely across the border is 
an essential part of daily life” and that the Government’s work on EU exit will “ensure that 
full account is taken of the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland”.
102. The UK and Irish Governments are co-guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement 
which refers to them both as “partners in the European Union”. During the process of 
resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland, both the Republic of Ireland and the UK were 
members of the EU, and the status of the two countries’ shared common membership of 
the EU is reflected throughout the Good Friday Agreement.
103. The issue of whether the Good Friday Agreement could be a legal obstacle to Northern 
Ireland’s exit from the EU was considered by the Supreme Court which ruled in January 
2017 that: (a) withdrawal from the EU was a matter for the United Kingdom Government; 
(b) that the Northern Ireland Assembly (like the other devolved legislatures) did not 
have a parallel legislative competence in relation to the withdrawal from the European 
Union; and (c) that the Belfast Agreement gave the people of Northern Ireland the right to 
determine whether to remain part of the United Kingdom or to become part of a united 
Ireland. The Supreme Court held that the Agreement neither regulated any other change 
in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland nor required the consent of the majority 
of the people of Northern Ireland to the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The latter 
point has raised the question as to whether any future exercise of the consent provisions 
of the Agreement in respect of a united Ireland would clearly and automatically guarantee 
its return to the EU in that context. We note the Taoiseach’s statement in Brussels on 23 
February 2017 regarding the Irish Government’s concern to see this matter reflected in 
any new UK–EU agreement. The Secretary of State has said:
As is clearly set out in the Belfast Agreement, if a majority of the people 
of Northern Ireland were ever to vote to become part of a united Ireland, 
116 Qq1437–1438, Q1471
39 The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
the UK Government will honour its commitment in the Belfast Agreement 
to enable that to happen. In that event, Northern Ireland would be in a 
position of becoming part of an existing EU Member State, rather than 
seeking to join the EU as a new independent state.117
104. We were told in Dublin that since the peace agreement, life had improved in both 
the north and the south, but creating any new barriers at the border would represent a 
backward step, and could act as a “lightning rod” for dissidents and renewed violence. 
In the view of some we met, any border posts or physical control points could become a 
target, and the potential for the re-emergence of violence should not be underestimated. At 
present, the North–South policing arrangements were working very well; there was very 
successful cooperation and good relations and data sharing in an international European 
context, and Ireland was committed to continuing them but details would need time to 
work out.
105. There was a perception in Dublin that the UK Government was saying that it 
understood the importance of a “seamless and frictionless border” but was, meanwhile, 
setting out a strategy for leaving the EU which would inevitably require a border presence.
106. The Oireachtas EU Committee has met Michel Barnier and other EU representatives, 
and members told us that Mr Barnier “largely understood” Ireland’s concerns about the 
peace process. The Secretary of State for Exiting the EU also told us that Michel Barnier 
has “a strong emotional investment in the Northern Irish peace process”.118 He also 
reiterated the Government’s commitment to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement and the 
Common Travel Area. We note that when offered the suggestion that the UK Government 
might indicate early in the Article 50 discussions that both the Belfast Agreement and the 
Common Travel Area should be named features in the “framework for future relationship” 
between the EU and the UK, he described this as “a good idea”.119 We encourage him to 
give further positive consideration to this suggestion.
107. Members of the Oireachtas EU Committee told us that, notwithstanding Michel 
Barnier’s personal sensitivity to the Northern Ireland peace process and the Belfast 
Agreement, a bilateral agreement between the UK and Ireland was unlikely to be acceptable 
to the EU Commission. We understand the sensitivities about any perception of the Irish 
Government negotiating separately from the EU27 in this whole process. However it 
would still be important to work together to identify options, given the facts of the Belfast 
Agreement, the Common Travel Area and the detailed issues at stake. The British–Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference might be considered as an established means of enabling 
appropriate and relevant dialogue, respecting the shared interests and responsibilities of 
both governments while also fully respecting the character of negotiations between the 
UK and the EU27.
108. The Secretary of State for Exiting the EU told us that “there is a border there now and 
there are excise duty differences across the border, which are collected and which are dealt 
with, but they are dealt with in a subtle and not highly visible way”.120 He explained that 
the Government would not do anything which might jeopardise the peace process and was 
well aware of the significance of the border. The Government is looking in detail at how it 




40  The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
could use trusted trader electronic systems and other technology to make any additional 
checks as swift and transparent as possible. For example, one option it was looking at was 
extending the authorised economic operators scheme to smaller companies, so that fewer 
border crossings would be subject to a physical inspection.121 The Secretary of State was 
confident that Ireland, the UK and the EU would resolve these issues because each had a 
strong commitment to do so and understood the importance of what was at stake.122
109. The UK and Irish economies are deeply integrated and mutually important. 
Disruption to the Irish economy would not only be damaging for Ireland itself, but 
would have consequential effects on the economy in Northern Ireland and the rest 
of the UK. Were the UK to exit the EU without a deal on tariff-free trade, the impact 
on the agri-food industry on both sides of the border in Ireland would be extremely 
serious and damaging.
110. The UK has deep and close historical, economic and cultural ties with the Republic 
of Ireland. The Government has a responsibility to consider how its future relationship 
with the EU will affect both Northern Ireland and the Republic. Politicians and 
businesses we met in Dublin were concerned about the UK’s future trading relationship 
with Ireland and the impact on trade of the re-introduction of customs checks on cross-
border trade. Maintaining freedom of movement throughout the island of Ireland and 
the wider UK is also extremely important, both for many businesses and for many UK 
and Irish citizens. The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic will become 
one of the EU’s external borders when the UK leaves the EU. Ensuring that this change 
does not disrupt flows of trade and people will be a complex challenge.
111. Cross-border cooperation in combating crime is highly valued by both the UK 
and Irish Governments. With goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to work out 
a way of ensuring that this cooperation can continue. However, the Irish Government 
does not see this as a straightforward task and some arrangement would need to be 
reached to ensure that cooperation can continue the day after the UK leaves the EU 
even if no permanent deal had yet been reached.
112. It is important to ensure that in implementing Brexit everything is done to 
maintain and build upon the considerable progress made as a result of the peace 
process. The Good Friday Agreement was not just a single event but was a critical step 
in the normalisation of social and economic relations over a period of time. Many in 
Ireland are deeply concerned that the introduction of new and visible border check 
points would provide an opportunity and focal point for those who wish to disrupt 
the peace and feed a sense in some communities that the Good Friday Agreement 
was being undermined. Irish politicians welcome the Government’s aspiration of 
maintaining a seamless border, but, at present, do not understand how this can be 
achieved in practice, given the obligations which Ireland will have as an EU Member 
State bordering a third country. With the goodwill that currently exists on both sides 
of the border, we hope that a mutually acceptable solution can be found. This must be 
at the top of the list of the Government’s negotiating objectives.
121 Q1383
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4 A fairer Britain
Objective 5: Controlling immigration
113. The Prime Minister noted the importance of immigration in her Lancaster House 
speech:
the message from the public before and during the referendum campaign 
was clear: Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to 
Britain from Europe. And that is what we will deliver.123
114. The White Paper pointed out that the last decade had seen record levels of long term 
net migration into the UK, creating some public concern about the impact on public 
services and on wages. It added:
The public must have confidence in our ability to control immigration. It is 
simply not possible to control immigration overall when there is unlimited 
free movement of people to the UK from the EU. [ … ] We will design our 
immigration system to ensure that we are able to control the numbers of 
people who come here from the EU. In future, therefore, the Free Movement 
Directive will no longer apply and the migration of EU nationals will be 
subject to UK law.124
115. The Government has indicated that a separate Immigration Bill will be brought 
forward setting out the framework for the system to be adopted after the UK leaves the 
EU.
Future immigration system and work permits
116. On our visits around the country, we have heard numerous requests from businesses 
for flexibility in a future immigration system to ensure that sectors currently reliant on 
EU workers do not face a sudden shortage of labour. We also heard evidence from the 
devolved governments that parts of the UK are dependent on immigration in order for 
their economies to grow.125 The impact of EU workers in the UK labour market has been 
profound, with significant employment of EU nationals in sectors as varied as seafood 
processing in Aberdeen, strawberry picking in Staffordshire, vets in Scottish abattoirs, 
digital skills in London, social care in Wales or daffodil pickers in Cornwall.126 Many 
of the business people we spoke to called for a relatively simple system, avoiding the 
complexity currently experienced in securing visas for non-EEA workers, highlighting 
the need for the UK to still be able to attract talent. There was support for a ‘lighter touch’ 
immigration system for EU workers than for those from outside the EU. The Government 
would have to work out how it wished to introduce control of who came in and out.127
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117. One option would be for the UK to develop a system of work permits for EU migrants, 
requiring employers to apply for authorisation to hire a non-UK national for a specific 
job. Authorisation would come with conditions attached, with the bulk of the burden 
of administration and enforcement falling on the employer. Most work permit systems 
in high-income countries typically restrict eligibility by factors such as occupation, skill 
level, or income. Low-skilled worker programmes are also common, although they tend 
to be more restrictive (often limited to specific types of work) and provide limited routes 
to permanent settlement or family unification. The UK used to operate a seasonal worker 
scheme for agricultural workers.
118. We commented in our previous Report on The Government’s negotiating objectives: 
the rights of UK and EU citizens that a balance needed to be struck between increasing 
control over EU migration and the complexity that might entail for the Home Office and 
employers.128
119. Since publishing that Report, we took evidence from Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London, 
and asked him about London’s priorities in a new immigration system. He told us that, 
while immigration may have been a concern in many parts of England during the 
referendum, London had different concerns. He said “Not only do we need talented people 
and immigration, but London voted that we want it as well.” The construction sector alone 
employed 300,000 in London, 50 per cent of whom were born outside the UK.129 Reducing 
net migration to the tens of thousands would impact on the ability of the construction 
sector to meet its workforce needs in London alone, never mind the workforce needs of 
the technology, cultural, financial sectors, or social care and the NHS. He acknowledged 
that more should be done to skill up young people to fill these jobs but argued that the 
ability of London to continue to attract talent was important for both London and the UK 
economy.130
120. Sadiq Khan told us he wanted to work with Government, both the Secretary of State 
and the Home Secretary, to ensure that the UK’s future immigration system was flexible 
enough to meet the needs of London.131 He did not want to “carve out a special deal for 
London” but called for a “flexible immigration system that recognises different parts of 
the country have different needs.”132
121. We took evidence from the Secretary of State on 15 March 2017. He agreed that the 
new system had to be able to meet the requirements of different parts of the country, and 
that “Whatever we do has to be flexible enough to meet these requirements”.133 He told 
us that:
The issue on migration will be one of the principle of free movement versus 
control, rather than numbers.134
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He also recognised the need to balance the economic arguments around migration with 
the social impact of migration, “housing and all the other things that go with it”. He 
acknowledged the need to ensure that any system reflected the needs of the economy:
I have said in terms, and again I was criticised for it, that this applies not 
just to scientists, bankers and so on; it also applies to seasonal workers in 
agriculture and so on. The aim of the Government, as the Prime Minister 
has made plain, and she is an exHome Secretary, is to bring down the 
net migration numbers, but it will not be done in a way that damages the 
economy.135
122. We agree with the Secretary of State that immigration from the EU has made an 
important contribution to many sectors of the economy in different parts of the country 
and that, while reducing net migration remains an objective of the Government, this 
should not be done in a way that damages the economy. The Government’s objective is 
to secure control of EU migration and this may not entail reducing numbers. Future 
policy will be an important element in the forthcoming negotiations, given the linkage 
frequently made between ‘free movement’ and access to the Single Market. We look 
forward to scrutinising the proposals once the Immigration Bill has been published.
123. We urge the Department for Exiting the EU to continue to make the argument in 
Government that the future system for EU migration needs to be flexible enough to 
meet the needs of the economy across the UK. This includes a broad range of different 
sectors, both high and low skilled, including scientists, bankers, vets, care workers, 
health service professionals and seasonal agriculture workers. That flexibility should 
include considering whether immigration should be managed on a geographic basis. 
We also note with concern the tendency of some employers to rely on importing skilled 
labour from abroad rather than training up UK employees.
Objective 6: Securing rights for EU nationals in the UK and UK 
nationals in the EU
124. The Government has said that it wants to secure an early agreement which guarantees 
reciprocal rights for both EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals who are resident 
across the EU. In our report on The Government’s negotiating objectives: the rights of UK 
and EU nationals, we called on the Government to:
make a unilateral decision to safeguard the rights of EU nationals living in 
the UK.136
125. We noted in our Second Report that:
Managing the permanent residence application process represents a 
considerable challenge for the Home Office, one that may affect its day 
to day work. It needs to be transparent about the necessary financial and 
human resources required and what it is doing to put them in place. The 
Government needs to be preparing now.137
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We note that the Home Office is advertising for an additional 240 staff to “work on all 
types of casework, including European”.138
126. Sadiq Khan told us that uncertainty over the rights of one million Londoners who 
are EU citizens is feeding into uncertainty in business recruitment.139 He referred to work 
by the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development that reported that there are some 
people leaving the UK to go back to EU countries of origin.140 He called for the Prime 
Minister to offer a guarantee to all EU citizens on the date she triggered Article 50.
127. The Secretary of State told us that:
In all except one of the meetings I have had since the White Paper with 
foreign ministers, it has spontaneously come up as the first issue. In that 
one, it was the second issue so, in all of them, it has come up in the first two 
issues.141
128. He added that:
What I will try to do, and I think I will succeed, is get an exchange of letters 
that makes absolutely plain what we think the outcomes will be and should 
be and we are determined to make, so we get both sides of the negotiation 
to agree that. That is what I will aim for.142
129. There have been media reports subsequently that representatives of both the EU 
nationals in the UK and UK nationals across the EU, including groups that gave evidence 
to this Committee, will be meeting Michel Barnier, and separately meeting the Secretary 
of State.143
130. The status of EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals living elsewhere in the 
EU cannot be left unresolved until the end of the two-year period for negotiations. We 
reiterate the conclusion of our earlier Report that it would be unconscionable for the 
more than four million people in these groups to find themselves living in a state of 
uncertainty about their futures until negotiations are complete, and, therefore, that 
the Government “should now make a unilateral decision to safeguard the rights of EU 
nationals living in the UK”. We note that, to date, Ministers have not taken this step. 
The debate around whether “no deal is better than a bad deal” has focussed on the 
trade aspects of the future relationship. If the negotiations were to end prematurely 
without an agreement on the rights for the four million, this could put them in an 
uncertain position.
131. We recommend that an agreement between the UK and EU27 is reached as a matter 
of priority once negotiations formally start. That agreement should be concluded as a 
stand-alone and separate deal which is otherwise not dependent on any other exit or 
future trade deal being agreed to between the parties.
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132. We welcome the intention of both the Secretary of State and Michel Barnier, the 
European Commission’s Chief Negotiator for Brexit, to meet representatives from 
the EU nationals in the UK and the UK nationals who are resident across Europe in 
advance of the negotiations. This is an important development and we hope it is a 
positive step towards an early resolution of the uncertainty and anxiety of the four 
million across Europe.
Objective 7: Protecting workers’ rights
133. The White Paper makes a strong commitment to the maintenance, and enhancement, 
of workers’ rights:
The Great Repeal Bill will maintain the protections and standards that 
benefit workers. Moreover, this Government has committed not only 
to safeguard the rights of workers set out in European legislation, but to 
enhance them.144
134. The White Paper identifies specific rights, such as annual leave, maternity leave, 
parental leave and the minimum wage, but does not define “workers’ rights” more generally. 
The previous Government’s Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and 
the EU identified the main areas of regulation that impact on the workplace as: equal 
treatment; regulation of the employment relationship; social protection; and health and 
safety at work. A range of other rights and pieces of legislation could be identified as falling 
under EU Employment Law and therefore pertaining to workers’ rights, including: agency 
workers legislation; data protection; anti-discrimination; fixed-term workers; health and 
safety; insolvency; information and consultation; maternity and parental rights; part-time 
workers; posted workers; written statement of terms and conditions; TUPE (Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment)); working time; and protection of young people 
at work.145
135. Frances O’Grady, General Secretary of the TUC, responding to the publication of the 
White Paper, expressed concern that:
While it’s good to see the Government maintain its commitment to 
protecting existing workers’ rights, people need to know the government 
won’t seek to compete in a race to the bottom that allows their rights to fall 
behind workers in the rest of Europe.146
She told us before Christmas that “we don’t want Britain to become the bargain basement 
capital of Europe”.147
136. The Secretary of State offered reassurance that:
As for employment rights, a large component of the people who voted to 
leave the European Union could be characterised as the British industrial 
working class. It is no part of my brief to undermine their rights—full stop.148
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137. However, there are a number of areas in which “workers’ rights” in the EU are 
currently under further development, including in proposals to revise the Posting of 
Workers Directive to address unfair practices and in a review of EU health and safety 
legislation. Rt Hon David Jones MP, Minister of State at the Department for Exiting the 
European Union, acknowledged that future divergence between UK and EU legislation 
would be an “important consideration” in the Brexit process.149
138. Notwithstanding the Government’s commitment to maintain protections for 
workers after the UK leaves the EU, it is likely that levels of protection for workers 
will diverge in future. Although regulations will be aligned on the day that the UK 
leaves the EU, thereafter, regulatory power will return to the UK. We note the General 
Secretary of the TUC’s concern that the UK should not become the “bargain basement” 
of Europe in this respect and therefore welcome the Secretary of State’s commitment 
that the Government has no intention of looking to undermine workers’ rights.
149 HC Deb, 7 November 2016, col 1364
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5 A truly global Britain
Objective 8: Ensuring free trade with European markets
Leaving the Single Market
139. The Government states it is seeking “the freest and most frictionless trade possible in 
goods and services between the UK and the EU”. The White Paper states that this will not 
be through membership of the Single Market, but through “a new strategic partnership 
with the EU, including an ambitious and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and a new 
customs agreement.”150 The White Paper adds that:
we do not seek to adopt a model already enjoyed by other countries. The 
UK already has zero tariffs on goods and a common regulatory framework 
within the EU Single Market. This position is unprecedented in previous 
trade negotiations.151
140. The Single Market has been described as the closest thing to a pure free trade 
agreement.152 However, the Single Market is underpinned by the “four freedoms” that 
EU members must abide by—the freedom of movement for goods; services; capital; and 
people. As a member of the Single Market the UK is part of a free trade area that:
• eliminates tariffs (i.e. border taxes/duties) between its members;
• provides for a customs union; and
• reduces non-tariff barriers through harmonisation of national rules.
141. Other key obligations are:
• financial contributions;
• adherence to EU laws and regulations, including rulings of the CJEU; and
• adherence to EU sectoral policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and 
Common Fisheries Policy.
142. Although the EU Single Market is not a legal term, the customs union and single 
market are constituent parts of the “internal market”, which is defined in Article 26 TFEU 
as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”. Sir Ivan 
Rogers told us:
Essentially, what is a single market or an internal market? It is a group of 
nations that agree to be bound by a single regulatory rulebook or code, 
which requires all its members to adhere to all four freedoms as defined 
150 The White Paper p35
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in the treaties. None of these freedoms are full freedoms; all of them are 
qualified by all manner of qualifications in secondary legislation, and even 
inside the treaties.
For others, correctly—and I think the Prime Minister is correctly concluding 
that herself—single market membership means acceptance of supranational 
law and the role of the Commission. It means acceptance of supranational 
jurisdiction and the role of the ECJ. It means the Commission’s right of 
initiative and its right to infract Member States when they think they are 
out of line and not implementing the single market acquis properly.153
143. Any non-EEA country can gain access (as opposed to membership) to the EU Single 
Market (i.e. trade with EU countries), but the terms of that access vary greatly depending 
on the extent of access negotiated:
• By means of a series of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the EU, 
Switzerland has access to the Single Market in all non-agricultural goods 
and some services on terms similar to those enjoyed by EU members (and is 
sometimes referred to as being a “member” of the Single Market). There are 
corresponding obligations to: abide by the four freedoms; make a relatively small 
financial contribution to the EU; and adapt domestic legislation to reflect some 
EU regulations. Switzerland is not part of the EU customs union, or bound by 
EU sectoral policies, or represented in EU institutions.
• Turkey’s customs union with the EU allows it to trade tariff-free with the 
Single Market in manufactured goods and processed agricultural goods only. 
There is a corresponding obligation to impose a common external tariff on all 
manufactured goods and processed agricultural goods entering Turkey from 
outside the EU. Turkey is, however, not an automatic beneficiary of the trade 
advantages that EU members enjoy in respect of countries with which the EU has 
FTAs, while those countries do gain access to Turkey’s markets. In addition, EU 
product regulations must be applied. Turkey’s ability to adopt an independent 
trade policy towards third countries is limited by the terms of the customs 
union. There are no corresponding obligations on Turkey in respect of the four 
freedoms; financial contributions to the EU; EU laws; and EU sectoral policies. 
Turkey is not represented in EU institutions. A small number of European 
microstates are also in customs unions with the EU.
•  The EU has FTAs with over 50 countries.154 These agreements give varying 
types and degrees of access to the Single Market—but almost entirely in relation 
to goods rather than services. None of these (except those involving EEA and 
Switzerland) require acceptance of the free movement of people, making a 
formal budget contribution, or the jurisdiction of the CJEU.
• The rest of the world trades with the EU on the basis of WTO rules, meaning 
that their exports to the EU are subject to the EU’s tariffs under WTO rules, as 
well as other trade barriers. Likewise, EU exports to those countries are subject 
to the tariffs that they operate under WTO rules and other barriers to trade.
153 Q1064
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The Government’s red lines
144. The Government has been clear that it is not seeking to adopt an existing model.155 
It has also chosen to set out certain “red lines” which the Prime Minister told the 
Conservative Party Conference in October 2016 were what “the people told us” they 
wanted with the referendum result: “Our laws made not in Brussels but in Westminster. 
Our judges sitting not in Luxembourg but in courts across the land. The authority of 
EU law in this country ended forever.” She wanted “free trade, in goods and services”, 
giving “British companies the maximum freedom to trade with and operate within the 
Single Market–and let European businesses do the same here”. While ensuring that the 
UK becomes “a sovereign and independent country”, she added that “we are not leaving 
the European Union only to give up control of immigration all over again. And we are not 
leaving only to return to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.”156
145. Subsequently, the Prime Minister also confirmed that “the days of Britain making vast 
contributions to the European Union every year will end.”157 In light of these conditions, 
the Prime Minister also stated at Lancaster House that what the Government is proposing 
“cannot mean membership of the Single Market”.158
146. The Secretary of State has indicated that the Government is seeking access to the 
Single Market which will “deliver the exact same benefits as we have,”159 at the same time 
as adhering to its “red lines”. When asked about the feasibility of such an outcome, the 
Secretary of State told us that he had been “expressing an ambition.”160 However, the 
White Paper contends that this will be done through a “new comprehensive, bold and 
ambitious free trade agreement” which may “take in elements of current Single Market 
arrangements in certain areas as it makes no sense to start again from scratch”.161
147. Sir Ivan Rogers suggested that this would be difficult for the EU27 to accept:
For them, they say: “That is fine. You have now accepted that you are not in 
the single market, and a good thing too”. Then the argument will become, 
“But you still may want to have large elements of your cake and eat it, by 
saying, ‘Effectively, our access to the market in loads of areas that matter 
enormously to us should be unchanged regardless of us no longer accepting 
supranational jurisdiction and law’”. I am sure you heard it; there is quite 
155 The White Paper para 8.2
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a large divergence between Berlin views, Brussels views and what you get 
here. People did say to me repeatedly, over months and years, “That is not 
on offer”.162
148. In his December 2016 press conference, Michel Barnier emphasised that:
being a Member of the European Union comes with rights and benefits. 
Third countries can never have the same rights and benefits, since they 
are not subject to the same obligations [ … ] the Single Market and its 
four freedoms [free movement of goods, services, capital and people] are 
indivisible. Cherry picking is not an option.163
The differences between membership of and access to the Single Market
149. Sir Ivan Rogers explained how access to the Single Market differed from membership. 
He gave three examples of how an FTA would not provide equivalent outcomes to current 
membership of the Single Market:
For example, on aeroplanes, access to the Single Market means planes 
can land at EU airports and return from them. Membership of the Single 
Market means you get slot, gate and lounge allocation on the same terms as 
local airlines—that is, not 3.00 am slots a mile away from the terminal, and 
the airlines can fly within the EU, not just to and from the EU.
Access means that your banks can only lend via a local subsidiary. 
Membership means there is no need for your banks to be separately 
supervised, regulated, managed and capitalised subsidiaries in other 
countries. One can operate through branches, and home state rules and 
supervision suffice. Access means that Scotch can be sold into France or 
Germany; membership of the Single Market means that all taxes and duties 
for comparable products to Scotch must be the same as for Scotch, and if 
they are not, we can take them to the ECJ and say, “Why are they not?” We 
will not be able to take them to the ECJ.164
150. UK goods and services that comply with EU standards before Brexit will still be 
compliant on the day the UK leaves the EU. However, as Sir Ivan Rogers explained, the 
UK would on day one after Brexit become a third country and, as a third country, would 
operate in a different legal position, unless a separate agreement has been reached:
We are saying—[ … ] “Come on guys. You know the day before you used to 
take our accreditation and inspection regimes. They were perfectly fine the 
day before; why the hell are they not the day after? Do not be ridiculous”. The 
EU is perfectly capable of saying, “It is not a matter of being ridiculous; it is a 
matter of the law. In the absence of any law, given that you have now left the 
Union and left the single market, there is nothing. You have not signed any 
162 Q1064
163 Introductory comments by Michel Barnier, European Commission website, 6 December 2016
164 Q1077
51 The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
other agreement with us, and unless there is a legal agreement between the 
two of us, we no longer recognise your accreditation, conformity assessment 
bodies, abattoirs or slaughterhouses. We do not recognise any of it”.165
Of course in this situation EU exporters would face a similar situation in trading into 
Britain.
151. Professor Jim Rollo, UK Trade Policy Observatory, University of Sussex, told us that 
the UK would need to introduce some form of conformity assessment to continue to sell 
its products to the EU:
It seems to me that the first thing that goes, with all the EU standards that 
are applied here through direct effect of EU law, is that we no longer get that 
recognition that what we produce is automatically and by law consistent 
with the EU standard. There are currently no administrative barriers based 
on standards that apply to UK exports to the EU, or on EU exports to us. 
That would, in principle, change on day one of Brexit if there is no other 
deal done. 166
Since Sir Ivan gave evidence on 22nd February 2017, the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement has come into force. This requires ratifying countries–including the EU–to 
take all practical measures to facilitate trade and reduce administrative obstacles.
152. Becoming a third country without any agreement, Professor Rollo added, is like 
moving into “a legal void” where you would not be “on the list” of countries permitted 
and approved to export to the EU market.167
Negotiating a new Free Trade Agreement with the EU
153. In our First Report, we stated that it would be in the best interests of both the UK and 
the EU27 to negotiate the UK’s future relationship with the EU in parallel with the Article 
50 negotiation.168 The Government responded that it expects the future relationship to 
include an FTA and it “wants to have reached an agreement about a future partnership 
by the time the two-year Article 50 process has concluded.”169 Some have argued that 
the two-year period for concluding Article 50 negotiations is an ambitious timetable for 
agreeing a trade deal.170 However, as the White Paper points out, the UK is in a unique 
position:
The UK already has zero tariffs on goods and a common regulatory 
framework with the EU Single Market. This position is unprecedented in 
previous trade negotiations. Unlike other trade negotiations, this is not 
about bringing two divergent systems together. It is about finding the best 
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enable UK and EU businesses to trade with and operate in each others’ 
markets, to continue when we leave the EU through a new comprehensive, 
bold and ambitious free trade agreement.171
154. The Secretary of State explained how the trade deal negotiations would be expedited:
when two countries come together to arrange a trading arrangement 
between themselves, the first stage is to be able to understand each other’s 
structures and standards, so that takes time too. None of that do we have 
to do. Neither do we need an entry-into-force period, which is the other 
issue that takes time in these things. It is not just the sign-off; it is the actual 
period of industry coming to meet the new standards. 172
155. He added that other Member States wanted a “constructive outcome” to maintain 
the strong trading links already in existence with the UK. By comparison, the CETA deal 
with Canada had required detailed sector by sector analysis which would not be necessary 
in this negotiation.173
Trade in goods
156. As a member of the Single Market, the UK trades with the EU on a tariff-free basis. 
The White Paper outlines the Government’s ambition that the UK’s new partnership with 
the EU should allow for “tariff-free trade in goods that is as frictionless as possible”.174
157. The Committee met representatives from a number of businesses on its visits 
across the UK that operated with international supply chains. Concerns were expressed 
that those supply chains could be subject to multiple tariffs and administrative delays.175 
However, John Longworth told us that these concerns were inflated and that “there is a 
huge amount of supply chain activity in Asia for UK manufacturing and service sector 
businesses”.176The White Paper emphasises the integration of supply chains as important 
for both UK and EU businesses, inferring that this mutual dependence will aid agreement 
for tariff-free trade. The White Paper gives the example that “the wings for the Airbus 
A350 XWB are produced in the UK. The wings are made from many parts, drawing from 
expertise and excellence across the UK and EU. Although the wings are assembled in 
North Wales, they are designed and produced through cooperation between specialist 
teams in Germany, Spain, France and Filton, near Bristol.”177
158. Given the political will, reaching an agreement on tariff-free trade should be 
straightforward. However, “frictions” the Government is seeking to minimise may come 
from non-tariff barriers. The UK Trade Policy Observatory highlighted examples of non-
tariff barriers in written evidence to us:
The need for Rules of Origin (ROOs), and possibly tests to demonstrate 
compliance with EU norms. Each of these barriers could be as costly as 
171 The White Paper para 8.2
172 Q1396
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the tariffs that are abolished. An FTA arrangement would also allow the 
introduction of anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguard actions 
(collectively known as Trade Defence Instruments (TDI)) into UK–EU 
trade. It follows from this that, despite their name, FTA variants are likely 
to result in higher barriers and lower trade than currently govern UK–EU 
trade.178
159. The White Paper explains how non-tariff barriers are dealt with within the EU:
Free movement of goods within the EU is secured through a number of 
mechanisms, including through the principle of mutual recognition (which 
means that goods lawfully marketed in one Member State can be sold in 
all Member States), the harmonisation of product rules (where the same 
rules apply for a range of goods, such as for fertilisers, in all Member States) 
and agreement that manufacturers can use voluntary standards as a way 
of demonstrating compliance with certain essential characteristics set out 
in EU law (such as for toy safety). In a number of sectors covering typically 
higher risk goods (such as chemicals or medicines), the EU has also agreed 
more in-depth harmonised regulatory regimes, including for testing or 
licensing.179
160. After over 40 years as a member of the EU, the UK will enter into negotiations with 
identical product and regulatory standards and, on the day the UK leaves the EU, these 
standards will have been incorporated into domestic law through the “Great Repeal Bill”.180 
Roderick Abbott, former Deputy Director-General, The World Trade Organisation and 
European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, told us that the negotiations would 
not be over the question of common standards:
The EU will approach this as, ‘We have got our standards; we have got our 
Single Market regulations. If you want to discuss whether you adopt those 
and have a continuity and so forth, that is up to you. On our side, we are not 
putting forward a negotiation about our standards’.
[ … ] The key is [ … ] how can you get a close association to the single 
market in terms of some deal where the EU accepts that you are able to 
pragmatically comply with Single Market regulations as you have in the last 
30 or 40 years? 181
161. Others have noted that following the UK’s exit, unless the UK actively decides to 
maintain compliance with EU standards, divergence will be inevitable. Sir Ivan Rogers 
explained to the Committee the perspective of his former EU counterparts.
[What my EU colleagues] said to me was: “The problem is not day one. 
It is day two, or day 200, or day 2,000. What have you recaptured your 
sovereignty and autonomy for, if you are now saying that you will line up 
178 UK Trade Policy Observatory (OBJ0149) para 1.1 
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via the “Great Repeal Bill” [ … ] to repeat exactly what you had when you 
were in the European Union?”182
[ … ] If you were a foreign counterpart to me, you are saying, “Hang on, 
you are likely over time to diverge really quite substantially from the acquis, 
because otherwise you would not have done this, and you must think that 
you can reap material advantage from divergence from the acquis. However, 
then you are asking us to sign up to a deal where everything is enshrined 
in UK law, but you are no longer subject to supranational jurisdiction. We 
need a governance process to know how far you are going to diverge, and 
on what, and then what happens when you do diverge”.183
162. Other trade agreements involving harmonisation of standards also have to incorporate 
resolution mechanisms to deal with possible divergence (after they have achieved the far 
more difficult task of converging standards). So there should be precedents to build on.
Trade in services
163. Given the UK’s strength in trade in services, which account for 42 per cent of the 
UK’s exports to the EU, negotiating a good deal in this area will be a priority. The UK has 
a surplus on trade in services with both EU and non-EU countries. Although the possible 
impact of Brexit on the financial services industry has dominated media commentary, 
the UK’s total exports of non-financial services to the EU, including professional services, 
digital, media, transport and education, stands at £62.9 billion, and is much higher than 
financial services exports at £26 billion.184
164. Free trade in services within the EU is enabled through a complex regulatory 
framework. However, as the White Paper points out, the EU Single Market for services is 
“not complete”, as the regulation of services remains a shared competence between the EU 
and its Member States.185 At present, UK service providers benefit from certain horizontal 
and sector-specific EU legislation for:
• the right of individuals or companies from one Member State to deliver services 
in another Member State either temporarily or permanently;
• mutual recognition of professional qualifications (the licensing of professionals 
by regulatory bodies is subject to the principle of mutual recognition throughout 
the Single Market); and
• sets of regulations for particular service sectors, including telecommunications, 
aviation, road-transport and media services. The Digital Single Market (covering 
digital marketing, e-commerce and telecommunications) aims to ensure the 
EU’s regulatory environment keeps pace with the evolving digital economy.186
182 Q1076
183 Q1100
184 House of Lords’ European Union Committee, Eighteenth Report of Session 2016–17, Brexit: trade in non-financial 
services, HL Paper 135, para 35
185 While only the EU can act in areas where it has exclusive competence (for example in setting the Common 
External Tariff for goods entering the customs union), in areas of shared competence either the EU or Member 
States can act (although Member States may be prevented from acting where the EU has already done so), 
giving Member States a certain amount of discretion over the application of services regulations.
186 International Trade Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, UK trade options beyond 2019, HC 817, para 72
55 The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
165. The White Paper states that the Government will aim for “the freest possible trade 
in services” between the UK and the EU.187 To reach an agreement including services 
liberalisation across borders would, according to Sir Ivan Rogers, be “the biggest free trade 
agreement ever struck”.188 Dr Federico Ortino, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s 
College London, told the Committee that for services:
outside the Single Market we have not been able to liberalise trade in services, 
particularly when it comes to, where it is relevant, non-tariff barriers. Look 
at even the most ambitious FTAs, such as Canada. What that gives in terms 
of the commitment in financial services in CETA is very marginal [ … ] 
Overall, it is not much different from what you get from the GATS schedule 
of WTO members.189
166. Sir Ivan Rogers stressed the importance of ensuring the UK–EU FTA covered services:
The slight danger for us is that, given the goods surplus for them is so great 
and the services surplus is so great, they would pocket the goods agreement 
and say, “Good; we have tariff-free access; we do not really need to bother 
about your services”. I would not buy that pig in a poke; I would want a full 
and comprehensive FTA that covered goods and services.190
167. The importance of mutual recognition of standards and professional qualifications, 
and non-discrimination, has been highlighted by a number of witnesses. Gareth Horsfall, 
a British citizen resident in Italy told us:
I work in financial services. I use the EU passport of qualifications, as 
do legal professionals and accounting professionals, into another EU 
state. If that were taken away from me, the reality is that I may have to sit 
examinations—in my case, in Italian—and there would be an additional 
cost to me of that. My understanding of the Italian language is very good, 
but to actually sit examinations, it would have to be at a very advanced level. 
There would be a massive cost to me as a business, and it might even put 
me out of business for a period. Mutual recognition of qualifications is of 
paramount importance.191
168. The International Trade Committee has recommended that a UK–EU FTA should 
seek as far as possible to reproduce the right of establishment and mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications from which the UK currently benefits as a member of the EU.192
169. In approaching the negotiations, the Government needs to recognise the strength 
of the view in the EU27 that, as Michel Barnier has emphasised, the ‘four freedoms are 
indivisible’.
170. The Government should seek a UK–EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which covers 
both goods and services and retains the mutual recognition of standards and conformity 
assessments. The Government should also seek to maintain the right of establishment 
187 The White Paper para 8.21
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and mutual recognition of qualifications in a UK–EU FTA. The Government should 
maintain the maximum possible flexibility in its negotiating approach to achieve these 
outcomes.
171. Notwithstanding the Government’s plans to enshrine EU law into domestic law 
through the “Great Repeal Bill”, over time the two bodies of law may diverge as the 
Government seeks to change or repeal regulations. The Government should provide 
clarity on how it will address divergence in rules and standards and disputes that may 
arise as a result, outside of the jurisdiction of the CJEU.
Financial services
172. A key concern for the financial sector is the potential loss of “passporting” rights when 
leaving the EU. Passporting currently gives UK firms the ability to sell financial services 
across the EU and EU firms to sell financial services in the UK without establishing a 
subsidiary. According to the White Paper, both UK and EU firms benefit from the UK’s 
passporting rights, with “over 5,000 UK firms that utilise passports to provide services 
across the rest of the EU, but around 8,000 European firms that use passports to provide 
services into the UK”.193
173. The Mayor of London has said that the loss of passporting rights would be “a 
disaster”.194 He said: “I’ll be pushing the Treasury to make sure passporting is top of their 
priority list”.195 He told us that some financial institutions have already decided to move 
staff outside the UK, while also pointing out that London has “underlying strengths” as 
a city, in particular in its talent and infrastructure which London will still have once the 
UK leaves the EU.196
174. Recognition of regulatory equivalence would provide UK financial services providers 
in some sectors with opportunities to run operations in the EU.197 In a letter to the Treasury 
Committee, Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
said that, for financial services, “in the absence of passporting rights, UK firms would 
need either to seek access under “equivalence” frameworks where possible, to use “third 
country” passports where available under specific pieces of legislation, or alternatively 
to seek authorisation from each regulator of the jurisdiction into which they aim to do 
business.”198 The FCA subsequently wrote:
we do not have a measure of the value of financial services that may be 
impacted in the event that passporting arrangements were no longer 
applicable to UK financial firms after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
However, [ … ] I reiterate that global standards and trade agreements do 
not, at least currently, provide for the recognition of authorisations in the 
way that the single market directives do.199
193 The White Paper, para 8.23
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175. Sir Ivan Rogers highlighted the limitations of recognition of regulatory equivalence, 
including that recognition could be “politicised” and withdrawn at short notice and only 
covered certain sectors. These limitations represented:
a very serious problem, unless we get a bespoke financial services deal with 
equivalence that really works for us. [ … ] but this would be something the 
EU27 have not done for any other partner. It did not do that for the States, 
and it has not been prepared to do it for any other partner.
We would have to say, on financial services, “We are big, and you need 
access to us. There is a massive interest to you in still having London as 
a kind of centre in our time zone, but we need a totally different type of 
agreement with you from any that has previously been negotiated”.200
176. The White Paper states that it is in the interests of the UK and the EU that the UK 
financial services sector should continue “in order to avoid market fragmentation and the 
possible disruption or withdrawal of services”, while adding that:
The fundamental strengths that underpin the UK financial services sector, 
such as our legal system, language and our world-class infrastructure will 
help to ensure that the UK remains a pre-eminent global financial centre. 201
177. London is a pre-eminent global financial centre and the financial services industry 
supports a large number of jobs in London and even more across the rest of the UK. 
It is in both the UK’s and the EU’s interests to ensure there is minimal disruption 
to financial services when the UK leaves the EU. As part of negotiations on a UK–
EU FTA, the Government should seek to secure stable and predictable equivalence 
arrangements or a bespoke system comparable to the EU system of “passporting” 
which will ensure the stability of cross-border financial services between the UK and 
the EU.
178. Financial and professional services will require time to adjust to any new 
trading arrangements. The Government should seek to agree a phased process of 
implementation for the sector early in the negotiations to provide certainty for 
businesses in preparing for Brexit.
 Digital services
179. The White Paper states that the Government is “committed to making the UK the 
best place in the world to do business” by looking to establish a stable and predictable 
regulatory environment, while also looking to reduce the cost of unnecessary regulation 
to support innovation. One aspect of this business environment is the importance of data 
transfer to many trade sectors. The White Paper states:
The stability of data transfer is important for many sectors–from financial 
services, to tech, to energy companies. EU rules support data flows amongst 
Member States. For example, the EU data protection framework outlines 
the rights of EU citizens, as well as the obligations to which companies 
must adhere when processing and transferring this data. [ … ]
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As we leave the EU, we will seek to maintain the stability of data transfer 
between EU Member States and the UK.202
180. When the Committee held a roundtable with representatives of the digital and tech 
sector in London in January 2017, a common priority was the need to ensure that there are 
uninterrupted data flows between the UK and the EU once we leave, and that there is legal 
certainty that that would be the case on the day the UK left the EU. According to the trade 
association for the digital sector, techUK’s report on The UK Digital Sectors after Brexit:
Failure to secure adequacy may force the “localisation” or redirection of 
data flows on EU citizens (that requires storage and/or processing outside 
the UK), risking fragmented communications links and data flows between 
the UK and European partners. In addition, many UK businesses will 
need to implement costly alternative legal mechanisms, many of which are 
subject to ongoing legal challenge and uncertainty. Continued uncertainty 
over EU–UK data flows could also see companies restrict the amount and 
type of data processed in the UK. Such an outcome could impact data 
infrastructure and in particular data centres in the UK, which are among 
the region’s and the world’s most active.203
181. The Secretary of State highlighted the challenge made by Austrian Max Schrems 
against Facebook on data protection and safe harbour status as the kind of challenge the 
UK could be subject to once we leave the EU. He told us that:
One of the strategies I am arguing inside Government is that we make 
ourselves extrarobust in that respect. That has security implications, 
commercial implications for other industries because data is so important 
there and of course enormously important implications for the digital 
industry and the tech industry itself.204
182. The digital industry is an increasingly important sector to the UK economy 
and relies on the stability of data flows across UK and EU borders. The Government 
must seek to maintain uninterrupted UK–EU data flows by securing a data adequacy 
agreement with the EU before the end of the Article 50 negotiations.
The Single Market for broadcasting
183. The White Paper states the following in relation to the broadcasting sector:
Content that is carried over electronic communication networks is regulated 
in the EU by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. This underpins the 
operation of the internal market for broadcasting by ensuring the freedom 
to provide broadcasting services throughout the EU. The UK is currently 
the EU’s biggest broadcasting hub, hosting a large number of international 
broadcasting companies. In the course of the negotiations, we will focus on 
ensuring the ability to trade as freely as possible with the EU and supporting 
the continued growth of the UK’s broadcasting sector.205
202 The White Paper, paras 8.38 and 8.40
203 techUK, “The UK digital sectors after Brexit”, January 2017, p38
204 Q1464
205 The White Paper, para 8.35 
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More than 650 different TV channels use the UK to broadcast to countries across the EU, 
more than double the number based in its nearest rival France.
184. The Audio Visual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) governs market access in the 
EU.206 The AVMSD employs a ‘country-of-origin’ approach, meaning that firms which 
satisfy regulatory requirements in the EU Member State in which their services originate 
can operate throughout the EU without having to apply for additional licences, so UK 
channels granted an Ofcom licence can broadcast freely across the Single Market. Adam 
Minns, the Executive Director of the Commercial Broadcasters Association (COBA) is 
reported as saying “The UK’s status as Europe’s leading international broadcast centre 
is at risk. [ … ] It’s black and white. Either those licences are valid or they aren’t.”207 We 
heard similar concerns at a roundtable discussion with the creative industries on our visit 
in London. The recent House of Lords report on Brexit: trade in non-financial services, 
also addressed concerns in the industry.208
185. One option would be for broadcasters based in the UK to apply for a licence in an 
EU Member State, which would require the broadcaster to have a “significant part” of 
their workforce (compared to the UK) and editorial decisions in the EU.209 Another 
would be for the UK to seek to include provisions on broadcasting in a UK–EU FTA. 
The recent EU-Canada FTA (CETA) excluded broadcasting. The EU-South Korea FTA 
granted some access for animé. There is no precedent for a third country securing Single 
Market-equivalent access for broadcasters.210 When asked about the AVSM, the Secretary 
of State told us that “equivalence mechanisms are going to be of incredible importance, 
particularly in service industry areas, whether it is film, video, any of the creative arts.” 
He also said he had “explicit work going on” in relation to broadcasting and would write 
to the Committee with further detail.211
186. The broadcasting industry, like many aspects of the UK creative industries, is 
a success story. International broadcasters base themselves in the UK to broadcast 
across the EU and the Audio Visual Media Services Directive enables broadcasters in 
one Member State to do so if they have a licence from the domestic regulator—Ofcom 
in the UK—and comply with the regulatory requirements in that Member State. This 
has helped the UK to become Europe’s leading broadcasting hub. In the event of an 
exit without alternative arrangements in place, international broadcasters could 
fall back on the Council of Europe’s Convention on Transfrontier Television (CTT). 
However, it is an inadequate replacement: on-demand broadcasting is not covered, six 
Member States are not signatories, and it cannot be effectively enforced. International 
broadcasters could seek to access the EU market through subsidiaries, but this would 
require them to relocate a significant proportion of their workforce to the EU and 
for most of their editorial decisions to be made there. Neither of these options are 
attractive to the sector. The Government must therefore ensure that a future FTA 
206 European Commission, General principles of the Audio Visual Media Services Directive 
207 “Brexit fears raised over UK’s status as Europe’s broadcast centre” Financial Times, 18 November 2016 
208 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in non-financial services report, HL Paper 135, Paras 
173–195, 201–207
209 A draft recast of the AVMSD proposes requiring a “majority” of a broadcaster’s workforce to be based in the EU 
in order for it to be eligible for a license, as opposed to a “significant part” of it. 
210 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in non-financial services report, HL Paper 135, Paras 
178–179 and Box.10, and TAS0044 
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between the UK and the EU retains the ability of broadcasters based in the UK to 
continue to operate across the Single Market to the same extent once the UK is no 
longer a Member State. Securing continued access to this market is a priority.
A mutually beneficial new customs arrangement
187. A customs union is an extension to a conventional free trade agreement. In addition 
to reducing or removing internal tariffs on goods, members of a customs union apply 
a common external tariff. The EU customs union has a Common Commercial Policy 
and Common External Tariff. Customs unions are recognised by the WTO as a form of 
regional trade agreement. As such, they need to meet certain conditions set out in Article 
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)212 and Article V of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).213 These stipulate that customs unions 
or free trade agreements must liberalise “substantially all the trade” in goods or have 
“substantial sectoral coverage” for trade in services.
188. The Government has stated that one of its key negotiating objectives is for the UK 
to be able to negotiate its own trade agreements without being bound by the Common 
Commercial Policy and the Common External Tariff,214 effectively ruling out the customs 
union option. In her Lancaster House speech, the Prime Minister said that she wanted 
cross-border trade to be “as frictionless as possible”, suggesting this could be done through 
a customs agreement with the EU:
Whether that means we must reach a completely new customs agreement, 
become an associate member of the Customs Union in some way, or remain 
a signatory to some elements of it, I hold no preconceived position. I have an 
open mind on how we do it. It is not the means that matter, but the ends.215
189. What is meant by a “customs agreement” is not clear. Roderick Abbott suggested 
that the term had been “deliberately chosen to be vague”.216 He told us that it could be 
anything that has a customs duty component of any kind. Witnesses to the Committee 
expressed the view that it would not be possible practically to run a free trade agreement 
and a partial customs union in parallel. Professor Jim Rollo told us that:
This will run into problems at the WTO, if nowhere else, because it will get 
on the wrong side of rules about free trade areas or customs unions meeting 
substantially all trade rules. That rule itself is deeply ambiguous as to what 
is the criterion for that, but if we put that to side for one moment, people 
could argue if it was quite small, with one or two sectors covered by the 
customs union, that probably would not be substantially all trade. If there 
were still not quite enough sectors left in the free trade area, that might not 
qualify to be substantially all trade either, so there is an issue there.217
212 WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
213 WTO, General Agreement on Trade in Services 
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Rules of origin
190. The advantage of a customs union is not having to prove origin of goods. In a trade 
agreement between two or more countries, participants agree to the Rules of Origin 
principle. This requires them to be able to demonstrate that traded goods benefitting 
from the trade agreement originated in their country. This is designed to prevent trade 
deflection, whereby a third country chooses to export to that free trade area through 
the country with the lower external tariff. Were the UK to agree an FTA with the EU 
without a customs union, then rules of origin would apply and a customs border would 
consequently exist between the UK and the EU.
191. We heard from John Longworth that companies which export around the world, 
have to comply with different regulations. He told us that “standards and regulations 
were becoming global, not simply concerning individual nations or blocs of nations”. He 
explained:
In relation to the customs union, curiously [ … ] all the export and origin 
documentation issued in the UK is issued by chambers of commerce. 
There is a 1922 treaty whereby goods can be transported globally without 
containers having to be broken open and the goods examined. They carry 
a chambers of commerce certificate, which enables the free movement of 
goods, in customs terms, around the world. That is already in place.218
192. The Secretary of State confirmed that we will “almost certainly have to have rules of 
origin arrangements and there will be some sort of inspection arrangement to go with 
that”.219 He suggested that the “frictions” of rules of origin could be reduced with a system 
of trusted traders and electronic arrangements, an aspiration also expressed in the White 
Paper:
As we look to build our future customs relationship with the EU and 
the rest of the world, we start from a strong position. As a large trading 
nation, we possess a world-class customs system which handles imports 
and exports from all over the world. We already have highly efficient 
processes for freight arriving from the rest of the world–the vast majority 
of customs declarations in the UK are submitted electronically and are 
cleared rapidly. Only a small proportion cannot go through so rapidly, for 
instance where risk assessment indicates that compliance and enforcement 
checks are required at the border. The World Bank’s Logistics Performance 
Index shows that HMRC operates one of the world’s most efficient customs 
regimes.220
193. In response to the House of Lords’ EU Committee report on Brexit: the options for 
trade, the Government suggested that the customs arrangements between the US, Canada 
and Mexico and between Norway, Sweden and Finland provide examples for how high 
volumes of trade flow across borders without the need for a formal customs union.221 The 
Government confirmed that it is examining examples from across the world, while the 
218 Q243
219 Q1400
220 The White Paper, para 8.44, and Q1400
221 House of Lords’ EU External Affairs and Internal Markets Sub-Committees, Brexit: the options for trade: 
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Department for Exiting the EU, in conjunction with the Department for International 
Trade, HM Revenue and Customs, HM Treasury, the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy, and other departments, have been undertaking a wide range of 
studies on different aspects of the UK’s trading relationship.222 However, the UK’s efforts 
to facilitate “frictionless” trade with the EU through customs systems can only be as 
effective as the corresponding efficiency of the customs systems in EU Member States and 
the treatment UK exporters might expect at EU borders.
Sectoral customs arrangements
194. Sectoral customs arrangements are a means to eliminate rules of origin, whereby 
countries co-ordinate their external trade policy. In a customs union, this is done through 
the external tariff. Sectoral customs arrangements require that any agreements those 
countries enter into with third countries would have to have the same coordination, as 
is the arrangement between the EU and Turkey. We heard from Dr Federico Ortino that:
If the agreement between the EU and the UK is to coordinate in terms of 
cars and car parts on what the tariff will be coming in, it will restrain the 
ability of both the UK and the EU in their third country arrangements. 
The UK has a clean slate and it can do that. The EU already has treaties 
[ … ] In any event, even if both countries started with a clean slate, that 
cooperation agreement would have to be respected in the relationship with 
third countries. That is not practical.223
195. When the car manufacturer Nissan UK announced that it would continue to invest 
in the UK following the referendum result, by building two new models at its Sunderland 
plant, some speculated that it had received assurances from Government that there would 
be some sort of sectoral arrangement specifically for the automotive industry. In evidence 
to the Committee on International Trade, the Senior Vice President of Nissan, Colin 
Lawther, said that what would benefit Nissan and the industry was not grant money but 
“free import duty for parts coming from the customs union, for example, in and out” 
or “an automotive-specific trade deal”.224 To date, the Government has not released full 
details of the assurances given to Nissan UK.
196. The nature of complex EU supply chains means that even if sectoral customs 
arrangements were envisaged, these would need to include not just the finished product 
(e.g. cars) but all the components that go into that product. Since such components would 
typically be used in several industries (i.e. not just in the automotive industry), sectoral 
customs agreements, even if legal, would run into practical difficulties in determining 
where a sector began and ended. As the International Trade Committee noted:
It is unclear, though, whether this would be legal under WTO rules. In 
addition, it is hard to see how it could be reconciled with the Government’s 
policy of pursuing an independent UK trade policy. The adoption of a CET 
222 Ibid.
223 Q1008
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[Common External Tariff], albeit only a sectoral one, of necessity limits the 
UK’s negotiating position as regards third-country FTAs, since these would 
have to be aligned with the EU’s FTAs in respect of automotive trade.225
197. Sir Ivan Rogers told us that the EU was likely to shy away from individual sectoral 
deals for fear of breaking the solidarity of the EU27.226 He added:
Could you have an automotive carve out and say these arrangements do not 
pertain or do pertain. I do not think that is very likely. Can I envisage some 
sort of customs co-operation agreement formally as part of an FTA? Yes, I 
am sure there could. I do not think any customs co-operation agreement 
when you are outside the customs union can exactly replicate the benefits 
of the customs union.227
198. In seeking to negotiate its own preferential trade agreements with non-EU 
countries, the Government has said that it will not continue to observe the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) and Common External Tariff (CET) of the EU customs 
union. However, it will seek to negotiate a new customs arrangement with the EU to 
minimise the “frictions” in cross-border trade between the UK and the EU27. The 
Government has been vague as to the characteristics of such a customs arrangement. 
The Government must provide more clarity as to the features of its preferred customs 
arrangement with the EU and how it will differ from a customs union.
199. There is, however, a risk that, on trade, the EU27 will decline to allow the UK to 
both leave the CCP and the CET and yet retain existing tariff and barrier free trade.
Trading on WTO terms
200. The WTO’s 164 members are all bound to observe the “most favoured nation” (MFN) 
principle. This means that they must offer each other the same trading terms as those they 
have granted to their most favoured trading partner.
201. Deviation from this principle is only permitted where an FTA or customs union has 
been negotiated with one or more trading partners, or where unilateral or non-reciprocal 
trade preferences are granted by a developed country to developing countries in order to 
support the latter’s development. WTO members must also make specific commitments, 
listed in schedules, which reflect specific tariff concessions and other commitments offered 
in the context of trade negotiations. The White Paper states:
Our WTO membership will form the bedrock on which we build our future 
trade relationships [ … ]
As part of leaving the EU, the UK will need to establish our own schedules 
covering trade in goods and services at the WTO, providing clarity for UK 
businesses about their access to overseas markets around the world and also 
providing a clear basis for negotiating new trade agreements, not just with 
the EU, but with old friends and allies from outside Europe too [ … ]
225 International Trade Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, UK trade options beyond 2019, HC 817, para 117
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Our aim is to establish our schedules in a way that replicates as far as 
possible our current position as an EU member state, thus creating a 
mutually beneficial, simple and inclusive outcome, so that the interests of 
the UK and other WTO members are protected.228
202. The Government has repeatedly stated that it is confident that it will negotiate 
a positive future relationship with the EU, including an FTA, as that would be in the 
interests of both the UK and the EU.229 However, the Government has also been clear that 
“no deal for the UK is better than a bad deal for the UK”,230 under which eventuality ‘no 
deal’ would mean having to trade with the EU under WTO rules alone.
203. Sir Ivan Rogers made the point that countries like the US or Australia, that do not yet 
have FTAs with the EU, have nonetheless negotiated equivalence and mutual recognition 
agreements in a range of sectors.231 The UK, if it were to exit the EU without any kind of 
deal applicable from the first day after exit, would be in an inferior position compared to 
other third countries in trading with the EU. According to Roderick Abbott:
on the day after you exit, businesses will face the common external tariff 
on their trade to the EU, unless, of course, you have made some kind of a 
trade deal by then. [ … ] If you assume there is ‘no deal’, then the common 
external tariff would be applied on the next day, because you are a nonEU 
country and that is what the EU does.
The second consequence would be that, unless you are very quick to 
introduce a UK customs tariff, businesses would have no protection against 
imports. You would have to have a tariff, so presumably that would be 
perhaps based on the common external tariff or on something else. You 
cannot just go back to 1972 and bring a tariff down from the shelf. That 
would be a second consequence.
Whether all of this would be destructive to business is an open question, as 
you said. My belief is that if you are out, under those conditions, and you 
are trading under WTO, it is perfectly feasible. Trade is not going to stop. 
There will be areas where you will face barriers that you did not face before. 
You perhaps will make less profit, but trade will flow.232
204. While trade in goods would continue to flow under tariff regimes, Dr Federico 
Ortino told us that services were much less predictable because there are fewer liberalising 
obligations under the WTO when it comes to services. He also noted that there are no 
national treatment obligations in many sectors, whereby any supplier of services is treated 
the same as any domestic supplier. In those sectors the EU could simply prohibit the UK 
from providing services in the EU.233
228 The White Paper, para 9.16–9.18 
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205. We heard from the Secretary of State that, should the UK leave the EU without a 
deal, the UK would face a number of consequences including the imposition of tariffs 
(of up to 30–40 per cent on some agricultural products) and customs checks (including 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland), an end to UK participation in 
the US–EU Open Skies Agreement, “probably” an end to participation in the EHIC 
health treatment card scheme, an end to passporting rights for the UK financial services 
sector and uncertainty around data transfer rights for the the digital sector.234 He also 
confirmed that there had been no assessment of the implications of ‘no deal’ since before 
the referendum.235
Contingency planning
206. While confident that it is unlikely the UK will leave the EU without a deal, the 
Government has said that it is right that it should prepare for every eventuality.236 The 
Secretary of State told us that every department of state was looking at how to mitigate the 
effects of leaving the EU without a deal. As the White Paper states:
In any eventuality we will ensure that our economic and other functions 
can continue, including by passing legislation as necessary to mitigate the 
effects of failing to reach a deal.237
207. We heard from the Secretary of State that any economic assessment of ‘no deal’ 
would depend on the mitigation undertaken and that “until we have worked out all the 
mitigation procedures, we could not quantify the outcome.”238 He reassured us that he 
would be able to quantify it in detail in about a year’s time.
208. The Government has conducted impact assessments into ongoing trade deals 
previously, for example into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between 
the EU and the US,239 while the EU also undertook analysis of the Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership agreement with Canada.240
209. In its report on the implications of ‘no deal’, the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded 
that the Government was not giving that scenario the consideration it deserved, finding 
no evidence of any serious contingency planning for ‘no deal’. The Committee contended 
that this would constitute a “serious dereliction of duty” on the part of the Government.241
210. Notwithstanding the Government’s ambition to secure a UK–EU FTA, there is a 
risk that the UK might reach the end of the Article 50 process without a deal and have to 
fall back on trading under WTO rules. It is imperative that the Government undertake 
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an economic assessment of the scenario whereby the UK leaves the EU without a deal. 
The Government must also set out what contingency planning is taking place across 
Whitehall and the mitigation being considered for a ‘no deal’ outcome.
Objective 9: Securing new trade agreements with other countries
211. In the machinery of Government changes which took place following the EU 
referendum, the Prime Minister established the Department for International Trade (DIT) 
with overall responsibility for promoting UK trade across the world, and developing, 
coordinating and delivering a new trade policy for the UK. The International Trade 
Committee scrutinises the work of DIT and published its first report on UK trade options 
beyond 2019 on 7 March 2017.242 The Government has identified the ability to secure new 
trade agreements with non-EU countries as a key opportunity arising from the UK leaving 
the EU. While the Government’s work in negotiating trade relationships with the rest of 
the world falls within the remit of DIT and the International Trade Committee, that work 
will be dependent on the nature of the UK’s exit from the EU and the future UK–EU 
relationship on which we heard evidence. There was agreement amongst witnesses to our 
inquiry that the UK had to prioritise negotiations on a FTA with the EU before it begins 
negotiations with other countries.243 Roderick Abbott told us that there will be countries 
who will not want to decide what their trading relationship with the UK will be until they 
know how the UK will be trading with the EU:
It is the idea of a close association with the single market that we started 
with. That could be a factor that holds other countries back until they know 
whether the UK will continue to be a place you can go through with your 
global value chain, or your investment into the EU. That is the key point.244
212. Sir Ivan Rogers suggested that, outside the EU, the UK may have the advantage 
of being “easier to deal with” and more “nimble and agile” than the larger EU market, 
while also noting that its smaller market could affect its attractiveness. However, the UK’s 
strength in negotiating FTAs would not be clear until we begin those negotiations:
You can argue that, as part of a composite and as part of the EU28 we 
have more weight in opening up markets where there has been deliberate 
protectionism against our products. Or you can argue that as the UK only, 
we will invest more effort and a higher quantum, a higher proportion of our 
effort, in doing stuff for Scotch whisky exports than the EU28, where by 
definition it is one of multiple different negotiation objectives for different 
countries. What I am saying is the proof of the pudding will be the eating. 
In some areas we will do better from being the UK alone and saying, “We 
can now focus on the few things that really matter to us in that market”. 
You can argue it either way.245
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213. As the UK embarks on negotiating its own preferential trade agreements, witnesses 
were clear that the Government would need to build up significant resources, particularly 
in terms of trade negotiators and experience.246 Professor Jim Rollo told us that trade 
negotiating was a craft which had to be learned. He suggested that the UK should begin 
negotiations with New Zealand and Australia as useful partners to learn from.247
‘Grandfathering’ EU FTAs
214. The UK is a party to over 50 Free Trade Agreements through the EU.248 Ensuring 
the UK can continue to trade through those agreements, known as ‘grandfathering’, is 
another priority for the UK’s future trading relationships. The White Paper states that:
We are also seeking to achieve continuity in our trade and investment 
relationships with third countries, including those covered by existing EU 
free trade agreements or EU preferential arrangements. We are exploring 
with our trading partners ways to achieve this.249
215. Roderick Abbott told us that he did not think it would be possible to transition 
seamlessly to trade deals with current EU partners:
The dynamics of trade between the UK and a partner are not the same 
as they were between the EU and their partner. It is not seamless in that 
sense. There is a question or an approach that says, “Why do we not cut 
and paste from an EU agreement with, let us say, Mexico, which already 
exists?” You cut and paste; you simply put in all the same clauses. Maybe 
you change some things, but you basically have the same agreement, and 
you go to Mexico and say, “How about this?” The question is what answer 
you are going to get, because this is where dynamics enter into it.
( … ) From a Mexican point of view, they may have been willing to do 
something for the EU that they are not willing to do just for the UK, because 
it is a much smaller market. The key here is that the UK on its own, outside 
the EU, is a much smaller market, in terms of population and consumers, 
and therefore in a mercantile trade sense it is less interesting.250
216. Professor Jim Rollo explained that the UK was circa 15 per cent of the EU28 market. 
Trade partners may not be willing to offer the same terms to the UK as they did for the 
EU.251 He added that it is not in the UK’s gift to run these agreements through. 252
217.  The option of ‘grandfathering’ existing FTAs is therefore far from guaranteed. The 
House of Lords’ EU Committee concluded in its report on trade in goods that maintaining 
access to the EU’s trade agreements was “unlikely”, but recommended that the Government 
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focus its efforts on agreements with those countries as “the cessation of these preferential 
trade conditions is likely to result in significant tariff costs after Brexit, until such a time 
as the UK is able to conclude new FTAs.”253
218. Similar to negotiating a UK–EU FTA, embarking on negotiations for FTAs 
with non-EU countries is entering into the unknown. It is unclear whether the UK’s 
smaller and more focussed market will be an advantage or a disadvantage in trading 
negotiations. What is clear, however, is that the UK needs to urgently develop resources 
and expertise for trade negotiations. The Government should identify resourcing 
needs and prioritise countries which provide opportunities for developing expertise in 
trade negotiating. The Government should also prioritise those countries with which 
the EU has preferential trade agreements and seek early clarity on whether the UK can 
‘grandfather’ those FTAs after Brexit.
Objective 10: Ensuring the United Kingdom remains the best place for 
science and innovation
219. The Government’s priorities for the negotiations include trying to maintain the 
UK’s position as a leader in science and a leading participant in Europe-wide measures in 
research and innovation. The White Paper states:
From space exploration to clean energy, from medical technologies to agri-
tech, the UK will remain at the forefront of collective endeavours to better 
understand, and make better, the world in which we live. We will seek 
agreement to continue to collaborate with our European partners on major 
science, research, and technology initiatives.
It also notes the strength of the UK university base, with the UK having three of the world’s 
top ten—and twelve of the top 100—universities, and the Government’s investment in 
research and innovation—£2 billion announced in the Autumn Statement and through 
the Government’s Industrial Strategy to help turn research into commercial products. 
These factors, the UK’s track record in collaboration, and its involvement in EU space 
programmes and research into nuclear fusion make the UK an attractive place to carry 
out research and innovation.254
220. The Government has responded to concerns from the higher education sector by 
saying it will underwrite research funding through Horizon 2020 while the UK is still 
a Member State, even if the project continues after the date the UK leaves the EU. It is 
not clear if the funding guarantee is new money or the EU’s legal commitments.255 The 
Government has said that existing EU students, and those starting courses up to 2017–18, 
“will continue to be eligible for student loans and home fee status for the duration of their 
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courses”, with similar support for postgraduate students.256 There are over 125,000 EU 
students at UK universities and 16 per cent of academic staff at UK universities are from 
EU countries.257
The international and collaborative nature of research
221. The success of the UK university sector is in part due to its ability to attract 
international talent and produce world class research.258 Professor Davies, Professor of 
Law and Senior Pro-Vice-Chancellor, of Swansea University told us:
A key point, of course, relates to the skills of the EU staff in question. For 
us, the importance of ensuring access to those skills, and the reputation 
of higher education and universities in Wales from the research outputs 
that come through collaboration, are mission-critical to the way in which 
science operates. It operates in a borderless world. For us, part of that 
process would be not simply ensuring continuing recognition of the ability 
of EU staff to remain, but being open to the world for the best, highly skilled 
international researchers and staff. [ … ] Part of our process would be to 
ensure that we could create a vision for Wales that is one where we are open 
to international staff and student collaboration. Without that, the essential 
USP of universities as global industries fails.259
This applies also to the student base. Erasmus, Europe’s programme to facilitate educational 
exchange, enables students to undertake part of their studies abroad. Research has shown 
that Erasmus increases participants’ employability through soft skills and the ability to 
speak foreign languages.260
222. The Secretary of State acknowledged that part of the success of UK science was due 
to the collaborative nature of research in the UK.261 He told us that he had devoted a lot of 
energy to meeting people from the higher education sector, and sciencedriven companies 
like GSK, to send out a consistent message that Brexit “is not a doorslamming exercise 
on immigration”.262 When asked whether a future immigration system would be flexible 
enough to include scientists and researchers who may not meet the criteria if their role 
was subject to an income threshold, the Secretary of State told us that good work permit 
systems had some sort of mechanism to “recognise another measure of value” and that he 
would be making “quite serious representations” when we get closer to the Immigration 
Bill so that “We have to have a technical skills requirement.”263
223. The value of international collaboration for innovation is not limited to academia. 
Sadiq Khan told us that fintech had taken off in London because of the proximity of 
financial services, “tech” expertise and venture capital, and that London would look to 
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258 Universities UK responded today to Theresa May’s speech on Brexit, 17 January 2017
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maximise the opportunities of leaving the EU by being able to continue to create the 
environment for talent and innovation in London.264 The CBI have stressed the need 
for an “open, flexible, simple immigration system [ … ] particularly for high-skilled 
immigration that boosts innovation and productivity.”265
224. The success of the Higher Education sector in the UK owes much to its ability 
to attract international skills and talent. The UK Government must design a future 
immigration system that does not make it difficult for such talent, both students and 
staff, to come to the UK. It must also send a strong and consistent message that the UK 
is a welcoming place for people to come and study. The Government should make clear 
that it wishes to continue to take part in the Erasmus+ student exchange programme.
Flows of funding: Horizon 2020
225. Horizon 2020 is an EU scheme to leverage research, development and innovation 
funding, to help meet research and development targets, including the target of 3 per cent 
of GDP for research and development across the EU by 2020. The UK has a strong track 
record in securing funds from Horizon 2020 and its predecessors. Around 15 per cent 
of funds allocated from Horizon 2020 have come to the UK, with UK universities in the 
top four higher education recipients to date (Cambridge, UCL, Imperial College London 
and Oxford). As of 23 February 2016, these four universities alone had been assigned over 
£363 million in Horizon 2020 funding. There have been a total of 3,937 participations in 
the programme from UK organisations, including 1,052 private, for-profit entities, 341 
research organisations, 150 public bodies, 2,253 higher or secondary education places, 
and 141 others.266 Horizon 2020 also links education institutes with the private sector, 
and supports the broader UK’s science and research base, from food and drink to life 
sciences to the creative industries.267
226. When asked about the Government’s commitment to Horizon 2020, the Secretary 
of State said the Treasury had moved very quickly to underwrite research funding so 
universities felt confident to continue making research applications, and to offer guarantees 
for EU students here. He said:
I am not kidding; to get the Treasury to move in two weeks in August is a 
measure of quite how seriously the issue is taken. [ … ]
I do not know what ongoing relationship we may have with projects or 
operations like Horizon 2020, like Erasmus and like all the various elements. 
I will say to you what I have said to every university and every research 
operation that I have talked to, which is this: we are a science superpower.268
227. The UK has benefitted from being part of Horizon 2020. The Government has 
made a clear commitment to underwrite research funding commitments while the UK 
is a Member State, even if the project continues after the UK leaves the EU. However, the 
Secretary of State has told us that he does not know what ongoing relationship the UK 
264 Q1323
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will have with Horizon 2020. The Government needs to make an explicit commitment 
that it wishes to continue joint research with the EU27 on the basis of the Horizon 
2020 framework, and its successor.
Euratom
228. Euratom provides a legal framework for civil nuclear power generation and radioactive 
waste management across Europe, including arrangements for nuclear safeguards, the 
movement and trade of nuclear materials between Euratom members, and also between 
Euratom Members and third countries such as the US. Euratom covers the management of 
nuclear material at various sites in the UK, including Sellafield in Cumbria—the UK stores 
stocks of plutonium belonging to other Euratom members at Sellafield. Hinkley Point C 
was approved under regulation under the Euratom Treaty.269 Euratom is responsible for 
the nuclear aspects of Horizon 2020 research funding. In addition to being a source of 
funding, it provides access to programmes linked with other research centres. Nuclear 
fusion research at Culham gains £48 million a year from the Euratom research fund.270
229. Switzerland has an associate status with Euratom which enables it to access nuclear 
research through Horizon 2020. The Swiss example may not necessarily replicate all 
that the UK wants from nuclear cooperation. A recent report on Brexit from the Tweede 
Kamer, one of the Chambers of the Dutch Parliament, noted the risk that, whatever the 
outcome, arrangements for cooperation in this crucial area might not be in place on the 
day the UK left the EU.271 The report recommended keeping the Euratom process separate 
from the Article 50 process so that “the negotiations on this can be conducted with care, 
rather than under time pressure.”272
230. The UK Government has said that future cooperation on nuclear energy matters will 
be a matter for the negotiations, and that:
it is an important priority for us–the nuclear industry remains of key 
strategic importance to the UK and leaving Euratom does not affect our 
clear aim of seeking to maintain close and effective arrangements for civil 
nuclear cooperation, safeguards, safety and trade with Europe and our 
international partners.273
231. The UK needs to be clear what kind of relationship it wishes to pursue with 
Euratom. It is important that whatever the relationship is, it does not reduce the 
ability of the UK to pursue international cooperation in the civil nuclear industry and 
collaborative research in the future, including Horizon 2020 and its successor.
269 University of Manchester policy blog
270 A 283 million euro operation contract signed between the European Commission and CCFE in July 2014 secures 
JET operation until 2018.
271 Oral evidence before the Business Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 28 February 2017, Q133, Q136, 
Q144
272 Tweede Kamer Der Staten-Generaal, The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, Brexit Report, Report 
by the Rapporteurs on Brexit, Adopted on 21 March 2017
273 The White Paper para 8.31 
72  The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
Objective 11: Cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism
232. The Secretary of State has told the House that the Government aims to “keep our 
justice and security arrangements at least as strong as they are” and wants “as far as 
possible, to replicate what we already have”.274 The White Paper notes that the UK has 
been “at the forefront” of developing tools for cooperation with the EU in combating 
crime and terrorism and:
As we exit, we will therefore look to negotiate the best deal we can with the 
EU to cooperate in the fight against crime and terrorism. We will seek a 
strong and close future relationship with the EU, with a focus on operational 
and practical cross-border cooperation.
233. The Secretary of State believes that the UK will negotiate from a position of strength:
Britain is the intelligence superpower in Europe; we are critical to the 
defence of Europe from terrorist threat, and we are critical to the military 
support of Europe and to dealing with migration, with our Navy at work. 
Those things will continue.275
234. In considering the model for future UK–EU interaction in security, criminal justice 
and law enforcement, Brandon Lewis MP, Minister of State for Policing and the Fire 
Service, Home Office, said:
We are looking at existing arrangements for third country cooperation with 
the EU, which can inform discussions, but it is important to be clear that we 
are not looking to replicate any other nation’s model.276
235. The Government’s objectives must be reconciled with the Government’s broader 
goals for the exit negotiations—set out in the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech—
including “taking back control of our laws and bringing an end to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice”. Cooperation on criminal justice is one of the areas in which 
the Prime Minister envisages that “a phased process of implementation” may be needed.277
Europol
236. Europol is at the forefront of the EU’s response to international crime. Founded as 
an intergovernmental organisation in 1995 and operational since 1999, Europol became 
an EU Agency in 2010. It provides analytical and operational support to national law 
enforcement authorities in all 28 EU Member States, enhancing their capacity to tackle 
security threats which have a cross-border dimension. Since 2009 Europol has been led 
by Rob Wainwright, the former head of the international division of the UK’s Serious 
and Organised Crime Agency (now the National Crime Agency). David Armond, the 
Deputy Director General at the National Crime Agency, told us that “In terms of the 
access we have obtained through Europol and the influence we exert through having a 
274 HC Deb, 10 October 2016, col 55 and 1 December 2016, col 1650
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British director, who has implemented since 2008 a whole load of what are really British 
intelligence management systems, we would have a quite steep hill to climb if we were to 
lose access to all of them.”278
237. Europol’s staff work alongside liaison officers seconded to its headquarters in The 
Hague by EU Member States and other partner countries or organisations in order to 
facilitate the rapid exchange of criminal intelligence, strategic and operational information. 
David Armond told us that it was “eminently possible” for the UK to have a liaison bureau 
but added that the size of the UK team might have to be “culled” because of available office 
space and that “we would have to make all our inquiries through a liaison structure rather 
than by direct access to the systems”.279
238. The UK participates fully in Europol. The Government has opted into a new 
Regulation updating Europol’s governance structure, objectives and tasks which will take 
effect on 1 May 2017. According to Brandon Lewis MP, Minister for Policing and the Fire 
Service:
Opting in will maintain operational continuity for UK law enforcement 
ahead of the EU exiting the EU, ensuring our Liaison Bureau at Europol 
is maintained, and that law enforcement agencies can continue to access 
Europol systems and intelligence. This decision is without prejudice to 
discussions on the UK’s future relationship with Europol when outside the 
EU.280
239. Denmark currently participates fully in Europol but has an opt out of all post-Lisbon 
EU justice and home affairs measures, meaning that it is unable to participate in the new 
Europol Regulation. An agreement has been reached to designate Denmark as a third 
country with respect to Europol, thereby making it possible for Europol and Denmark 
to conclude a cooperation agreement. A Joint Declaration issued in December by the 
Presidents of the European Council (Donald Tusk) and the European Commission (Jean-
Claude Junker) and the Danish Prime Minister (Lars Lokke Rasmussen) states:
Such arrangements must be Denmark-specific, and not in any way equal full 
membership of Europol, i.e. provide access to Europol’s data repositories, 
or for full participation in Europol’s operational work and database, or 
give decision-making rights in the governing bodies of Europol. However, 
it should ensure a sufficient level of operational cooperation including 
exchange of relevant data, subject to adequate safeguards.
This arrangement would be conditioned on Denmark’s continued 
membership of the European Union and of the Schengen area, on Denmark’s 
obligation to fully implement in Danish law Directive (EU) 2016/680/EU 
on data protection in police matters by 1 May 2017 and on Denmark’s 
agreement to the application of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of 
the EU and the competence of the European Data Protection Supervisor.281
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240. Commenting on these arrangements, David Anderson QC said:
One could say that is cutting off the nose to spite the face. One could say 
we are probably a much bigger contributor to Europol than Denmark 
is. Nonetheless, it is an indicator of how some people at least within the 
institutions think about these matters, and the distinction that they draw 
between being a Member State or, at the very least, being a member of the 
Schengen arrangements and being a third country, even one which in the 
past has fully participated.282
241. The cooperation agreement with Denmark would be based on the existing rules 
governing Europol’s relations with third countries. These envisage two types of third 
country agreements:
• strategic agreements are limited to the exchange of general intelligence as well as 
strategic and technical information;283 and
• operational agreements which allow the exchange of information, including 
personal data, provided that the third country is able to ensure an adequate level 
of data protection.284
242. David Anderson QC told us that some operational agreements had taken between 
five to twelve years to negotiate.285 The dispute settlement provisions vary. Most envisage 
“consultations and negotiations” between the parties or an arbitration panel if the parties 
are unable to reach an amicable settlement. The agreements with Canada and the US 
envisage a process of mutual consultation.
243. No third country agreements with Europol allow direct access to Europol’s databases 
or its secure messaging system (SIENA). Nor do they allow any role in Europol’s 
governance structures which influence Europol’s strategic direction. Third countries with 
operational agreements are able to post liaison officers to Europol’s HQ in The Hague. 
Any new relationship with Europol once the UK leaves the EU will be governed by the 
new Europol Regulation. The Regulation authorises the transfer of personal data to third 
countries in the following circumstances:
• the Commission has adopted an “adequacy decision” establishing that the third 
country ensures an adequate level of data protection; or
• the EU has concluded an international agreement with the third country based 
on Article 218 TFEU—the likely legal base for any future relations agreement 
between the EU and the UK—“adducing adequate safeguards with respect to 
the protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals”.
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The White Paper notes the UK’s important contribution to Europol:
• the UK is one of the biggest contributors to Europol systems, supporting police 
forces across the UK and Europe in the fight against cross-border crime; and
• the UK currently participates in all 13 of Europol’s current operational priority 
projects and the UK is “driving, or co-driving, almost half of Europol projects 
against serious organised crime”.286
244. The Government intends to seek a “unique and bespoke” relationship with Europol:
There are associate members of Europol that are not members of the EU, 
such as the United States. I also point out that Europol existed as a non-EU 
institution before the EU was involved with it. Therefore, it is important to 
recognise that we will look to develop a unique and bespoke position for 
the country.287
I understand that the EU Treaties do not allow for non-EU members to join 
Europol as full members, but, as indicated already, we are seeking bespoke 
arrangements with the EU in this regard, and certainly we would wish to 
pursue access to Europol on as enhanced a basis as possible.288
245. The Government will be looking to conclude a bespoke arrangement for continuing 
involvement with Europol. The UK has been a leading force in Europol’s development. 
If negotiations progress in a spirit of goodwill towards agreement, there should be scope 
for an imaginative solution to enable the UK to continue some level of involvement 
with Europol for the benefit of all European citizens. However, the technical obstacles 
that will need to be overcome for this to happen will be significant and it is unlikely 
that the UK will be able to retain the leading role that it currently enjoys.
Information-sharing
246. The White Paper highlights the law enforcement benefits of the Schengen Information 
System—the latest version is abbreviated as SIS II—as well as the EU Passenger Name 
Records (PNR) Directive and the European Criminal Records Information System 
(ECRIS). The UK participates in all of these measures and last year opted back into the 
so-called Prüm measures on cross-border law enforcement cooperation.
247. There is limited third country participation in EU law enforcement information 
sharing systems: the four Schengen associate countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein) participate in SIS II. The EU has negotiated three international agreements 
on the sharing of PNR data with Australia and the US (both in force since 2012) and with 
Canada (not in force, awaiting a ruling from the CJEU). No third country participates in 
ECRIS. The EU has concluded an agreement with Iceland and Norway on participation in 
Prüm which is not yet in force, and has a mandate to open negotiations with Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein.
286 The White Paper, para 11.2
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248. The Government has not set out its position on future UK participation in EU 
information sharing systems but has made clear that “the question of how the UK 
shares data with the EU from the point of exit will be an issue for discussion during the 
negotiations”.289
249. The Home Secretary told the House in December:
I am having extensive discussions with European counterparts and with 
European bodies that help to keep us safe, so that when we do leave the 
European Union, we will, as far as possible, be able to have access to that 
information. When people voted to leave the European Union, they did not 
vote to be less safe.290
250. Closing gaps in existing EU information sharing systems is a priority for the 
Commission, following a spate of terrorist attacks across Europe. It has established a High 
Level Expert Group to explore the interoperability of EU border management and security 
information systems which will produce a final report in April 2017.291 It is considering 
various work stands to enhance the interconnectivity of the databases including single 
search interfaces.
251. It is unclear whether this work will make it easier or harder for the UK to negotiate 
some form of access to EU information sharing systems post-Brexit. The European 
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) has suggested 
that technical arrangements would need to be put in place to ensure that the UK only has 
access to the information systems on which an agreement on participation/access has 
been reached, not to other inter-linked systems.
SIS II
252. As the UK does not participate in the Schengen free movement area and is not bound 
by EU rules on external border controls, it is not entitled to access alerts concerning third 
country (non-EEA) nationals who are to be refused entry or stay in the Schengen area. The 
UK does participate in those elements of the Schengen rule book that deal with broader 
law enforcement issues and can access all other alerts held in SIS II, covering matters such 
as the arrest of individuals wanted for extradition. SIS II became operational in April 
2013; the UK connected to it in April 2015.
253. Four non-EU countries associated with Schengen (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein) apply the full Schengen rule book and participate in all aspects of SIS II 
covering both border control and law enforcement. Apart from these countries, there is 
currently no provision for wider third country access to SIS II data.
Sharing of Passenger Name Record Data (PNR)
254. The UK has consistently pressed for the introduction of an EU-wide framework for 
the collection, processing and use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data—the term used 
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to describe information held in air carriers’ reservation and departure control systems 
which provides a record of each passenger’s flight details and itinerary. An increasing 
number of countries view PNR data as an important means of combating serious crime 
and terrorism and require air carriers operating flights to, from or across their territory to 
provide their law enforcement authorities with electronic access to the passenger data they 
collect. These data can be used to help identify passengers who may present a security risk 
or are wanted for a criminal or terrorist offence.
255. The EU has concluded PNR agreements with Australia, Canada and the United 
States to regulate the transmission and use of PNR data. The UK participates in all three 
agreements. The Government believes that such agreements are necessary to remove legal 
uncertainty for air carriers flying to these countries and to ensure adequate data protection 
safeguards. The European Parliament has asked the Court of Justice to consider whether 
the agreement is compatible with the data protection provisions in the EU Treaties and 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
256. Last September, the Court’s Advocate General issued a preliminary opinion (which 
is likely to be persuasive, but is not binding on the Court) stating that some provisions 
of the agreement are incompatible with the EU Charter.292 For example, the agreement 
would allow the processing of sensitive data (information revealing racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, or 
information about a person’s health or sex life) under certain conditions. The agreement 
would also allow PNR data to be processed for purposes which the Advocate General 
does not consider are strictly necessary to prevent and detect terrorist offences and other 
serious transnational crimes. The Court is expected to issue its opinion in the early part 
of 2017.
257. The Court’s ruling will potentially have important implications for any future 
agreement between the EU and the UK to share PNR data once the UK leaves the EU. In 
proposing a negotiating mandate for an agreement with the UK, the Commission will be 
bound to ensure that it complies with EU Treaty and EU Charter requirements on data 
protection, as interpreted by the CJEU. David Anderson QC told us;
Just look at what is happening at the moment with the EU–Canada PNR 
agreement, which similarly was forged for completely pragmatic reasons, but 
which appears to be running into quite serious problems in the European 
Court. Put that together with the Davis–Watson case, which is very hostile 
to this whole idea of the blanket collection and retention of data, and you 
find quite a neuralgic issue that could arise between the UK and Europe.293
Prüm
258. Prüm is one of the areas in which the Government is keen to seek a bespoke solution 
for the UK. In his letter of 22 November 2016 to the Chair of the European Scrutiny 
Committee, Brandon Lewis MP, the Minister for Policing and Fire Services, made clear 
that the UK “is in a unique starting position” and in stating that the UK “will not be 
replicating another nation’s model”, said:
292 “Opinion 1/15 of General Mongozzi 8 September 2016 (1)”, Case Law of the Court of Justice, 8 September 2016
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We have a strong history of working closely with Member States as partners 
and allies on security cooperation. We have significant technical expertise 
in relation to fingerprints and DNA. Our law enforcement agencies use 
biometric information more effectively than many others in Europe and 
maintain a significant database of the fingerprints and DNA of convicted 
persons.294
259. The Secretary of State told the House earlier this month that, although the UK would 
no longer be part of the Prüm framework when it leaves the EU, “that is not to say that we 
will not be making new arrangements”:
The Prüm framework covers data exchange, DNA and so on, and it is 
very clear in our minds that we will be making new arrangements to keep 
terrorism, crime and so on under control.”295
European Criminal Records Information System
260. There is no provision for third countries to participate in ECRIS, either in the existing 
instruments governing its use or in the latest changes proposed by the Commission. 
Brandon Lewis MP, the Minister for Policing and the Fire Service, has confirmed that 
“the ECRIS legislation does not explicitly provide for the possibility of third country 
agreements”, adding:
The EU could conclude an agreement with a third country to exchange 
criminal records. At present, however, there are no countries other than EU 
Member States participating in ECRIS.296
261. He also indicated that the Justice and Home Affairs Council has called for work 
to “consider solutions (other than the ECRIS system) to allow the proactive sharing of 
convictions data, in particular relating to terrorism”.
262. The White Paper underlines the utility of ECRIS for law enforcement, noting:
The UK is the fourth largest user of European Criminal Records Information 
System (ECRIS). In 2015/16 the majority of the over 155,000 requests for 
overseas criminal convictions information were made to EU countries 
through ECRIS. EU Member States also benefit from notification messages 
we provide about their nationals who have been convicted in the UK, with 
the vast majority of the over 46,000 notifications made through ECRIS.297
263. There are alternatives to ECRIS—the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters or informal Interpol channels—but the Government’s 
view is that these are “more time consuming, complex and expensive than the ECRIS 
procedure”.298
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264. Across the range of Justice and Home Affairs data-sharing instruments, there is 
a strong operational argument, in the interest of both UK and EU27 law enforcement, 
for the UK retaining access to data. However, the extent to which this will be possible 
is likely to be determined by commitments that the UK is able to make in relation 
to ensuring that its data protection provisions remain aligned with those of the EU, 
and the governance arrangements that can be agreed around the databases. The access 
agreed is likely not to be of the same level currently granted.
The European Arrest Warrant and mutual recognition instruments
265. The principle of mutual recognition involves decisions by the judicial authority in one 
Member State being recognised and given effect by the competent authorities of another 
with minimum formality and minimum grounds for refusal. The most notable and most 
controversial mutual recognition instrument is the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The 
UK opted back in to this instrument in December 2014.
266. Prior to the EAW, extradition between Member States was underpinned by the 1957 
Council of Europe Convention on Extradition, which has been ratified by a wide number 
of states which are members of the Council of Europe and three which are not (Israel, South 
Korea and South Africa). Whilst the Convention is still in force it has been superseded by 
the EAW for extradition between EU Member States. Extradition under the 1957 Council 
of Europe Convention is less streamlined than the EAW in some notable respects:
• Requests are considered by the receiving state before a decision is taken on 
whether to issue the arrest warrant;
• The 1957 Convention gives a state the option of refusing to extradite its own 
nationals and there are limits on extradition for political, or revenue offences;
• The 1957 Convention has more stringent “dual criminality” provisions barring 
extradition if the act in question is not an offence in the requested state.
267. Some Member States have adjusted their extradition arrangements with other Member 
States to rely solely on the EAW and would have to legislate to revert to extradition under 
the 1957 Convention.299, David Armond told us “In the event that we lose that, which is 
likely, we would need to go through a process of re-engaging with all the Member States to 
negotiate treaties on extradition, because many countries have repealed the legislation.”300
268. The House of Lords EU Committee summarises evidence from law-enforcement 
agencies on the EAW in its December 2016 report, Brexit: future UK–EU security and 
police cooperation:
The Crown Prosecution Service still regarded the EAW as ‘absolutely vital’. 
The National Crime Agency also listed the EAW among their top three 
priorities for the forthcoming negotiations on UK withdrawal from the EU. 
Helen Ball, the Metropolitan Police Service’s Senior National Coordinator 
299 For example Denmark, (p55 of CM 8897, the Government’s Impact Assessments for the purpose of the UK opt-
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Brexit: UK–Irish Relations HL Paper 76, para 147)
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for Counter-Terrorism Policing, told us that on a scale of 1 to 10, she would 
currently rate the EAW ‘about an 8’ in terms of its importance to CT 
policing: ‘it is an extremely valuable power to have’.301
269. The Framework Decision establishing the EAW makes no provision for third 
countries to participate. However, the EU has entered into an EAW style extradition treaty 
with Norway and Iceland. Barristers Chambers 6KBW College Hill in July 2016 identified 
a number of factors which might affect the willingness and/or ability of the UK to adopt 
this course of action but concluded:
an EAW-style agreement remains a significant option. It is important 
to note that (unlike Norway and Iceland) the UK will be negotiating as 
a current member of the EAW system whose extradition processes are 
already in harmony with those of the EU. A potentially important factor 
may be that the Norway/Iceland agreement does not provide for the CJEU 
to have jurisdiction over disputes, and instead provides for a harmonisation 
of approach through the ‘constant review’ of case-law (Article 37 of the 
Agreement) which may make this a more attractive option for the UK 
Government.302
270. However, David Anderson QC observed that there could be “great resistance to us 
trying to carve out a special relationship for ourselves” in relation to EAW cooperation 
citing the examples of Norway and Iceland. However, he added “We can certainly try. We 
are leaving now so one takes that as the baseline. There is going to be a trade-off between 
getting an early deal on extradition and getting a bespoke deal on extradition. I would be 
very surprised if we can manage both”.303
271. The value of maintaining participation in the European Arrest Warrant, or at 
least securing an analogous agreement, has been commended to us. We note that the 
UK comes from the position of having extradition processes already in line with those 
in the EU. We also note that there are precedents for agreements with the EU analogous 
to the European Arrest Warrant that do not involve remaining within the jurisdiction 
of the CJEU.
272. The Secretary of State has said that the Government wants “as far as is possible to 
replicate what we already have” in respect of Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation. 
It is to be hoped that the UK’s relationship with the EU when outside it will be one of 
partnership on the basis of shared values and cooperation. Continuing deep levels of 
Justice and Home Affairs cooperation represents a test of whether this will be possible. 
The technical challenges are significant but, we believe, not insuperable and the prize of 
continued close cooperation is too valuable to lose. We note that, as the Prime Minister 
acknowledged, a “phased process of implementation” may be required if agreement is 
not possible within two years.
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Common Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation
273. The UK is a major global actor. It is one of the EU’s two nuclear-armed states with a 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is also a prominent member 
of NATO, the G7 and G20. In addition to the bilateral agreements it has with certain 
states—such as the Lancaster House Agreements with France—the UK cooperates with 
other EU states on foreign and defence policy matters through the intergovernmental 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). This includes participation in both military and civilian CSDP operations 
overseas, the adoption of common positions on major global issues, and the imposition 
and maintenance of sanctions against third countries such as Russia.
274. In our previous Report, we said it would be “essential” for the Government to 
maintain co-operation with the EU27 on defence and foreign policy matters, and that it 
would be “clearly in the UK’s and EU27’s mutual interests” to ensure that this happens.304
275. The White Paper makes clear the Government’s intention to continue this cooperation, 
although it does not go into detail on how this might be achieved in the light of the UK’s 
departure from the institutional decision-making structures of CSDP and CFSP. The 
White Paper says:
We want to use our tools and privileged position in international affairs 
to continue to work with the EU on foreign policy security and defence. 
Whether it is implementing sanctions against Russia following its actions 
in Ukraine, working for peace and stability in the Balkans, or securing 
Europe’s external border, we will continue to play a leading role alongside 
EU partners in buttressing and promoting European security and influence 
around the world. We aim to enhance our strong bilateral relationships with 
our European partners and beyond, projecting a truly global UK across the 
world.305
On defence matters specifically, the White Paper adds:
We participate in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions 
and operations across the globe. Our objective is to ensure that the EU’s role 
on defence and security is complementary to, and respects the central role 
of, NATO. After we leave the EU, we will remain committed to European 
security and add value to EU foreign and security policy.306
276. We welcome the Government’s commitment to continuing co-operation with the 
EU27 on foreign policy and defence matters. This is an area of considerable mutual 
interest and must be prioritised during the negotiations. We look forward to the 
Government setting out in more detail its proposals for how such cooperation can be 
made to work in practice, including the institutional and decision-making frameworks 
that would underpin it.
304 Exiting the EU Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, The process for exiting the European Union and the 
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6 A phased approach
Objective 12: A phased approach
277. In her Lancaster House speech, the Prime Minister made clear that the Government 
would like to negotiate the Article 50 exit agreement and the terms of the future UK–
EU relationship in parallel.307 The White Paper repeated this proposal, suggesting that it 
would help to avoid a “cliff-edge”:
It is [ … ] in no one’s interests for there to be a cliff-edge for business or 
a threat to stability, as we change from our existing relationship to a new 
partnership with the EU. Instead, we want to have reached an agreement 
about our future partnership by the time the two-year Article 50 process 
has concluded.308
278. The EU27 and the EU institutions, however, have said that they will not be willing to 
begin talks on the future relationship between the UK and EU until after the terms of the 
exit deal are finalised.309 In evidence to this Committee, the Secretary of State said:
The range of views, just to remind you, range from the views taken by some 
members of the Commission that we will do the “divorce”, the departure 
deal, and then after that have a transitional arrangement while we are still 
paying money and there is still the free movement of people. There are all 
of these things going on and we will do the longterm deal in slow motion. 
That is plainly not what we are after.310
He also confirmed that, as at 15 March, neither the EU27 nor the Commission had agreed 
that negotiations on the exit deal and the future relationship could take place in parallel.311
279. Sir Ivan Rogers, however, also pointed out that “Nobody knows” exactly how the 
negotiations will be sequenced in practice.312 He said:
I would expect us probably to take until at least the summer before there is 
an agreement about negotiating structures and modalities, and the coverage 
of what we are going to negotiate. I hope that is not too complex. None of us 
knows. I would have thought there will be a bit of a stand-off at the outset. 
They will say, “We think of this as primarily around divorce terms”. [ … ] 
I am sure we will say, “That is not an acceptable ambit for the negotiation, 
and we want to cover the future relationship. Unless you are looking at 
the future relationship at the same time, how on earth can you decide the 
divorce terms?”313
280. Even if the EU will agree to the UK’s proposal to negotiate a future agreement 
alongside the exit deal, Sir Ivan noted that this may not be possible within the two-year 
307 The Lancaster House Speech
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timeframe. Negotiating the EU–Canada CETA agreement, for example, took over seven 
years from the launch of talks to ratification. Asked how long a UK–EU FTA might take 
to conclude, he told us:
It obviously depends on the ambit of the FTA, and how wide you go, and 
how difficult it is—it will be much more difficult on financial services, 
because it is unprecedented, than it is on aviation, where the answer is fairly 
obvious and ought to be in everyone’s interest but it might be quite difficult 
to do it by a date, certainly, in October 2018. Then in some areas, what 
happens on energy or agriculture and phytosanitary, or competition law 
etc., is very hard to judge. You would have to open, as I say, like an accession 
process, chapters. [ … ] If your question is, could you in principle agree 
with them that by date certain there would have to be an agreement, and 
that is a definitive cut-off, you probably could. The question is, as ever for 
negotiators like me, what is the reality of that, or would you just reach that 
cut-off point and find you were not quite there and have to have another cut-
off point? How do you avoid that situation? How do you make it a definitive 
cut-off point that everybody does sign in blood? It is very hard to judge.
I think [ … ] we should not accept and do not have to accept that there is 
this stately round of FTA negotiations, and with the Americans we reached 
round 15 of TTIP—I assume it has now bitten the dust—and they were 
happening at a regular rhythm of about four or five a year. We would 
presumably be saying, “We do not have to do four or five a year. We could 
do two a month, and we get all our negotiators across all the sectors”. You 
have to be realistic; a lot of work emerges during a negotiation that you had 
never thought of before the negotiation, and then people have to go away 
and do their homework, and they have to consult their Ministers and their 
Commissioners, and they have to consult the 27, and it all takes longer than 
you think possible.314
281. Sir Ivan also noted, however, that the EU27 may be open to moving more quickly 
than would typically be the case in negotiating an FTA with a third country. He said:
They are, in principle, persuadable that an FTA with the UK is a good 
thing. They might regret that it was not a closer relationship than an FTA, 
but they would be up for negotiating an FTA. As to whether they are then 
persuadable that that can be done on your continuity and convergence 
argument and can all be done and dusted by October 2018, we can only 
see when it starts. That is not the doctrine in Brussels or in the key capitals 
I dealt with, but if you say, “Look, we are up for a really quick process. We 
start convergent; we are able to give you a very good account of where we 
shall remain convergent. We want a governance process for what happens 
when we cease to be convergent. We recognise your sovereignty such that 
in those areas where you argue we are not convergent enough there will 
be market-access consequences for us. You will have to accept that if that 
314 Q1125
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is what you choose to do to us, there will be market access consequences 
for you in return”. Your proposition, if you are the Prime Minister, will 
undoubtedly be, “We could all do this much more rapidly than you all say”.315
282. It appears clear that negotiations will have to take place in a timeline shorter 
than the two years provided for in Article 50 TEU. Michel Barnier has said that, once 
Article 50 is triggered, the UK would have just 18 months to negotiate its exit from the 
EU in order to give the EU institutions enough time to ratify the agreement within the 
two-year period afforded by Article 50. On both occasions he has given evidence to us, 
the Secretary of State has agreed with this timetable.
283. There is no precedent for the conclusion of a major, comprehensive bilateral or 
multilateral FTA covering goods and services within two years, although there is also 
no precedent for the negotiation of a major FTA between countries that are already 
convergent in legal and regulatory terms. It may be that starting from this position 
of convergence enables the terms of a future trade deal to be negotiated more quickly 
than comparable agreements such as CETA. It is not yet evident, however, that the two-
year timetable for achieving this is realistic.
A potential exit payment
284. The White Paper did not mention the possibility that the UK will pay an exit “fee” 
to the EU to cover what the EU sees as the UK’s outstanding financial liabilities under 
the current Multi-Annual Financial Framework. As the Foreign Affairs Committee 
recently noted, however, this is likely to be among the first issues on the table during the 
negotiations.316 It has been reported in the press that the Commission has indicated it will 
not begin negotiations on the future relationship until agreement is reached on the so-
called exit “fee”, which it apparently calculates at €50–60 billion.317
285. The Secretary of State told us:
The first thing to say is that this bill has not been presented. I have not seen 
any rationale behind it. I have seen the Financial Times’ surmised rationale, 
but we have not seen anything. The other thing I would just remind people 
of is that we are at the beginning of a negotiation. Positions will be taken in 
all of this. Our stance is pretty straightforward. We are a lawabiding nation. 
We believe in international systems of rules. We obey them, and we have 
rights and obligations. We will insist on one and meet the other. That is the 
first thing to say.318
286. The House of Lords European Union Committee recently concluded that “Article 50 
allows the UK to leave the EU without being liable for outstanding financial obligations 
under the EU budget and related financial instruments, unless a withdrawal agreement 
is concluded which resolves this issue”. The Committee said that it was “questionable” 
315 Q1108
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whether any international court could have jurisdiction in this case.319 However, the 
Secretary of State indicated to us that the Government has not yet reached a view on the 
extent, if any, of the UK’s legal obligations or on the formula it will use to calculate those 
obligations. He said that:
the House of Lords report on this was interesting, because it laid out the 
competing arguments quite well. From the Committee’s point of view, it is a 
very good starter in this exercise, but we do not recognise the numbers that 
you are talking about. [ … ] There is ongoing work on all of the legal aspects. 
The reason that I point you to the House of Lords report is that it makes 
clear that there is an interaction between these two things. At the end of the 
day, anybody who has been a Minister in the Council of Ministers knows 
that the European Union is about getting answers to solve the problems. 
It will be a problem solving/negotiated/legalbased outcome, and that is a 
woolly answer, but I suspect it will be a woolly exercise, at least in part.320
287. Sir Ivan Rogers told us that the question of UK liabilities would be a point of contention 
in the negotiations because of its implications for the EU budget. He said:
[The EU27] are all looking ahead to the next two years, thinking, “We have 
a hell of a budgetary negotiation coming up in 2019”. Now, as far as they are 
concerned, we have lobbed a grenade into the budgetary mess, because they 
now have to start examining whether their funds go around for the period 
up until 2020 now, rather than waiting until 2019. We all have a problem.321
288. He later added that:
it could get pretty bitter and twisted on money. Nothing gets more bitter 
and twisted than EU negotiations on money, and I have lived a few of them. 
Sometimes it can be over beans rather than large sums, and these are very 
large sums, if you were to believe the rhetoric from the other side.322
289. Negotiations around the UK’s outstanding and future financial liabilities to the 
EU will form a very important part of the negotiations which will need to consider 
liabilities, assets and, potentially, payments by the UK for continued participation in 
certain EU programmes. It will be essential also to ensure that discussions about money 
do not get in the way of simultaneous negotiations on the UK’s future relationship 
with the EU27.
A ‘no deal’ scenario
290. The White Paper stated:
We are confident that the UK and the EU can reach a positive deal on our 
future partnership, as this would be to the mutual benefit of both the UK 
and the EU, and we will approach the negotiations in this spirit. However, 
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the Government is clear that no deal for the UK is better than a bad deal 
for the UK. In any eventuality we will ensure that our economic and other 
functions can continue, including by passing legislation as necessary to 
mitigate the effects of failing to reach a deal.323
291. In evidence to this Committee, the Secretary of State said that the Government has 
not yet undertaken a study of the economic impact of leaving the EU without a deal in 
place. He told us that:
The Prime Minister said, in terms, that no deal is better than a bad deal. 
Why did she say that? She said that because, in the emotional aftermath of 
the referendum, there were lots of threats of punishment deals and all the 
rest of it. Let me be clear that we could manage this in such a way as to be 
better than a bad deal, and that is true. I cannot quantify it for you in detail 
yet. I may well be able to do so in about a year’s time, but it is certainly 
the case. Frankly, Mr Chairman, it is not as frightening as some people 
think, but it is not as simple as some people think. [ … ]It is not as good an 
outcome as a freetrade frictionfree open agreement, which is why we are 
trying for it.324
292. The Secretary of State also indicated, however, that some contingency planning for 
the possibility of leaving the EU without a deal in place was underway. He said:
In the event that we do not get that or that there is no conclusion, we will 
have a fairly extensive contingency plan, which is already under way, as I 
said to you. Whatever happens, we will have sharply improved access to the 
rest of the world, off the back of a large number of free trade agreements, 
which will be coming into effect shortly after we leave—or some of them 
will be. You do not have to have a piece of paper with a number on it to have 
an economic assessment. I spent most of my working life before I came into 
politics dealing in business; you often knew what was a good deal, even 
though you did not have the numbers.325
293. We note the Foreign Affairs Committee’s recent conclusion that a ‘no deal’ scenario 
“represents a very destructive outcome leading to mutually assured damage for the 
EU and the UK”. We share that view. It is, therefore, very important that both the 
UK and the EU avoid reaching the end of the two-year negotiating period without an 
agreement. The Government has talked about walking away from a bad deal, but has 
not yet explained what terms would be demonstrably worse for the UK than ‘no deal’. 
The Government should therefore conduct a thorough assessment of the economic, 
legal and other implications of leaving the EU at the end of the Article 50 period with 
‘no deal’ in place. This should be published. The public and Parliament have a right to 
the maximum possible information about the impact of the different future trading 
options being considered, including the possibility of no FTA being reached.
323 The White Paper para 12.3
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294. Without an economic assessment of ‘no deal’ having been done and without 
evidence that steps are being taken to mitigate what would be the damaging effect of 
such an outcome, the Government’s assertion that “no deal is better than a bad deal”, 
is unsubstantiated. Parliament must be in an informed position to decide whether a 
proposed deal is, in fact, better or worse than ‘no deal’.
Implementation phase
295. In our previous Report on the process for exiting the EU and the Government’s 
negotiating objectives, we concluded that “The Government must make clear from the 
outset that a period of adjustment to any change in trading arrangements or access to 
EU markets for UK service industries will be sought as part of the negotiations.”326 This 
reflected the views of several of our witnesses, who expressed concerns about the need 
to minimise disruption to trading relationships and complex supply chains in particular 
sectors.
296. Since then, the Government has indicated that it aims to put in place “a phased process 
of implementation, in which the UK, the EU institutions and Member States prepare 
for the new arrangements that will exist between us, will be in our mutual interest”.327 
According to the White Paper:
This will give businesses enough time to plan and prepare for those new 
arrangements. This might be about our immigration controls, customs 
systems or the way in which we cooperate on criminal and civil justice 
matters. Or it might be about the future legal and regulatory framework for 
business. For each issue, the time we need to phase in the new arrangements 
may differ; some might be introduced very quickly, some might take longer. 
And the interim arrangements we rely upon are likely to be a matter of 
negotiation. The UK will not, however, seek some form of unlimited 
transitional status. That would not be good for the UK and nor would it be 
good for the EU.328
297. Asked to explain the difference between “transitional arrangements” and the 
Government’s proposal for an “implementation period”, the Secretary of State told us:
What we do have around Europe among Member States is an understanding 
that we are going to need some time to put into effect whatever it is that we 
agree afterwards. Last time [I appeared before the Committee], I resisted 
being drawn on what that—I do not like “transition arrangements”—
implementation phase would be for a very simple reason. What the 
implementation phase needs to be is dependent on what the final outcome 
is—what the end structure is. If it is very similar to now, and arguably a 
comprehensive free trade agreement would be quite similar to the effect in 
terms of accessing the single market, then less transition is required. If it is 
a big difference, more transition is required.329
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298. Later, the Secretary of State elaborated further:
We have been talking to people about what they would want out of these 
things and it does vary. Every single person wants something different. That 
is part of the issue. This is why I say that what we need to do is first work 
out what the end state will be and then work out whether there is a need, 
whether there is a disruptive effect of some sort in the change, and whether 
there is a need to allow people to accommodate to that. That is one part of it. 
When I talk about the implementation stage or implementation phase, it is 
the Government implementation. It may also be corporate implementation 
as well. We may need to think this through. Bear in mind again, as I keep 
reiterating to the Committee—the Committee quite reasonably asked me 
for hard answers—that starting a negotiation is sometimes hard to do. It 
will be on both sides’ interest to make sure that there is a smooth and orderly 
transition to the new state, and we will try to do that on an industry-by-
industry basis, if need be.330
299. As the Government has suggested, the extent of disruption caused by leaving the 
EU is likely to vary across sectors, depending on the terms of the final withdrawal 
agreement. In some areas, adjustments are likely to be minimal. Where changes 
in trading arrangements or market access may be more substantial, however, the 
Government should seek to establish frameworks for implementation phases as early 
as possible in the negotiation process. It should communicate the terms of those 
agreements promptly and clearly to businesses and the public, in order to ensure 
adequate time for planning.
330 Q1399
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Annex 1: Note of meetings in 
Wolverhampton, 19 January 2017
Introductory meeting with local councillors and LEP
Prof Ian Oakes Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
Prof Andy Westwood Director of University Observatory
Cllr John Reynolds Cabinet Member for City Economy, Wolverhampton City Council
Stewart Towe Chair of the Black County LEP
John Wood Chair of Economic Growth Board
Dr Keren Jones Service Director City Economy, Wolverhampton City Council
Tim Johnson Strategic Director, Wolverhampton City Council
The LEP presented the area’s 30-year economic growth plan, which began in 2003. Roughly 
half way through the plan and the city is on track to meet its growth targets, particularly 
in infrastructure. One of the biggest challenges Wolverhampton faces is the skill levels in 
the city. Wolverhampton has double the national average of people with no qualifications. 
It also has the fourth highest proportion of young people in all LEP areas. As such the LEP 
is investing in bringing young people into the workforce. There is a mismatch between 
the investment in the city and the low levels of skills and employment. EU funding has 
increasingly been targeting socio-economic factors and worklessness.
The key issues for Wolverhampton from Brexit were set out as:
• loss of significant EU resources to help deliver economic priorities and stimulate 
other investment
• Impact on foreign direct investment
• Implications for future international trade and business
• Impact of any future labour controls on key economic factors.
• The main asks for Wolverhampton for the Brexit negotiations were identified as:
• ensuring government has the capacity and expertise not just to deal with Brexit 
but other key agendas
• Ensuring a replacement regional assistance programme reflecting the specific 
scale of the challenge and opportunity in the city and across the Black Country
• Ensuring tangible support for local businesses—especially SMEs—to navigate 
and thrive in a post-Brexit trading environment
• More investment in activity to explore the trade and investment potential of 
other non-EU markets
• Ensure priority of the order of trade negotiations reflects critical sectors and 
markets
• Recognition of criticality of foreign owned businesses (EU and non-EU) to 
operate flexibly across the EU
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It was noted that Brexit had already impacted foreign direct investment in the city. The 
example was given of a manufacturing company which had decided to invest in Holland 
rather than Wolverhampton in the wake of the referendum result. In spite of this, it was 
suggested that the business community welcomed the challenge of Brexit, that it was their 
responsibility to react to changes in circumstances and make it work.
In responding to questions, it was noted that EU funding had targeted worklessness and 
low skills in the city which required longer-term investment. There were concerns that 
UK Government funding tended to work on shorter time-frames. It was also suggested 
that Brexit was an opportunity to free up funding and make it more flexible, so it would 
not be as prescriptive as European funding has been, for example in terms of the size of 
companies. Rather UK funding could be channelled through LEPs who understand local 
needs and opportunities.
It was argued that through greater devolution, decisions on funding could be made locally 
on key priorities such as transport, energy, employability and an education system to 
reflect local economic needs. EU funding was described as limited in compartmentalising 
funding into either business or education for example, while Wolverhampton would like 
to link these two sectors.
A good outcome from the negotiations was identified as a level-playing field, with a free 
trade agreement and no tariffs. The significance of non-tariff barriers depended on the 
business, for example, they are very important for the automotive sector. Less regulation 
was also listed as a positive. Currency fluctuations were described as key for manufacturers, 
while being out of the customs union would be a bad outcome. Control over immigration 
was needed while still allowing the UK to access skills. Time to adjust to the deal the UK 
reaches with the EU would be vital, the example was given of 12 months.
Roundtable with university staff and students
Prof Ian Oakes Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
Prof Nazira Karodia Dean of the Faculty of Science and Engineering
Prof Andy Westwood Director of University Observatory
Prof John Darling Dean of Research
Derek Walton Head of the International Centre
Ray Flynn Policy Adviser to the Vice-Chancellor
Simon Brandwood Head of Careers and Employment Services
Habiba Amjad Students’ Union President
Sohaib Farooqui Home student
Joshua Sutliff Home student
Aaron Green Home Student
Iman Hussain EU student
Mark Anderson EU student
Wai Lok Ng International student
Lianne Brooks Regional Officer, Unison
Tatiana Panteli European Business and Research Development Manager 
(Brussels via telephone)
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Prof Oakes provided an introduction to the University, drawing the meeting’s attention to 
the fact that 75% of home students came from a 25 mile radius, while the university was 
also global, attracting students from over 100 countries with around 1,000 EU students. 
EU funding had contributed to the development of the Science Park, which housed 80 
businesses, and the Innovation Centre, home to 40 businesses. Within 12 years, the 
University expected to have in excess of 150 businesses located on campus. The University 
had seen a growth in research, including world-leading research.
When asked about research income, the University confirmed that disruption had so 
far been minimal but that was likely to change following the triggering of Article 50. 
Wolverhampton had focused on research into local factors, such as deprived communities, 
and cuts in this research could create difficulties in addressing such local problems. 
There were concerns about the focus of future research funding if allocated by Research 
Councils. It was also suggested that the loss of EU research funding would also impact 
on the attractiveness of the UK for talent, particularly staff. It was recommended that the 
Government seek to maintain research funding and access to research networks across 
Europe.
The Erasmus programme was considered vital for providing students with opportunities. 
It was noted that last summer, the University sent 200 students to Europe with Erasmus 
and that 98–99% of students with international experience found employment within 6 
months of graduating.
Students were particularly concerned about the loss of Erasmus. The Committee heard 
that European experience made students more employable in the UK and students with 
international placements tended to get a better class of degree. There were worries about 
employment opportunities for graduates once the UK left the EU and any obstacles that 
would create for finding work and living in the EU. It was suggested that Brexit had created 
a “cloud of uncertainty” around opportunities and experiences, as well as fees. However, 
like every UK university, Wolverhampton took in far more students under Erasmus than 
it sent out – the appetite for English taught degrees in the rest of Europe was immense and 
was likely to continue.
In terms of applications for places at the University, applications from EU students had 
fallen a little but the University had acted quickly to guarantee fee levels for those starting 
in September 2017. The University would not be able to make such guarantees for students 
beginning in September 2018. It was noted that students were thinking twice about 
pursuing Masters or PhDs in Wolverhampton since the referendum. Students also found 
the prospect of visa applications daunting. Some were concerned about employment 
opportunities owing to headlines that employers were poised to cut graduate training 
schemes. There were questions around the future of internships and knowledge exchanges 
with Institutions in the EU.
It was explained that lower numbers of students at the University could have knock-on 
effects for the wider area with lower numbers of staff. Often universities are the biggest 
employer in their area, not just of teaching staff but also administration, cleaning staff 
etc. A drop in University students and staff would impact local businesses such as shops 
and bars. It was noted that unemployment is already a concern in the West Midlands. 
The importance of maintaining European employment law, such as flexible working and 
equalities legislation, were also highlighted.
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At least 89 out of 230 staff at the University are EU Nationals. They are sitting tight at the 
moment but would welcome “more knowns than unknowns”. The University had set up an 
EU Futures Group to provide advice and support to staff. In terms of a future immigration 
system, the University would like continuing access for international postgraduates, 
research staff and highly-skilled grades. It was suggested that the Government should 
adopt a fairly light-touch approach. At present, the bureaucratic difficulties of bringing in 
non-EU talent were considered very burdensome for the University and for individuals. It 
was argued that such difficulties could make people go elsewhere where they could get a 
similar service for less effort.
In Brussels, the University had noticed an initial tension with partners after the referendum 
result but that had returned to positive communication. It was suggested that European 
partners were looking to the UK for solutions and were sympathetic to the situation. 
The University is fortunate in having a small presence in Brussels and can meet partners 
face-to-face and participate actively at an EU level. However, many were concerned about 
the uncertainty once Article 50 is triggered. For example, when Switzerland limited 
movement of people, the country lost access to Horizon 2020. Even if the UK were able to 
provide funding for research nationally, it would not have the same level of international 
recognition or peer review. The University had benefitted from Horizon 2020 funding, 
and also structural funding in developing facilities and engaging with businesses. This 
is a key part of the institution’s strategic plan so they need some certainty on where the 
funding will come from once the UK leaves the EU. The University asked for the same level 
of funding but with more flexibility than is usually the case with government funding.
Roundtable with local businesses
Prof Ian Oakes Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
David Danger MD of UTC Aerospace Systems and Chair of Employment and 
Skills Board
Jeremy Vanes Chair of the Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust
Peter Comforth Director of Retail, Benson and Elliot
Sam Hudman Senior Project Manager, Carillion
John Wood Chair of Economic Growth Board
Corin Crane CEO, Black Country Chamber of Commerce
Phil Barnett Chair of Governors, Wolverhampton Grand Theatre
Sham Sharman Owner, Zuri Coffee and Chair of Wolverhampton Business 
Forum
Ninder Johal President, Black Country Chamber of Commerce
Keith Harrison Editor, Express and Star
Cllr John Reynolds Cabinet Member for City Economy, City of Wolverhampton 
Council
Marc Fleetham Director of Business Solutions, University of Wolverhampton
Stephanie Peacock GMB Union
Rachel Eade MBE Director, RED Ltd.
James Martin Partner at CCW Recovery Solutions / Crowe Clark Whitehill LLP
Paul Cadman Business Consultant to Manufacturing Sector, Stone Tile
Ian Timmings MD, JH Lavender Ltd
Darren Peach Commercial Director, JH Lavender Ltd
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The main theme to arise from this discussion was the need for clarity. There were questions 
about whether there would be a sectoral approach, what would happen to businesses 
which rely on EU nationals, what would replace European Regional Development 
Funding, would there be tariffs and the impact on parts crossing borders, what regulatory 
frameworks would there be, and would the UK be able to influence the regulations which 
affect businesses here.
The Committee heard that businesses would be able to adapt to any changes arising 
out of Brexit, but that they needed time to prepare and adjust, for example, in terms of 
administration, resources, skills and getting their products here. There were calls for a 
transitional period during which support could be provided to businesses for working 
with changed systems, new paperwork, and to improve capacity. It was agreed that 6 – 12 
months would be long enough for businesses to adjust.
The biggest gap in information was identified as tariffs and customs. They said it was difficult 
to get good quality data on what tariffs will look like and that the flow of information 
from Government agencies to businesses needs to improve. It was described as a need 
for the “education of businesses” for a different way of working. For big businesses who 
are already well-versed in the paperwork that comes with tariffs and customs, the most 
pressing concern is delays at the border. This could be addressed with a more streamlined 
process such as an approval mark if companies meet certain criteria.
It was recognised that there was a need in Wolverhampton and the West Midlands for 
highly-skilled staff and that any new immigration system needed to be flexible to respond 
to changing needs in future. It was noted that where the UK can’t grow its own talent, 
then businesses become hostages to agencies. This is particularly evident in the NHS, for 
which it would take years to train up a local workforce. It was suggested that, while the 
Government can’t control currencies, it can control talent and skills and should secure 
access to the right people.
Businesses called for small, flexible funding programmes through which skills gaps could 
be identified and workers retrained, for example, for haulage drivers. It was noted that 
Wolverhampton had a low level of skills but not a low level of vacancies. There was no 
evidence that EU workers were taking British jobs. It was suggested that those who are 
out of the jobs market were now further from it than ever. This was not a Brexit issue, 
but Brexit has highlighted it. Wolverhampton would have to improve skills in the town 
and local area. The suggestion was made that funding be allocated through LEPs who 
understand local issues and needs.
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Annex 2: Note of meeting in Stoke-on-
Trent, 19 January 2017
Roundtable with local businesses
Stephen Dixon Managing Director of Johnson Tiles and British Ceramics 
Confederation (BCC) President
Paul Farmer Managing Director of Wade Ceramics Ltd., President of 
Staffordshire Chambers of Commerce and BCC member
Karl Woodcock Managing Director of Unifrax Ltd (UK) and Saffil Ltd and BCC 
Board Member
Jon Cameron Group Finance Director for Steelite International Ltd and BCC 
Member
Philip Ray Group Company Secretary for Steelite International Ltd and BCC 
Member
Andrew McDermott BCC Technical Director
Tom Reynolds BCC Policy Manager




Head of Public Affairs, Michelin
Sarah Robinson Principal, Stoke College
Members heard how the farming industry had changed the Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
(SAW) system had been in place. Polytunnels have helped local farms extend the soft fruit 
production up to nine months. Consequently, the number of months a year they needed 
labour had grown. Fruit farmer paid over £7 an hour, which could be improved depending 
on the productivity, but they found it difficult to recruit local workers. The businesses 
would not be viable without access to EU workers.
Other employers said factories in Stoke offered £8–£9 an hour and could not recruit local 
labour. Immigrants, some over qualified, had shown a willingness to take the jobs. They 
now were looking for better jobs.
Participants discussed how the Common Energy Market and EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) could be improved. It was suggested that Brexit was an opportunity for 
the manner in which climate change targets can be met. Members heard that incentives 
for hitting targets must change. There need to be more positive incentives to invest in 
energy efficient and low carbon technologies, for example through the tax code. As an 
energy-intensive sector, it was noted that the ceramics sector was already becoming more 
energy efficient in order to reduce bills. They complained that they were being penalised 
for this under the EU ETS scheme, while Climate Change Agreements were more effective 
at delivering climate ambition, whilst preserving competitiveness.
Ceramics industry is a high energy user. They wanted secure and affordable access to 
electricity and gas from the continent, and to know if the UK would still be involved in 
the single energy market. They did have the ear of Government on energy through the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 
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It was noted that 14% of business in Stoke-on-Trent export, compared to a national average 
of 11%. Members of the Staffordshire Chambers of Commerce are buoyant and positive 
about Brexit as few are exporters. 
However, for the ceramics sector a large proportion of stock is exported, with 50% of 
exports sold in the EU. Therefore a UK–EU FTA is vital for those businesses. The ceramics 
sector’s second largest export market is the US, where manufacturing in ceramics is 
very small and therefore an FTA with the US would be welcomed. Members heard that 
the article 50 discussions would need to secure transition arrangements for certain EU 
measures, such as anti-dumping, to maintain a level-playing field with China.
Businesses wanted clarity over if the UK would remain in the customs union as soon 
as possible, so they could plan for the possible tariff rates and the extra administration. 
Uncertainty about possibility of delays at the border, especially for time sensitive products, 
and asked if UK ports had the capacity to process more items needing checks. Big 
businesses would have IT systems to help them manage, SMEs would need more help. The 
bigger the changes from the status quo, the more need for a transition period.
Johnsons Tiles told the Committee that the single biggest change since the referendum 
had been the fall in the value of the pound, which had led to rises in domestic costs. 
It was noted that they had had to delay purchasing new equipment as a result. SMEs 
had raised concerns about currency fluctuations and the difficulty of managing unstable 
prices. Many SMEs did not see themselves as exporters but they inputted to a supply chain 
that led to an exporter.
Michelin facility exported millions of tyres a year, 90% to non UK market, including 80% 
to Europe. Also imported several million tyres for sale in UK market. Barriers either way 
which increased costs or delays would be difficult. Further, while they had three sites in 
the UK, they had 30 sites across Europe so they had options where to produce tyres and 
investment tended to go to competitive sites.
The Chambers of Commerce said they were exploring how EU structural funding had 
been used in the region, so they could make the case for what replaces it. 
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Annex 3: Note of meetings in London, 26 
January 2017
Tech/Digital sector Roundtable at Google Campus
The Committee was given a short tour of the Google facility in Shoreditch, which provides 
space for tech entrepreneurs to meet, use co-working or event space, meet mentors, and 
learn about how to access finance and commercialise ventures.
The Committee then held a roundtable discussion around the opportunities and risks 
from Brexit with a range of businesses, including multi-nationals and start-ups, organised 
with TechUK.
Risks and opportunities
The Single Digital Market was a work in progress and progress had been slow. Tariff 
barriers were considered of a lower priority as tariffs on IT goods were already low. 
Concerns were raised about non-tariff barriers developing in the event of the UK leaving 
the single market, and consequent regulatory divergence. Trading on WTO terms would 
be considered less of an issue. Clearly a dominant strength of London was the eco-system 
that brought people from Fintech and Venture Capital networks together. A portion 
of the venture capital that fed into London’s tech economy had come via the European 
Investment Fund.
The main two concerns raised were access to talent and data flows.
Access to talent
There was an acceptance that free movement as it currently operates would end. The 
replacement system needed to be open to talent, but there was a fear this would be 
incompatible with an immigration system designed to meet a numerical target. One 
company recounted a four month experience of trying to secure a visa for employing non-
EEA nationals. An estimated 25% of the tech workforce are EU nationals, and similarly an 
estimated 25% of the tech workforce in Europe are UK nationals. Deterring international 
talent would affect the attractiveness of the sector. Much of the growth in employment in 
the tech sector had been driven by non-UK born workers.
The tech/digital sector was expanding and it needed to be able to source talented people. 
The domestic skills pipeline needs to grow, but there is a time lag and tech talent pipeline 
needs to be maintained. This was not just the technical specialists, one large company 
pointed out they employed lots of EU nationals in whole range of roles within the operation. 
Start-ups do not have HR departments. They are less able to manage complicated 
immigration processes. Other barriers, such as delays in shipping goods, are much more 
difficult for small operations to absorb.
97 The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
Legal basis for data flows
This was described as a red line for the sector. Current data protection measures in the 
UK are considered ‘adequate’. The EU Commission have the power to decide if such 
systems are adequate once the UK leaves the EU. Business wanted confirmation of the 
Government’s approach in advance of leaving the EU to maintain business certainty.
An adequacy decision allows personal data to flow from the EU (and EEA countries) to 
a third country without further safeguards. This is important to enable the import and 
export of data. It is possible for third countries to receive an adequacy decision, and Israel 
was given as an example.
There would be implications if the UK did not have a data adequacy decision. There are 
risks that businesses in all sectors of the UK economy would not be able to rely upon 
international data flows between the UK and the EU. The UKs competitiveness would 
diminish and may affect the attractiveness of the UK as a destination for investment. 
While some large, international firms may be able to adapt—there are alternatives but 
they involve considerable burdens on business—but it is less likely to be unworkable to 
SMEs, and this would have repercussions in areas such as Fintech.
A free trade agreement between the UK and the EU should secure ability to move data 
across borders. The UK has strength in services and, generally, services are not covered 
well by FTAs. There is a risk that data protection authorities in Member States may not 
consider the economic aspects of the UK not getting a data adequacy agreement. There 
would also be a risk of a legal challenge from privacy advocates who do not like UK 
legislation on privacy. US and EU have different approaches to privacy, and managing this 
can create complexity.
Bilateral relationships outside the EU require more work in advance to ensure privacy 
regulators in both jurisdictions are content. The Digital Single Market aims to reduce 
the need for lots of bilateral negotiations. However, development of the DSM has been 
ponderous.
Creative Industries roundtable at the Museum of London
The Committee had a roundtable discussion with a range of public and private sector 
organisations and businesses involved in the creative industries, hosted by the Creative 
Industries Federation.
Many creative sectors in the UK seen as a success story. Film industry record level of 
exports and globally competitive. Cultural exports seen as valuable soft power to be used 
in negotiations with any third country. There are lots of areas where the UK drives creative 
partnerships in Europe so positive feeling the EU will want the UK to be involved in the 
future. Question was raised how we would manage if regulation diverged from EU. There 
should not be a presumption of the status quo, change could be an improvement and there 
were opportunities, e.g. to own UK consumer regulation.
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Access to talent and freedom of movement
It was acknowledged that the UK has skills gaps and needs to improve training of domestic 
talent. It takes time to train and gain experience, so in a post free movement UK, sector 
wants a flexible immigration system to enable access to talent with creative and STEM 
skills. Some sectors, such as computer games, have up to 30% non-UK workers. In some 
sectors, diversity and different perspectives seen as an asset, e.g. having international staff 
helps access international markets. Some parts of the industry are global and compete 
in a global pool for talent. It is difficult to get a replacement opera singer at short notice. 
One aspect of free movement that came up in several contexts was the ability of UK staff 
to move around the EU, such as for UK orchestras to tour, UK staff to escort valuable 
museum artefacts abroad, and for situations where a UK based international film crew 
can easily go to different locations across Europe. (One comment was that it was unusual 
to choose to film in the US because the visas and red tape made it too difficult.) It also 
enabled staff to come to the UK to work on short high profile events, such as London 
Fashion Week. A new immigration system needed to be able to facilitate that fluidity of 
movement, or competing European cities—such as Paris and Berlin—will benefit. There 
is a lack of coordination between Government departments—Home Office appear to stop 
some high profile arts or sports people used to demonstrate the immigration system is 
serious.
IP and copyright
Important to be able to protect IP in the UK and in Europe. Projects without IP protection 
tend to have low margins, while projects which retain the IP have higher margins. 
Copyright and IP protection was mentioned in reference to several different sectors, from 
broadcasting to design, and IP protection needed to be included in any trade deal with 
emerging markets. The creative industries rely upon data flows between the UK and EU, 
and require a decision on the UK’s data adequacy from the EU. Data protection rules in 
the UK may have to be kept in line with the EU to access the single market.
Access to single market
AVMS Directive. Audio Visual sector the licence to broadcast in other countries from the 
UK is attractive. License holders want to be able to broadcast into the EU from the UK. 
Fearful if UK outside single market, then international broadcasters may not choose UK 
as a base, or will not choose it in the future. Many high standard drama productions for 
television are too expensive for a single broadcaster. Many are co-productions and London 
is a centre of skills and facilities. Free movement has helped London grow as a centre, and 
to enable international staff to move around locations. Single market has enabled UK 
publishing to be the bridge between the US and the EU. UK publishing understood the EU 
market better, and shared a common language with the US. Leaving the EU could help if 
it enabled the UK to reduce VAT on books.
99 The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
Tourism and culture
Many visitors come to the UK for cultural experience—e.g. music festivals, theatre, 
sporting events. A multilingual workforce is important in hospitality sectors. ERDF had 
helped some regions to develop cultural industries. Eg artist traditions in St Ives and the 
Tate.
Education 
There was considerable discontent with the education curriculum, the lack of 
understanding and support for creative education. International students are important, 
bringing different ideas and skills, and also money. There was a fear that if Government 
did not understand the creative sector very well then it would be ill equipped to argue 
its corner in the negotiations. There was support for the UK’s continued involvement in 
transnational funding and academic cooperation, such as Horizon 2020.
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Annex 4: Note of meetings in Boston, 
Lincolnshire, 2 February 2017
Introductory meeting
Phil Drury Chief Executive, Boston Borough Council (BBC) 
Cllr Peter Bedford Leader, Boston Borough Council
Cllr Paul Gleeson Labour Group Leader, Boston Borough Council
Cllr James Edwards UKIP Group Leader, Boston Borough Council
Cllr Alison Austin Chair of Planning Committee, Boston Borough 
Council
Ruth Carver Lincolnshire LEP Manager
Rebecca Clark External Funding Manager, Boston College
Superintendent Paul Timmins Lincolnshire Police
Justin Brown Enterprise Commissioner, Lincolnshire County Council
Darryl Dixon Director of Strategy, Gangmasters Licensing Authority
The Committee heard that Boston had changed dramatically since 1998, when 
Portuguese migrants came as seasonal agricultural workers. The Committee heard that 
the concentration of young migrants in a small town meant that changes were felt more 
acutely.
The most striking impact of immigration in Boston has been the growth of homes of 
multiple occupiers (HMO), a unique aspect of which was “hot bedding”. Hot bedding 
had led to the local phenomenon of large groups of migrants drinking in the streets while 
they waited for their turn to have a bed. It was noted that the majority of EU migrants 
were 18–30 year olds living and working abroad for the first time and acting as 18–30 year 
olds do when away from home, but in quiet residential streets. The Committee was told 
that the local authority needed government funding to tackle the HMO and hot bedding 
phenomenon.
The rise in migration into Boston had been so rapid (a 400% increase in EU migrants 
between 2004 and 2014) that demand for accommodation significantly outstripped supply. 
HMOs expanded overnight, turning two-bed terraced houses into accommodation 
for 10 people. The rent that landlords made on HMOs put those houses out of reach of 
local people. There is no law to register HMOs so the authorities were unclear about the 
exact number of such accommodation in the town and also found it difficult to manage 
landlords. The example was given that when the town was flooded in 2013, it took nearly 
six months to find all the landlords, one of whom was registered in the Virgin Islands. 
The local authority had explored the option of a licensing scheme for landlords, similar to 
Newham, but they did not have enough evidence to meet the legal test.
The Committee heard that migrants represented cheap labour and that gangmasters were 
able to lower what workers receive without breaching the minimum wage by arranging 
transport to the fields which workers must take and pay for, even without the guarantee 
of work once they arrive. It was noted that the authorities do have the power to revoke 
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licences if gangmasters do not meet standards, but had difficulties in getting evidence as 
workers are afraid of losing their jobs. There is a very low rate of unionisation amongst 
migrant workers.
The meeting then discussed the importance of migrant workers to the local economy. 
The Committee heard that there is an insufficient number of local workers able to meet 
demand in some parts of the local economy. Agriculture and food production and 
processing sectors use a lot, sometimes over 50 per cent, of migrant labour. Technology and 
robotics were highlighted as a means to increase productivity, but it would take time for 
such developments to have an impact. There was a need to improve skills training locally. 
It was noted that at present France and Germany use four times as much technology 
and robotics in manufacturing and food processing than the UK. This would require 
significant investment. The skills shortages locally had also led Lincolnshire County 
Council to recruit social workers from abroad, including from outside the EU.
The Committee were told that many of the challenges the town had faced as a result of the 
rapid increase in EU migrants to the town was due to the shortage of local resources to 
cope with the population increase. The police in particular had had to deal with increased 
pressures. The key issues for the police had been with migrants unable to go to their 
accommodation until a certain time which had led to street drinking, young people with 
nowhere to go, large groups hanging around and talking in foreign languages, which some 
parts of the community had found intimidating. Alcohol was a big issue, with a correlation 
between alcohol and other offences such as assaults and drink driving. Police had had to 
adapt their approach to policing the night-time economy from employing interpreting 
services to dealing with increased demand on custody services with reducing resources. 
For example, the police were spending £440,000 a year extra on interpreting services. As 
an indication of the difficulties in understanding the number of EU migrants in the town, 
the meeting noted that the number of Central and Eastern European (CEE) migrants 
passing through custody was higher than the estimated CEE population. Government 
funding is linked to population data which the local authority cannot reliably provide. 
The police, as with other public services, were lacking the tools and resources to deal with 
extra pressures, for example Public Protection Orders were limited to designated areas 
and difficult to enforce.
The Committee also heard about pressures on the health service, particularly on A&E as 
migrants were often not registered with a GP.
Discussion then moved to the shortages of skilled local labour in Boston. The Committee 
heard that low wages coupled with high rents discouraged British workers. While young 
people would go to university and not return.
The meeting concluded noting that attacking the drivers of problems in the town would 
mean attacking the exploitation of migrants in housing and employment which had 
caused low wages, high rents, and groups of young people with nowhere to go in the 
streets and street drinking.
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Roundtable with local businesses
Clive Gibbon Economic Development Manager, Boston Borough Council
Mark Tinsley Chair of Greater Lincolnshire LEP Food Board
Keith Gott Regional Chair, Federation of Small Businesses
Simon Beardsley Chief Executive, Lincolnshire Chamber of Commerce
Gordon Corner Regional Director NFU East Midlands 
Mark Newton MD, Freshtime Ltd.
John Richmond Owner, Freshtime Ltd.
Phil Ball UK Operations Director, MetsaWood (UK) Ltd.
Phil Parker Product Development Manager, Pilgrim Foodservice Ltd
Rachel Gedney HR Manager, T H Clements
David Earnshaw MD, Parkinson Harness Technology
Darryl Dixon Director of Strategy, Gangmasters Licensing Authority
Ian Turvey Turners Distribution
Andy Woods Turners Distribution
The most pressing concern for businesses represented at the roundtable was the availability 
of labour. It was noted that EU migrants were not just transient workers, but some had 
been there for over 10 years. They make up over 50% of workers at all levels in the food 
industry and on the transport side as HGV drivers. For one business for which two thirds 
of the workforce are foreign workers, 90% of those who stay are from Central and Eastern 
Europe. The participants challenged the perception that EU migrants were taking British 
jobs, as businesses were recruiting using agencies in Lincolnshire. 
Concerns were raised about the difficulties in finding labour locally and what would happen 
to migrant workers at the cut-off date. For agriculture, there was the suggestion of a SAW 
scheme, but workers were now needed 11 months of the year. They also mentioned the 
need to invest in automation in agriculture, an area which both the LEP and Lincolnshire 
University were looking at. It was suggested that the ready supply of labour had meant 
effort had not been made in automation.
The Committee heard from some participants about the importance of agency labour and 
from others about “rogue agencies”— a problem which they believed was greater than the 
GLA were aware of. Businesses complained about paying more tax as “rogue agencies” 
were cheating the system. They said that they were able to recruit 45% of their workforce 
locally and as such suggested that the local workforce is there. However, too many “rogue 
agencies” were bringing in cheap labour.
The Committee were told about efforts to improve skills locally and establish links with 
schools. Again participants talked about local young people going to University and not 
returning to Boston. It was also noted that Boston is isolated geographically with poor 
infrastructure, and as such it was not a town workers could commute to. Participants 
were concerned about a culture in the UK, and particularly in schools, which meant 
that children did not think farming and manufacturing were important industries, and 
that they had to aspire to greater things. It was difficult to attract young people to these 
industries, and it was difficult to attract people to Boston.
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Participants suggested there was a disconnect between the local Brexit vote and the needs 
of local businesses. The Committee was told that immigration was actually driving the 
economy, but this was not a popular message with the local population.
Another sector which was identified as facing challenges if access to EU migrants was 
restricted was the health sector. It was noted that there was an aging population in the 
area and 1 in 5 care workers currently come from outside the UK.
Manufacturers also expressed concerns with leaving the Single Market and Customs 
Union and would have to adapt their supply chain and incur the costs of delays at customs.
Outreach event in local community
Table Notes
Why did Boston vote to leave the European Union by such a large margin?
Attendees felt there were a variety of reasons to explain Boston’s vote to leave the EU. Some 
felt that that the decision was a protest vote against Westminster and central government. 
Many suggested that Lincolnshire had been forgotten by Westminster. One attendee 
raised the view that the population was in fact bigger than the census suggested, as there 
was a contrast between the census numbers and those registering with local GPs.
The general consensus amongst the group was there was not enough funding in the local 
area which then translated, in real terms, to an enormous pressure on local services, for 
example doctors’ appointments and local school places. Additionally, across Lincolnshire 
transport infrastructure has not been improved, with no dual carriageways and poor rail 
links to London. Attendees felt that Lincolnshire had “dropped off the end of the world”. 
One attendee expressed the view that there was a feeling within the local area that if 
Boston voted to leave the EU workers would leave. The increase in workers from Europe 
has resulted in changes to the local area – such as shops and languages being spoken. 
Some attendees suggested that these cultural differences were found to be quite shocking 
by local people. One attendee did highlight that unemployment in the local area is fairly 
minimal but that the job market offered a high proportion of low income jobs. Some 
attendees suggested that public perception played a key role in explaining why Boston 
voted in such large numbers to leave the EU. For instance, many people hold the view that 
EU citizens who move to the area get benefits that they are not able to get which is not 
based in fact. Other attendees expressed the view that a common sentiment in the local 
area was that EU workers get some form of special treatment. Some attendees believed 
that Europe and EU workers were the easiest to blame for problems within the local area 
but this was not in fact the full picture.
How should migration be controlled once we leave the EU?
Some attendees were quite keen to suggest that the emphasis should be on understanding 
migration into the UK, rather than controlling it directly with limits based on numbers, 
for instance. At the moment, there is little to no data on public health and housing users 
which could help to inform policy. One attendee asked whether it is actually possible to put 
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controls on immigration when there is a demand for employment – could immigration be 
self-controlling? In recent months, the local area has seen a decrease in people interested 
in moving into the area for work as the demand for labour has decreased.
One attendee highlighted that many of the people working in manual, unskilled jobs in 
the area from the EU are highly educated. Currently, one flaw with the system that all 
attendees agreed on was the reluctance in the UK to read across qualifications. There was 
also the feeling that for many EU workers to the UK, English posed a barrier to changing 
employment. Attendees suggested that English lessons be offered. Therefore, attendees felt 
that there needed to be a way of harnessing the expertise and knowledge already available.
The current structure of obtaining work is transient with very little guarantee of work 
on a daily basis. Attendees raised concerns that it would be very difficult to encourage 
people to do this work if visas were required. Some kind of “seasonal workers scheme” was 
suggested to manage numbers and ensure that there were enough people to do the work 
required (as informed by employers).
What are the risks and opportunities of Brexit for Boston?
Opportunities:
In 2015, Boston was accepted into the Hanseatic League which provides opportunities for 
local business to develop, increase tourism and trade connections with fifteen countries 
and 187 cities across Europe. Currently, the port of Boston is used for importing steel and 
wood. Attendees suggested that historically Boston has a strong connection with trade 
(“the Stump was built on wool”) and that, with improvements to infrastructure, Boston 
could increase its trading capacity.
A further opportunity for Boston is to clarify where Boston residents sit with regards to 
their legal rights and benefits with fact rather than based on hearsay and perceptions. 
Additionally, EU citizens living in Boston require greater certainty regarding their legal 
position in the UK.
Attendees felt that understanding cultural differences were extremely important, 
particularly in schools as this would be a great way of encouraging community growth. 
Currently, Lincolnshire County Council run an “understanding your community” 
programme in schools but this has a small reach. Attendees suggested that this could be 
given additional funding and extended so that more school children have the opportunity 
to discuss their community, who lives there and engage with each other. The general 
consensus across the table was that Brexit posed a good opportunity to disseminate 
information to assist all members of the local community, particularly at the local level.
Risks:
Attendees felt that Brexit reinforces the feeling of “us and them” within the local 
community. For some, they also suggested that the vote and the aftermath of the vote 
created a feeling of alienation within community groups. Attendees also suggested that 
there were significant value differences between parents and children from EU countries 
who had settled in Boston which had also created pressures within the local area and 
which could be heightened by Brexit.
105 The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
A very tangible risk was felt to be the decrease in workforce. Attendees were worried that 
there might not be help to re-establish trading blocs in local areas. Additionally, attendees 
were also worried that changes would be made at central government level and would 
have very little practical effect on their daily lives.
Attendees also said that there might be discrepancies with reported hate crimes versus 
what was actually taking place. Many in the group who had interacted with people from 
European countries had found that they had a negative impression of the police (stemming 
from their experiences with the police in other countries) which then meant they were 
reluctant to report any incidents to the police in Boston.
Group Feedback Discussions
Top Issues & Recommendations
• Too many people too quickly
• Swamped
• Local services let us down
• Public drinking
• Housing
• Schools and languages
• British identity 
• People feel threatened
• Need imported labour
• “East coast” effect – need skills
• Business risk to the area
• Ignored by Westminster
• Lack of money to deal with issues
• Level of English and jobs to come to
• Criminal record checks and accommodation
• Opportunity: more jobs for local people
• Tackle homelessness by migrants coming to fixed-hour jobs
• Why? Protest
• Supply and demand will do its own job
• Opportunities – look at schools and children
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• Risks – people who voted to leave want to see change
• People felt ‘unnerved’ by people speaking foreign languages
• Risk – problem with attracting skilled workers here
• If can’t fund NHS when we’re in the EU, how can we after we left?
• Opportunity – America for trade
• Disconnect between Boston, Westminster and Brussels
• Wrong to shutdown debate about immigration
• Remain campaign ignored Boston
• Migration is very important
• Concerns about labour market e.g. job ads in Polish
• Illegal migration – concern
• Boston should be celebrated – opportunity to bring community together
• Risk – losing workforce, young people don’t see Boston as a place to build careers
• Need to invest in infrastructure
• Lincoln is the problem
• Vote – failure of all levels of government to listen to basic needs of local 
population, on everything from housing to gang masters and adequate school 
places.
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Annex 5: Note of meetings in Truro, 
Cornwall, 9 February 2017
Introductory meeting with local council and LEP
Councillor John Pollard Leader of Cornwall Council
Kate Kennally Chief Executive of Cornwall Council and Chair of the CIOS 
Futures Group,
Mark Duddridge Chair of the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly (CIOS) LEP
The Committee were presented with background on Cornwall and its economy, noting in 
particular that Cornwall was still recovering from historical declines in its industrial base, 
most significantly in extractives and china clay. As a result, the population was suffering 
from intergenerational disadvantage, particularly in terms of fuel poverty and a high 
economically inactive population. The local authority also faced the additional costs of 
maintaining the coastline. Members were told that Cornwall’s story was about “building 
foundations from a low starting point.”
The Committee heard that Cornwall’s key strength lies in minerals and energy. Although 
only 0.002% of the world’s land mass, over 90% of the world’s minerals by type are found 
in Cornwall. The Committee were told about recent discoveries of lithium in Cornwall, 
the biggest source in Europe. Cornwall had also begun work in geothermal and two 
applications have been received for EU funding for test sites for geothermal. At present, 
40% of energy needs in Cornwall are met through renewable sources and there is the 
potential for Cornwall to become 100% self-sufficient. The most pressing obstacle to this is 
infrastructure as Cornwall can’t presently get all the energy it produces into the National 
Grid. So far, investments in energy have been through EU funding.
The Committee also heard that Cornwall is investing in aspiration through Falmouth 
University, and improvements in social care and schools. Cornwall’s population is skewed 
towards those of retirement age, as many leave the area at 18 and don’t return until 40. 
However, through investment in homes, better paid jobs and the university they are 
hoping to keep more people in Cornwall and balance the population profile of the area.
By virtue of Cornwall’s dispersed population, Members were told that businesses tended 
to be small (84.2% of which are micro enterprises). Employment levels are rising but 
Cornwall continues to be a low wage economy (earnings 77% of national average at £17,873) 
and productivity is the lowest of all LEP areas. EU funding had significantly improved the 
digital connectivity of Cornwall, with superfast broadband aiding the development of the 
second fastest software development hub in the UK.
Members were told that Cornwall’s competitive advantage lay in digital, agri-technology, 
marine technology, low carbon and renewable energy and space and aerospace. It was 
noted that the fishing industry were a small but vocal part of the local economy.
In the wake of the referendum, the Council began work to look at Brexit. On 15 July, 
they held a Brexit summit to understand what was on residents’ minds. The Bishop of 
Truro attended the summit to consider societal issues, particularly as there had been a 
spike in hate crime following the Brexit vote. The Futures Group was established at the 
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summit to look at the risks and opportunities of Brexit. A key area of work has been on 
EU funding, with £633m of funding at risk from leaving the EU. It was suggested that the 
results of EU funding had not been publicised enough. It was also noted that Cornwall 
was determined to move away from dependence on structural funding and that Brexit 
could be an opportunity to influence future economic policy for the regions. 
The Committee also heard about Cornwall’s devolution deal and efforts to maintain the 
momentum of devolution following the referendum.
Roundtable with local businesses
Mike Carr MD, Pendennis Shipyard Limited
Ross Williams CEO, Creative Kernow
Julian Cowans Superfast Cornwall
Paul Trebilcock Chief Executive, Cornish Fish Producers Organisation
Ruth Huxley Managing Director, Cornwall Food and Drink
David Walrond College Principal, Truro and Penwith College
Prof Geoff Smith Senior Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Falmouth University
Helen Childs Interim Chief Operating Officer, NHS Kernow
Paul Massey Director, Bluefruit Software
Ben Gowers Director, BG Renewables
Helen Coley Regional Organiser (Cornwall), GMB Union
The main concern raised by participants was recruitment if the UK limits freedom of 
movement of EU workers. Recruiting non-EU staff was described as “too burdensome”. 
One participant told Members about hiring a worker from India who had had to return 
during the project while a mistake in his paperwork—stating his job title was a developer 
rather than a programmer—was corrected. 
Businesses did talk about “growing their own” pipeline of staff and working with 
educational institutions on building skills, but that this would require significant 
investment and would take time. Some with highly-skilled workforces had invested in 
training and apprenticeships but still needed EU workers to fill gaps. For lower-skilled 
jobs, businesses said they needed EU workers to do the jobs which the local workforce 
were not prepared to do. It was noted that Cornwall could suffer in terms of productivity 
and skills without access to EU workers. Members also heard that Cornwall relied heavily 
on EU funding for skills.
Educational institutions were concerned about their EU staff and students and asked for 
a simplified visa scheme. They said that “talent” should be taken out of net migration 
debate.
The fishing industry said that Brexit was an opportunity for home-grown talent and would 
create a more “economically buoyant” industry. It was suggested that fishing was part of 
the “social fabric of Cornwall” and needed a better deal than they had had as a member 
of the EU. It was noted that 77% of fish caught in UK EEZ is caught by non-UK fleets and 
the reestablishment of a 12 mile limit would be achievable and would give UK fishermen 
a “fairer share” of fishing opportunities.
109 The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper 
Members heard that investment in superfast broadband and in Falmouth University 
had led to more people staying in Cornwall. It was noted that superfast broadband had 
benefitted from EU structural funding and that the digital agenda for Europe was more 
ambitious than UK plans, raising concerns about further funding once the UK leaves the 
EU. However, it was mentioned that outside of the EU, the UK would no longer be bound 
by state aid rules.
Renewables was described as an emerging sector in Cornwall which has benefitted from 
EU funding. That industry now needed certainty in terms of energy policy in order 
to secure investment. Low carbon energy was identified as important to Cornwall but 
developments in that area had stalled due to a lack of grid capacity. If they could secure 
investment, Cornwall could be a leader in energy storage.
Brexit was considered an opportunity for the region to tackle its weaknesses such as low 
pay and skills.
Uncertainty, particularly around what a free trade agreement with the EU would look like 
and how long it would take to agree, was affecting business and investment decisions. It 
was suggested that “uncertainty is almost as bad as what the outcome may be”. There were 
concerns that the UK had become non-inclusive, which had created a certain amount of 
unease. While others said that prejudices were colouring how realistic people were about 
opportunities and that uncertainty was being used as an excuse to avoid dealing with 
different questions around Brexit.
Opportunities to address procurement law and tendering were raised by a number of 
sectors, for example in the health service and in energy. Members were told that the UK 
imported too much energy from Europe, especially off-shore wind. It was noted that 
some countries had subsidised their energy sector and were benefitting from that. It was 
suggested that Cornwall could be a “beacon” for the UK by becoming self-sufficient on 
a mix of low-carbon and energy storage. The Committee also heard that there would 
be opportunities for small and micro businesses, as the UK would need to address its 
unintended bias towards big business. The nature of investment could also be looked at, 
as Members were told, at present investment focussed on capital expenditure, while the 
area would benefit from revenue.
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Annex 6: Note of meetings in Dublin, 
Republic of Ireland, 23 February 2017
We held four informal meetings on our visit to Dublin: with members of the Oireachtas 
Committees for Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and Implementation of the Good 
Friday Agreement; business representatives; Frances Fitzgerald, Tánaiste and Minister for 
Justice and Equalities, and Dara Murphy, Minister of State for European Affairs and Data 
Protection and officials; and with Michael Creed, Minister for Agriculture, Food and the 
Marine and officials.
During these meetings we heard views about the potential impact on Ireland of the UK 
exiting the EU, and about the importance of maintaining the close connections between 
Ireland and Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. The main concerns we heard related 
to possible consequences for trade, possible impacts on the peace process in Northern 
Ireland and the importance of maintaining the Common Travel Area (CTA).
Ireland is a committed member of the EU, but it has a close relationship with the UK and 
has particular concerns, such as membership of the CTA and the Northern Ireland peace 
process, which require engagement with the UK and which it wishes to protect. Brexit is 
seen by many in Ireland as the biggest economic challenge for a long time. We were told 
that Ireland has good communications with the UK Government and with the European 
Commission, and that Michel Barnier understands Irish concerns about Brexit.
Some of the comments made by people we met were:
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) is something to be proud of, but it is 
still a process and not a finished product. It followed 30 years of traumatic 
events and the peace must not be disrupted.
The EU has a good understanding of the implications of Brexit for the 
peace process. The UK and Ireland must work together to identify possible 
solutions, although a bilateral agreement between the UK and Ireland is 
unlikely to be acceptable to the EU Commission.
Ireland is committed to the EU, but wants to keep strong business and 
trading links with the UK as far as possible, and wants the UK to have a 
good relationship with EU.
Ireland and Northern Ireland both benefit from the lack of a border but 
there are conflicting messages coming from the UK Government. Ireland 
believes that the EU will require customs checks at the border and there 
may also need to be checks on the movement of people. But border posts 
could act as a lightning rod for dissidents: if there are border posts and 
physical controls, they will become targets.
A hard Brexit will risk trade and jobs in Ireland. It will need serious political 
will between the UK and Ireland to ensure productive bilateral discussions. 
Even customs checks on the border could have serious effects. Ireland is not 
optimistic about the future need for customs checks given that it will have 
EU obligations to protect the border with a third country. Even the least 
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intrusive measures using technology look politically unacceptable and like 
the re-emergence of a hard border. There is no obvious technical solution 
which is politically acceptable.
A strong economy and prosperity for people living in Ireland is an important 
factor for continued stability. The ability to cross the border freely has helped 
to increase employment levels. Some business sectors such as agriculture 
are vital to the economy but are dependent on quick and easy movement of 
goods across the border. For example, the milk and farm economies in the 
island of Ireland are so intertwined they cannot be unravelled.
Agriculture is an all-Ireland sector of the economy which relies on a seamless 
cross border operation. Any impediments will put jobs at risk. If the UK 
were to revert to WTO terms both the UK and Irish markets would suffer. 
It would be a problem especially for the agri-food sector which would have 
a major concentration of high tariffs and also a range of non-tariff controls. 
UK consumers are used to existing agriculture product standards and this 
could be undermined if the UK started trading with countries with less 
rigorous standards. It would be very helpful for Ireland to be an indication 
as to whether the UK might choose to maintain its existing environmental 
and carbon footprint standards.
Ireland and the UK currently have good opportunities for regular contact 
at EU meetings and this forum will need to be replaced to maintain strong 
links between the Irish and Westminster Parliaments.
There is great interest in Brexit in Ireland, and a lot of work is already 
being done in Cabinet Committees and in each government department 
examining potential implications for Ireland. All areas are being examined, 
but the broad priorities for the Irish government are the economy, trade and 
agriculture (because of the amount of cross border trade); implications for 
the GFA, given that its status is protected by international treaty; and the 
CTA.
North–south policing arrangements have never been better; there is 
currently strong cooperation and very good relations and data sharing in 
an international European context, and that must continue.
The CTA is very important to Ireland. Citizen entitlements and reciprocal 
rights are very important, and Ireland would be very concerned if any 
changes were made. It would be in Ireland’s interests to see progress on 
maintaining the CTA early on in the negotiation process.
Interim arrangements will be required to continue cooperation on justice issues such as 
tackling terrorism and organised crime. When the UK leaves the jurisdiction of the CJEU, 
it will have a huge impact on a range of issues. Putting in place a new relationship between 
the UK and EU will be a long and complicated process and it needs to be orderly. It will 
take many years to replace all the necessary instruments. Having a cliff edge is the other 
option, in which case both Ireland and the UK might be glad of interim arrangements.
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Annex 7: Note of meeting in Swansea, 2 
March 2017
Cara Aitchison Cardiff Metropolitan University
Steven Altmann-Richer CBI
Dr Jane Davidson Pro-Vice Chancellor University of Wales, Trinity St David
David Davies Axiom
Stephen James NFU Wales
Andy Jones Milford Haven Port Authority
Tony Kelly CBI Communications
Tiernan Kenny CBI
Liz Maher Centurion Vat
John Mercer NFU Wales
Tracy North Outwrite PR
Mike Plaut Northmace and CBI Wales Chair
Ian Price Director, CBI Wales
Kieron Singleton SPTS
Philip Wallace TWI
The meeting opened with attendees each highlighting a key issue or priority for their 
business when the UK leaves the EU. Some issues were raised by more than one business, 
and included the following:
The need for continued unfettered tariff and barrier free access to EU markets;
The ability to continue to recruit EU migrant labour for those businesses which need to do 
so. Also important is the free movement of labour throughout the EU to enable businesses 
to make the best use of skills in different offices throughout the EU;
When EU funding is no longer available, universities will need help to bridge the funding 
gap in the short term and to target other funding sources;
Opportunities to re-shape regulations might help make the UK more competitive in terms 
of inward investment;
If there are to be any technical changes to VAT, then there must be sufficient time for 
businesses to plan for them;
Wales will be particularly affected by the loss of EU funding. It will need either continued 
participation in European programmes of UK funding to replace EU structural funds. 
Any replacement for EU funding should not come through Barnet formula funding, but 
must be focused on areas of need;
Customers are worried about potential future difficulties around customs clearance, 
rather than tariffs;
There will be opportunities for new trade agreements with Europe and Asia and these will 
need to be accompanied by an ability to deploy staff around the world;
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Businesses want to be able to reassure those EU migrant workers already in the UK that 
they can stay;
Businesses would like more information from Government about the UK’s negotiating 
objectives, and the Government’s industrial strategy;
Businesses are concerned about the risk of no deal being reached with the EU and a risk 
of cliff edges for different sectors if there is no UK–EU deal.
The group then had a discussion about a number of issues including whether transitional 
arrangements might be required; the opportunities and risks that might arise from new 
trade deals and new markets; the potential implications for businesses of a new UK 
immigration policy; and the impact of a hard border with the Republic of Ireland. Key 
points made in the discussion included:
Concerns about whether there really was scope to develop new trade agreements with 
other countries, and what help would be available to help businesses identify new markets;
The potential to develop new UK agriculture policies which are fit for UK farming and 
support the whole farm economy. However, threats to Welsh agriculture include very high 
tariffs which could decimate the Welsh sheep industry, as could imports of New Zealand 
lamb or South American beef;
Universities in Wales have a high level of connectivity with industry, including the food 
and drink industry and rely on funding from the EU to a greater extent than in England 
and Scotland.
The free movement of workers around Europe for training and career development is 
important. Also many high quality research staff are from overseas. It is very difficult 
to attract UK researchers and it would be very serious to lose EU staff. There are many 
examples of Welsh businesses which rely on EU workers.
Many vessels cross the Irish Sea with freight, and there is also regular ferry traffic. If there 
were to be a hard border with Ireland there is no infrastructure or capacity in small Welsh 
towns to deal with the inevitable delays of freight traffic.
Roughly half of Wales’ trade is with the EU. If the UK were to trade with the EU on WTO 
terms there would be a return of tariffs which are high in some sectors like cars and 
agriculture. Non-tariff barriers would be even more of a problem. Margins are so tight, 
even small tariffs are a problem.
The ERASMUS programme has been very successful—about 500 students a year from 
Wales have participated. There is a good correlation between participation in the scheme 
and future career success which in turn boosts the Welsh economy.
Business is where the help and energy is needed to help generate wealth in Wales. There 
are many SMEs in Wales and they need a replacement for EU funding to support them to 
grow and increase capacity.
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Formal Minutes 
Wednesday 29 March 2017
Members present:

















Draft Report (The Government’s negotiating objectives: the White Paper), proposed by the 
Chair, brought up and read.


















Question accordingly agreed to.
Paragraphs 1 to 32 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 33 read.
Amendment proposed, at end, to insert
“Due to the impact on devolved areas of competence, the endorsement of the National 
Assembly of Wales, Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly should be 
sought.”—(Jonathan Edwards)
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Paragraphs 34 to 69 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 70 read.
Amendment proposed, at end, to insert
“The Committee is disappointed that the Prime Minister has failed to uphold her promise 
only to proceed following UK-wide agreement.”—(Jonathan Edwards)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Committee divided.

















Mr John Whittingdale 
Question accordingly negatived.
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraphs 71 to 292 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 293 read. 
Motion made, and Question put, That the paragraph stand part of the Report. 



















Paragraph accordingly agreed to.
Paragraph 294 read.
Motion made, and Question put, That the paragraph stand part of the Report.




















Paragraph accordingly agreed to.
Paragraphs 295 to 299 read and agreed to.
Annexes agreed to.




















Question accordingly agreed to.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).
[Adjourned till Wednesday 19 April at 9.00 am
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
Wednesday 16 November 2016 Question number
Professor Catherine Barnard, Professor of European Union Law, University 
of Cambridge, Sir Simon Fraser, former Permanent Secretary, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, and Dr Hannah White, Director of Research, 
Institute for Government Q1–64
Wednesday 23 November 2016
Dr Robin Niblett, Director, Chatham House, Stephen Booth, Acting Director, 
Open Europe, Shanker Singham, Director of Economic Policy and Prosperity 
Studies, Legatum Institute Q65–123
Wednesday 30 November 2016
Dr Virginia Acha, Executive Director for Research, Medical & Innovation 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), Gary Campkin, 
Director for Policy and Strategy, TheCityUK, and Fergus McReynolds, 
Director of EU Affairs, EEF, The Manufacturers’ Organisation Q124–236
Wednesday 7 December 2016
Carolyn Fairbairn, Director General, Confederation of British Industry; 
Frances O’Grady, General Secretary, Trades Union Congress; and John 
Longworth, Co-Chair, Leave Means Leave, and former Director General, 
British Chambers of Commerce Q237–345
Thursday 8 December 2016
Richard Baker, Head of Policy and Strategy, North East Local Enterprise 
Partnership, John Elliott, MBE, DL, Executive Chairman of Ebac and 
representative of Business for Britain in the north east, Ross Smith, Director 
of Policy at North East England Chamber of Commerce, and Councillor Paul 
Watson, Leader of Sunderland City Council Q346–402
Wednesday 14 December 2016
Rt Hon. David Davis MP, Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union Q403–526
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Wednesday 19 December 2016
Professor Michael Keating, Chair in Scottish Politics, University of 
Aberdeen, Andrew Walker, Managing Partner, Johnston Carmichael, 
Deirdre Michie, Chief Executive, Oil and Gas UK, and Suzanne Burr, Business 
Manager, Thorpe Molloy Recruitment Q527–554
Michael Bates, Development Officer, Scottish Seafood Association, Bertie 
Armstrong, Chief Executive Officer, Scottish Fishermen’s Federation, and 
Andrew Scott, Chief Executive Officer, Scotrenewables Q555–598
Wednesday 18 January 2017
Anne-Laure Donskoy, Co-Chair, the3million, Barbara Drozdowicz, Chief 
Executive Officer, East European Resource Centre, Nicolas Hatton, Co-Chair, 
the3million, and Florina Tudose, Information and Outreach Co-ordinator, 
East European Resource Centre Q599–642
Christopher Chantrey, resident of France, Gareth Horsfall, resident of Italy, 
Debbie Williams, resident of Belgium, and Sue Wilson, resident of Spain Q643–703
Wednesday 25 January 2017
The Hon. Dr Joseph Garcia MP, Deputy Chief Minister of Gibraltar; Michael 
Llamas QC, Attorney General of Gibraltar; and the Hon. Fabian Picardo QC 
MP, Chief Minister of Gibraltar Q704–754
Wednesday 1 February 2017
David Goodhart, Head of the Demography, Immigration, and Integration 
Unit, Policy Exchange, Sunder Katwala, Director, British Future, and 
Jonathan Portes, Professor of Economics and Public Policy, King’s College 
London Q755–815
Wednesday 8 February 2017
Michael Clancy, Director Law Reform, Law Society of Scotland, Professor 
Nicola McEwen, Professor of Politics, University of Edinburgh, and Professor 
Alan Page, Professor of Public Law, University of Dundee Q816–870
Michael Russell MSP, Minister for UK Negotiations on Scotland’s Place 
in Europe, Scottish Government, Ian Mitchell, Deputy Director External 
Affairs, Scottish Government, and George Burgess, Deputy Director EU and 
International Trade and Investment Policy, Scottish Government Q871–963
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Thursday 9 February 2017
Councillor John Pollard, Leader, Cornwall Council, Kate Kennally, Chief 
Executive, Cornwall Council, and Chair, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Futures 
Group, Mark Duddridge, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Enterprise 
Partnership, and Kim Conchie, Chief Executive, Cornwall Chamber of 
Commerce Q964–976
David Rodda MBE, Rural Delivery Manager, Cornwall Development 
Company, Patrick Aubrey-Fletcher, County Adviser for Cornwall, National 
Farmers Union, Dr Laurence Couldrick, Board Member, Cornwall and 
Isles of Scilly Local Nature Partnership, and Nicola Lloyd, Head of Inward 
Investment, Invest in Cornwall Q977–1002
Tuesday 21 February 2017
Roderick Abbott, Senior Adviser on Trade Policy, European Centre for 
International Political Economy, Dr Federico Ortino, The Dickson Poon 
School of Law, King’s College London, and Professor Jim Rollo, UK Trade 
Policy Observatory, University of Sussex Q1003–1058
Wednesday 22 February 2017
Sir Ivan Rogers, Former UK Permanent Representative to the EU Q1059–1135
Tuesday 28 February 2017
David Anderson QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David 
Armond, Deputy Director General, National Crime Agency, and Professor 
Steve Peers, University of Essex Q1136–1232
Thursday 2 March 2017
Professor Roger Scully, Professor of Political Science, Wales Governance 
Centre, Cardiff University, Dr Jo Hunt, Reader in Law, Wales Governance 
Centre, Cardiff University, and Dr Rachel Minto, Research Associate, Wales 
Governance Centre, Cardiff University Q1233–1253
Professor Brian Morgan, Professor of Entrepreneurship, Cardiff 
Metropolitan University, Professor Iwan Davies, Professor of Law and 
Senior Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Swansea University, and Steve Thomas CBE, 
Chief Executive, Welsh Local Government Association Q1254–1273
Tuesday 7 March 2017
Mark Drakeford AM, Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Local Government, 
Welsh Government, Piers Bisson, Deputy Director, European Transition, 
Welsh Government, and Andrew Slade,  Director, Agriculture, Food and 
Marine Group, Welsh Government Q1274–1314
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Tuesday 14 March 2017
Rt Hon Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London Q1315–1370
Wednesday 15 March 2017
Rt Hon David Davis, Secretary of State for the Department for Exiting the 
European Union, and Olly Robbins, Permanent Secretary, Department for 
Exiting the EU Q1371–1503
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Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
OBJ numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 ADS Group (OBJ0093)
2 Age Platform Europe UK (OBJ0150)
3 Agriculture & Horticulture Development Board (OBJ0002)
4 Aila Baron (OBJ0131)
5 Airlines UK (OBJ0161)
6 Airport Operators Association (OBJ0105)
7 Alan Gillman (OBJ0153)
8 Alan Hill (OBJ0018)
9 Alice Chapman-Hatchett (OBJ0067)
10 Alison Gibbs (OBJ0043)








19 Association of British Insurers (OBJ0094)
20 Brexit Infrastructure Group (OBJ0079)
21 Brightwake Ltd (OBJ0065)
22 British Ceramic Confederation (OBJ0164)
23 British Heart Foundation (OBJ0120)
24 British Hospitality Association (OBJ0152)
25 British Medical Association (OBJ0103)
26 British Screen Advisory Council (OBJ0074)
27 British Summer Fruits Ltd (OBJ0159)
28 BritishAmerican Business (OBJ0162)
29 Brits in Europe (OBJ0089)
30 Brits in Europe (OBJ0136)
31 Campaign for the Real Referendum (OBJ0004)
32 CBI (OBJ0129)
33 CITB (OBJ0168)
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34 Clare Quarman (OBJ0027)
35 Clive Loughlin (OBJ0007)
36 Commercial Broadcasters Association (OBJ0154)
37 Confederation of British Industry (OBJ0172)
38 CPMR North Sea Commission (OBJ0113)
39 David Doyle (OBJ0003)
40 DBA – The Barge Association (OBJ0151)
41 DKT Consultants Ltd (OBJ0026)
42 Dr David W Lawlor (OBJ0157)
43 Dr Gary Skinner (OBJ0009)
44 Dr James Briscoe (OBJ0083)
45 Dr Monica Threlfall (OBJ0122)
46 Dr Philippa Allen (OBJ0024)
47 Dr Sophie Acton (OBJ0063)
48 Dr Sylvia de Mars (OBJ0119)
49 Dr Theodore Gorton (OBJ0012)
50 Eamonn Phillipson (OBJ0158)
51 Endocrine Society (OBJ0163)
52 Expat Citizen Rights in EU (ECREU) (OBJ0091)
53 Fair Deal for Expats (OBJ0141)
54 Federation of Entertainment Unions (OBJ0115)
55 Free Movement Policy Team (OBJ0137)
56 Frontline Business Consulting Ltd (OBJ0060)
57 Government of Anguilla (OBJ0173)
58 Greater London Authority (OBJ0090)
59 Greener UK (OBJ0095)
60 Hanzo Archives Limited (OBJ0080)
61 HM Government of Gibraltar (OBJ0082)
62 Institute for Particle Physics Phenomenology (OBJ0070)
63 Institute of Export & International Trade (OBJ0087)
64 International Consortium of British Pensioners (OBJ0126)
65 John Frake (OBJ0021)
66 John Lee Daniel Thompson (OBJ0025)
67 Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (OBJ0167)
68 Kenneth Bardsley (OBJ0028)
69 Larkfleet Homes (OBJ0108)
70 Later Life Ambitions (OBJ0128)
71 Law Society of Scotland (OBJ0143)
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72 Martin Cahn (OBJ0008)
73 Matthew Traves (OBJ0046)
74 MillionPlus (OBJ0005)
75 Monique Hawkins (OBJ0144)
76 Mr Anthony Tuffin (OBJ0042)
77 Mr Barry White (OBJ0047)
78 Mr Edward Avis (OBJ0073)
79 Mr Fawzi Ibrahim (OBJ0106)
80 Mr Gary Rimmer (OBJ0032)
81 Mr Jason Hunter (OBJ0058)
82 Mr John Coats (OBJ0051)
83 Mr Lawrence Gould (OBJ0057)
84 Mr Lorenzo Colo (OBJ0071)
85 Mr Martin Houston (OBJ0015)
86 Mr Michael James Clifton (OBJ0078)
87 Mr Michael Meehan (OBJ0013)
88 Mr Nick Valentine (OBJ0068)
89 Mr Oliver Rowland (OBJ0160)
90 Mr Paul Bailey (OBJ0037)
91 Mr Paul Narraway (OBJ0155)
92 Mr Peter Sturdgess (OBJ0010)
93 Mr Rabie Abdel Samad (OBJ0127)
94 Mr Richard Szmidt (OBJ0055)
95 Mr Ryan Curtis (OBJ0029)
96 Mr SHR Redburn (OBJ0056)
97 Mr Stephen Noreiko (OBJ0020)
98 Mr Steve Cheney (OBJ0006)
99 Mr Thibault Jamme (OBJ0031)
100 Mr Thomas Cole (OBJ0077)
101 Mr Titus Alexander (OBJ0104)
102 Mrs Ann Rattle (OBJ0121)
103 Mrs Elizabeth Roberts (OBJ0034)
104 Mrs Jenefer Ford-Knubley (OBJ0049)
105 Mrs Susan Wilson (OBJ0117)
106 Mrs Valerie Chaplin (OBJ0019)
107 Ms Alison Giraud-Saunders (OBJ0064)
108 Ms Angela Steatham (OBJ0011)
109 Ms Anne Wesemann (OBJ0123)
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110 Ms Elizabeth Smith (OBJ0054)
111 Ms Emma Telford (OBJ0041)
112 Ms Keziah Mee (OBJ0059)
113 Ms Polly Ernest (OBJ0038)
114 New Europeans (OBJ0125)
115 NFU Scotland (OBJ0107)
116 Open Britain (OBJ0142)
117 Professor and FRS Michael Lockwwod (OBJ0022)
118 Professor Derrick Wyatt (OBJ0086)
119 Professor Louise Locock (OBJ0040)
120 Professor, QC Derrick Wyatt (OBJ0084)
121 Research Councils UK (OBJ0092)
122 Richard Bronk (OBJ0048)
123 RIFT – Remain in France Together (OBJ0124)
124 Roger Fuller (OBJ0066)
125 Royal College of Nursing (OBJ0112)
126 Royal College of Physicians (OBJ0001)
127 Royal Society of Chemistry (OBJ0097)
128 Sabine Klapdohr (OBJ0132)
129 Sara Challoner (OBJ0023)
130 Simon Ferrigno (OBJ0052)
131 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) (OBJ0098)
132 Stehen McCann (OBJ0016)
133 Stephanie Cunningham (OBJ0072)
134 Sue Craig (OBJ0017)
135 Suzanne Taylor (OBJ0061)
136 Tate & Lyle Sugars Ltd (OBJ0088)
137 The Academy of Medical Sciences (OBJ0139)
138 The British Academy (OBJ0111)
139 The Investment Association (OBJ0110)




144 Tyndall Centre (University of East Anglia) (OBJ0085)
145 UCL (OBJ0101)
146 UK CEE Mediation Consultancy (OBJ0140)
147 UK Independence Party (OBJ0102)
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148 UK Interactive Entertainment (Ukie) (OBJ0109)
149 UK Trade Policy Observatory (OBJ0149)
150 UKHCA (OBJ0130)
151 Unite the Union (OBJ0099)
152 Valpak Limited (OBJ0170)
153 Which? (OBJ0114)
154 William Carpenter (OBJ0075)
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